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THE SELF, THE NATION AND THE WORLD:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS
OF ISRAELI PRE-ADULTS
TOWARD THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
for the degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Field of Education

BY

LYA DYM ROSENBLUM
Evanston, Illinois

June, 1973

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My return to the academic world owes much to long discussions with Professor Eliezer Krumbain, who supported and encouraged me to challenge the barriers of academia. Once again inside the hallowed halls, I was fortunate to experience the intellectual stimulation of the minds of Professors Victor G. Rosenblum, David A. Minar, Lee F. Anderson, John R. Lee, and others.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Politics and education have long been recognized as interrelated processes essential for an understanding of the socio-political history of mankind. For Plato the relationship between education, or civic training, and the health, indeed the viability, of the polity was crucial. His analysis of this relationship may be read not only as "the finest treatise on education that was ever written"¹ but as perhaps the earliest extant treatise on the subject of political socialization.

Both democratic and totalitarian systems in recent times have given this concern high priority. Hitler's preoccupation with political indoctrination was directed toward achieving his 1000-year goal. Beginning at a point well before conception and concentrating on childhood as the crucial period, it continued throughout the life cycle of the individual. In the USSR, specifying and creating the ideal conditions for political training of the citizen from early childhood together with training of the parent as surrogate agent for government were given high priority by the Communist Party. Ideological statements concerning the relationship of childhood training and adult political behavior and citizenship were articulated and developed by Makarenko,² and their implementation has been discussed by Bronfenbrenner and others.³

Yet civic or citizenship training has been no less important to democratic systems. In the United States, public education early became associated with education for "good" citizenship and studies show all

fifty states with some requirements for citizenship training in public schools.⁴ More recently and dramatically we have seen efforts of new nations to build or rebuild a sense of national identity and community. For most this is viewed as a prerequisite for political development and modernization.⁵

As a sub-specialty of political science, the field of political socialization has experienced tremendous growth in little more than a decade, leading to a virtual explosion of output. Growth has not necessarily meant maturity, and a survey of the literature indicates the breadth of theoretical and atheoretical concerns which have contributed to this development. If man is the beginning and end of politics, then man, it was felt, is as appropriate a unit of analysis for a study of political life as is the political system. This conviction was reinforced by the behavioral approach which pervaded all the social sciences, particularly since World War II.

The rationale for focusing on man and political learning as crucial in understanding political life was supported by findings in other areas of social science and, in fact, these multi-disciplinary origins of the field have shaped its present orientation. The term socialization itself is derived from the field of psychology and the meaning acquired in that context has shaped its application to socio-political theory. It is reflected in the widespread approach to studies of political socialization as problems in integrating individual development with societal goals.

Social anthropology, with its emphasis on culture and personality, has focused attention on cultural determinants of individual development. Thus Levine warns--and his warning is of particular relevance for the immediate concerns of this research--that to focus exclusively on

political or pre-political structures will lead to failure in understanding differences in political behavior within governments or countries which appear structurally similar.⁶ A third source of theoretical interest is reflected in the psychoanalytic approach with its focus on the development process. The insights of psychoanalysis have provided a rationale for the view that the child is the father of the (political) man and that a study of the child may lead to increased understanding of political actors.

The breadth of theoretical concerns which has stimulated questions relative to the origins, development, and impact of man as a political being on the existence and functioning of the political system is evident in the eclectic nature of the literature in the field. The same literature offers ample evidence that a multitude of questions have been asked and studied without benefit of a guiding theoretical framework. Yet both types of studies have yielded valuable and suggestive data and methodological tools.

In the past few years, attempts have been made to introduce some formal order into the almost limitless variety of approaches with which studies of political socialization were undertaken. The most ambitious attempt to develop a paradigm in Kuhn's terms was the effort by David Easton to construct a political theory of political socialization. In Children in the Political System, he and Jack Dennis propose to the community of scholars a set of models and theories which will set the parameters of the discipline and determine the permissible problems for scholarly investigation.⁷ Easton and Dennis focus attention on the central issue of the development of support for the political system in childhood. Their express concern is with avoiding the bias which they see pervasive in most of the socialization literature, a bias toward viewing

political socialization as a mechanism for maintaining stability. As has been pointed out by a variety of critics,⁸ the authors do not succeed in avoiding the pitfalls, and the proposed shift of emphasis from systems maintenance to systems persistence does little to free the political socialization process from its umbilical ties with socialization research.

It is significant that, in all surveys of political socialization research covering more than a decade of prolific output by its practitioners, one fact stands out. Most of the research reported has dealt with a single system. In fact, most of it has been done in the context of the American political system. The meager literature on comparative studies has compared processes of political socialization within political systems.⁹

Yet an observer viewing the political life of man in the second half of this century must note two complementary trends: the increasing interrelatedness of political systems and processes on a global level; and the increasing involvement of the individual in overlapping areas of political life.

It would appear that perhaps a less ambitious approach to theory building is indicated, which may yet prove to have broader explanatory power. A political theory of political socialization must deal with the reality of man's political relationships with various systems at various levels. With man as the common denominator, such a theory should provide models for understanding these multiple relationships which each individual may have. It should further provide models for understanding the effect of these multiple relationships on both man and the political system. Utilizing a systems approach, I propose to focus on the outcome of the political socialization process and to arrive at a theoretical

statement concerning the political socialization process and the totality of the political self.

Inkeles states that "although socialization is one of the most important mechanisms giving society stability and continuity, it may also serve as a major vehicle for change. Some individuals, indeed whole segments of populations, may be socialized to play the role of creative, innovative, change-inducing catalysts."¹⁰ This definition applied to the process of political socialization will increase its relevance to the concerns central to this research. It may also provide a means for investigating new facets of old problems.

The growth of the political arena within which each individual may function and within which he may increasingly be both object and possessor of political influence has become the subject of a significant area of research. In a recently published volume edited by Herbert Kelman,¹¹ the common concern of the contributing scholars is defined as one focusing on the human dimension of international relations. They are concerned with

. . . the ways in which individuals relate themselves to their own nation and other nations, to the international system as a whole, to problems of foreign policy, and of the broader issues of war and peace; and with the study of actual interactions between individuals across boundaries.

An awareness of this broadened scope of the political life of all individuals informs the thrust of the present research. It grows out of the conviction that we are living in what can be described as an emerging world-wide, socio-political system which is analytically comparable to other levels of human social organization. Indicators of this emergence of a global society are such factors as a rapidly developing world-wide system of human interaction, an expanding network of cross-national organizations and institutions, an expanding homogeneity

of culture, increasing similarity in mankind's social institutions and an internationalization of social problems.¹²

This view of an emerging global society sees intra-national and international political systems as cases within a population of analytically comparable systems, in which individuals participate and through which such human values as wealth, power, health, enlightenment and respect are created and allocated among members of the human species.¹³ It leads to a concern with politically relevant socialization as one of the functional processes common to both the national and international systems.

A cross-system approach to political socialization has not been widely employed. Partly this is due to the fact that political socialization has only recently emerged as a new field of specialization in political science and research in the area has just begun to yield an empirically based understanding of the childhood acquisition of politically relevant concepts, values, expectations and knowledge.¹⁴

In fact, the bulk of current research on political socialization has dealt with the development of children's orientations toward the national--largely American--political system. The earliest preferences for research in this area dealt with knowledge of persons and institutions such as the President, the mayor, the Congress, or with politically relevant orientations, such as authoritarianism.¹⁵ Only recently have relatively comprehensive overviews of the induction of children into the domestic political system appeared. However, neither Easton and Dennis in Children in the Political System nor Hess and Torney in their work with elementary school children, The Development of Political Attitudes, focused upon children's perceptions of disagreement or conflict in the

operation of the system or their perceptions of linkage between themselves and political events and conditions in the system.

There has been some research on international socialization and it has also largely focused on the development of children's orientations to specific objects and institutions. The work, for example, of Piaget and Weil, Jahoda, Weinstein, and Lambert and Klineberg has been concerned with tracing certain developmental trends in terms of children's national identification and geographic perspectives. It has also explored cognitive and affective orientations with regard to definitions of foreign nations and peoples.¹⁶ In this respect, the work of Cooper, Alvik and Rosell on war and peace was until recently almost unique in its concern with children's orientations toward conflict in the international system.

Cooper's pioneering study¹⁷ employed an open-ended questionnaire to develop a scheme of conflict based on Piaget's model of cognitive development. He found that, by age seven and eight, children were able to "clearly define war." He further noted that the reasons children give for the causes of war fell into three categories: defense of country; friendship and honor; and aggressive attack. The percentage of children who accepted the defense of country rationale as a justification for war went from 30 per cent at age eight to 90 per cent by age fifteen.¹⁸

Alvik¹⁹ adapted Cooper's questionnaire for a study of Norwegian children in which he was primarily concerned with an investigation of the relationship between the general ability of children to relate multiple perspectives in the logical sense and their ability to relate multiple perspectives concerning war and peace. In terms of the concepts of war and peace, Alvik concluded that "while the war concept in overall content can be said to appear rather similar in the two investigations, it looks as if the peace concept is more culturally determined."

Rosell's study²⁰ focused on the developmental pattern of the political orientations of Swedish children toward war and peace cast in a sociological framework.²¹ He, too, found that with age war is increasingly defined in terms of conflict; 33 per cent of the eight-year-old respondents as compared with 80 per cent of the fourteen-year-olds. Rosell also interpreted his findings as reflecting an increased capacity for reciprocal reasoning or intellectual development.²²

While there is little research directly pertinent to children's domestic-international imagery of conflict, it would appear from what evidence is available that the development of children's domestic and international images of conflict proceeds almost in reverse order. In regard to domestic political processes, while the only data deal with partisan competition,²³ children seem to develop perceptions of conflict only very gradually and at a relatively late age, thirteen years, in socialization terms. Contrariwise, with regard to the international system it appears that children's initial imagery is dominated by conflict behavior.

Jahoda noted that, by ages ten to eleven, children's dislikes with regard to foreign nations tend to follow the lines of contemporary East-West cleavages and are justified in conventional, adult cold-war arguments.²⁴ Weinstein has suggested that six-year-olds identify the American flag with the "good guys" as opposed to the "bad guys" who do not subscribe to it.²⁵

From his study of children's attitudes toward war and other international processes in grades four, five and six, Targ concluded similarly:

Finally, the data tended to indicate that children increasingly were socialized to accept a political world view not too dissimilar from Morgenthau's theory of political realism. Children increasingly saw war as bad but legal. Alliances were seen as aggressive and good.

The older children (sixth grade) with increasing knowledge about the international system were less optimistic about the future. This, coupled with the developing "we-they" definition of the world, interacts to create a conception of reality that justified war, military policies, and nationalism at the same time as such conceptions require, at best, guarded optimism.²⁶

At the same time that socialization research has tended to focus on political institutions rather than processes it has, understandably, focused on one level of political system at a time, even though most would acknowledge that people are usually members of multiple political systems. That is, while socialization research has been comparative in terms of a few cross-national studies, there have been, with one exception, no attempts to study political socialization among members of the same political system toward different levels of political systems.²⁷ The one exception is Jennings who studied political orientations of adolescents toward multiple levels of government. He found 53 per cent of his sample ranked international affairs as more salient than other levels of government. There was a correlation between the orientation and level of knowledge concerning international politics and public affairs.²⁸

In order to compare the development of political orientations toward multiple levels of government or different political systems, the following theoretical approach will be employed.

Political orientations viewed as products of the political socialization process may be seen as functions of three factors: the structure of the system, the position of the individual within the system, and personality. While major emphasis in studying the development of political orientations of young people is directed to political socialization as a process, other factors influence this process at various points. Inkeles notes that "social structure impinges on, and in many ways determines socialization. In its turn, socialization may have substantial effects

on social structure."²⁹ If, as suggested above, both the international and national systems are treated as political systems, both may be said to encompass socialization as a functional requisite.

Political socialization as a function of structure has also been discussed by Easton and Dennis. In their analysis of how the political system develops support through early socialization, they point out that the very nature of the political socialization process requires that there be "structural linkages" or "contact points" between the political system and the child. They perceive different levels of political systems offering different "structural linkages" and "contact points," with significant consequences for the outcome of the socialization process.

Applying this conception of the socialization process to the cross-systems approach suggests that differences in political orientations toward multiple systems may be related to structural variables. If the international system offers different "structural linkages" and "contact points" than does the national system, the consequences may be significant for the developmental staging of the socialization process, for the imagery of the system developed, and for the patterns of political attitudes and behavior which children acquire toward each system. At the very least it may be assumed that the international political system will socialize toward international orientations, while the national political system will socialize toward national orientations.

Political orientations are also functions of the position of the individual within the system. Position is here defined as an object of socialization. If all children are socialized by the political system as a whole, one would expect to find minimal differences in political orientations. There might be early socialization toward the national

system and, somewhat later—and more discontinuous—socialization toward the international system. Such a pattern would be congruent with both theoretical conceptualization and empirical findings.

Research has shown, however, that within a single system children are socialized by a variety of sometimes parallel and sometimes overlapping systems and agents, among them ethnic, religious and racial sub-groups. Such a sub-group could conceivably be a transnational movement, defined as a group whose interests and concerns are shared with members in other national systems, and which may have special definitions of the role of the national toward the nation-state or the international system.

Social-psychological research in international behavior of individuals suggests that transnational contacts may increase the saliency of the international system for the individual. Studies on the effect of transnational experiences such as travel, business and education, have been shown to influence international orientations to a significant degree.³⁰

It may be conjectured that socialization by transnational experiences or movements will develop those individuals or groups who will play the roles of "creative, innovative, change-inducing catalysts" described by Inkeles, who may bring about the increased commitment to an internationalist ideology anticipated by Kelman.

Within the framework of this study it is assumed that socialization by transnational movements will develop multiple loyalties or at least positive orientations to multiple systems. Evidence of multiple loyalties, loyalties extending beyond national boundaries, would be expected to be more prevalent among such children than among those socialized only by the national system.

Finally, political orientations are functions of personality. Socialization, political or otherwise, is in all cases mediated through the personality of the individual. Thus political orientations, seen as the dependent variable, may differ widely for individuals exposed to the same socialization process.

Theoretically, as was pointed out earlier, political socialization is a special form of the more general phenomenon of socialization, and in the language of socialization theory may be defined as the developmental process through which the citizen matures politically. In the course of this developmental process he acquires a complex of beliefs, feelings and information which help him comprehend, evaluate and relate to the political world around him. Borrowing from Mead's notion of the social self,³¹ Dawson and Prewitt suggest that political socialization produces a political self. This political self is developed through the individual's relationship with the social world in the same way as the social self.³² Both develop out of a process of interaction. The individual is neither altogether passive nor the sole acting or initiating agent.

There has been some research on the capacity of children to hold multiple role perceptions. However, except for the Jennings study, there has been, to my knowledge, no research reported which focuses on the development of the political self as it relates to overlapping political systems, such as the nation-state and the international system. It seems clear that individuals are socialized simultaneously into overlapping political systems and that, in this process, orientations toward each are developed. It seems equally clear that if we are to understand the orientations of individuals toward these overlapping systems, it would

be useful to study the process by which they develop, noting similarities and differences in content, sequential development and interaction.

Reflecting a basic interest in the development of the political self and identity and in the consequences this has for political life, the following questions may be asked: Are there differences in the process by which orientations are developed toward different political systems? Are there differences in the content of these orientations? What elements in the process of political socialization lead to different outcomes for different individuals? What are the consequences of these differences?

Choices must be made by any researcher. These must be made both in terms of focus and approach before the more specific issues of methodology can be considered. A common interest in questions and concerns related to the development of global society served to direct the efforts of a number of researchers in political socialization,³³ who found themselves at Northwestern University from 1969 to 1971. A common goal of contributing to the beginnings of a broad theory of political socialization guided the formulations of individual research interests. A common hope that these small contributions would indeed add to our understanding of political life prescribed limited objectives for each.

The objective of the present study is to develop exploratory hypotheses concerning the development of political orientations toward the international political system. Specifically, my research efforts are directed to a comparative analysis of the development of political orientations toward the national and international systems among Israeli pre-adults and the effect of transnational movements in this process.

The research is designed to be comparative in three ways. It compares political orientations toward different systems, the national

and international systems. It compares these orientations between groups socialized by transnational movements and groups not socialized by transnational movements. Finally, it provides data for a future comparative study on a cross-national basis. The selection of Israel as the research site was directly related to these aspects.

Many years of close study of the political development of Israel combined with familiarity with the language and culture as well as assured access to a research population offered a unique opportunity for the research contemplated. Bearing in mind the caveat mentioned by Przeworski,³⁴ that meaningful cross-cultural research requires concomitant variation of systemic variables as well as consideration of within-system variables, Israel was seen as a valuable addition to the political systems under consideration. As a democratic political system with a western outlook, it shares a basic orientation with both the United States and Great Britain. It shares certain basic structural features with these systems and, as Oran Young says in speaking of general systems theory, "the central point is that systems which differ in terms of size, time, scale and specific substance may yet resemble one another closely in regard to certain basic structures and processes and may also have significant subsets of such structures and processes that interlock."³⁵

In addition to its different status on the international pecking order, there are certain unique features to be considered. National ideology as a systemic variable can be used to compare political systems in cross-cultural studies. The implication of a national ideology for the development of political orientations, both national and international, is clear. Since the very existence of the State of Israel rests on a shared ideological commitment--Zionism, as a transnational movement--Israeli society will reflect a relatively greater degree of international

involvement than other new nations. This expectation is, of course, subject to empirical verification. Teune's observation--made in another context--is also suggestive here. He stated that "many groups that have either experienced punishment or have knowledge that others like them have been punished should develop internationalist orientations among at least some of the members of the group."³⁶

Political socialization as a functional process is a systemic variable which Israel shares with other political systems, both new and old. As a new nation, Israel shares with other new nations the task of political integration of its members and the shaping and reshaping of a national identity. In this context it has faced the additional task of integrating large-scale immigration of diverse populations--doubling the population since statehood in 1948--and extending the process of political socialization longitudinally.

A number of institutions and processes in Israel have special significance in the process of political socialization, i.e. the army, in which all young adults are expected to serve, and the various youth movements.³⁷ For this analysis, two institutions in Israeli society are defined as transnational movements. One is religion and the second is the kibbutz. These two concepts will be theoretically defined and their relationship to the political orientations of young Israelis will be explored.

This comparative analysis of the development of political orientations toward overlapping political systems is designed to generate exploratory hypotheses. Exploring largely unknown territory, such propositions and hypotheses which can be more rigorously tested in future research, can contribute to an understanding of how the political self

relates to a sample of the multiplicity of extant political environments. A link will be added to the construction of a theory of political socialization which may in the foreseeable future encompass political orientations toward a political system including outer space. The central issues with which the research is concerned will be restated, to be followed by an outline of the format for reporting the findings.

The study focuses on two major questions:

1. Are there differences in the political orientations of young Israelis toward the national and international systems?
2. Are there differences in these orientations between young Israelis socialized by transnational movements and those not socialized by transnational movements?

Explanatory models will be based on propositions drawn from the literature and from empirical findings and will explore more specific research questions.

1. Are there differences in the content of orientations toward the two systems?
2. Are there differences in the sources of information utilized for the two systems?
3. Are there differences in the degree to which respondents see the two systems affecting their lives?
4. Do respondents perceive differences in the degree to which they can influence the two systems?
5. Do respondents perceive different degrees of involvement with problems of violence in the two systems?
6. Do respondents perceive different degrees of involvement with problems of social justice in the two systems?
7. Are there differences related to age?

The following paragraphs outline the organizational structure of the study.

In Chapter I the research has been placed in the context of the political socialization literature. I have pointed out that, while there

has been considerable research on the development of political orientations in young people toward their national political system and some toward the international system, there has been none comparing orientations toward both systems. This has been seen as a major lacuna in the field. I have outlined the broad framework which will guide the study based on the conceptualization that political orientation as the outcome of the process of political socialization will be a function of (1) the structure of the system, (2) the position of the individual in the system, and (3) the personality of the individual.

In Chapter II, I outline the research design of the study. The sample and its setting are described. I present theoretical and operational definitions of the major variables to be studied together with indicators to be used. I also discuss the methodological procedures used in the collection and analysis of the data.

Chapter III contains a discussion of theoretical and conceptual considerations involved in determining specific research questions and relates these to previous research findings. The conceptual framework for the comparative analysis of political orientations toward the national and international systems is based on three propositions:

1. Young people are socialized simultaneously into the national and international political systems.
2. The national and international political systems have analytically comparable, but empirically distinct political cultures.
3. The development of political orientations is a process which can be studied in terms of a cognitive-developmental learning model.

In Chapter IV, I present data and findings related to the predictions made in Chapter III. I discuss the findings concerning differences in political orientations toward the two political systems in the light of theoretical expectations.

Chapter V discusses the theoretical and conceptual considerations involved in exploring the effect of political socialization by transnational movements. The conceptual framework for this aspect of the study is an elaboration of the discussion in Chapter III. In Chapter III the outcome of the process of socialization is seen as a function of the structure of the system, whereas in Chapter V it is also seen as a function of the position of the individual within the system. Transnational movements are defined as determinants of position in the system and as affecting the outcome of the process of political socialization. Kibbutz and religion are identified as transnational movements for purposes of this analysis.

In Chapter VI, I present data and report on findings of this analysis. Two between-group comparisons are made: Kibbutz and non-kibbutz, and religious and non-religious. Both comparisons are made for the same dimensions reported in Chapter IV.

In Chapter VII, I present and discuss findings on two additional instruments used to measure political orientations for both sets of subgroups. A measure was developed for this study which categorizes respondents as having functional, normative or symbolic national identity. This test was administered together with one measuring world-mindedness. Findings are related to the outcome of political socialization as a function of position. The question of interaction between parallel processes of political socialization is also related to the position of the individual in the system and to the development of a political identity.

In Chapter VIII, I summarize the findings and present conclusions derived from them. I also state implications for future research, especially as related to the development of political identity within a framework of political socialization.

NOTES

1. Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 3. Greenstein cites Rousseau's observations in Emile, and goes on to describe Plato's discussion of education in The Republic as an ingenious analysis of the consequences of defective political education.
2. Kenneth I. Rothman reports that the writings of Makarenko and other official teaching manuals serve as guiding principles and practices of the Soviet approach to the training of the Soviet citizen. See: "Attitude, Competence, and Education: A Selective Bibliographic Guide to the Relation of Education to Political Socialization," in Education and Political Development, ed. by James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 601.
3. Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Soviet Methods of Character Education: Some Implications for Research," reprinted in American Psychologist, XVII (1962), 550-64; also by Bronfenbrenner, the popularized discussion found in Two Worlds of Childhood: US and USSR (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970). The interaction of the polity and schools in Soviet society is also discussed in a series of essays in G. Z. F. Bereday, ed., The Politics of Soviet Education (New York: Praeger, 1961).
4. Ward W. Keesecker, Education for Freedom as Provided by State Laws (Washington, D.C., Federal Security Agency Bulletin No. 11, 1958), p. 8. Also see Bessie Louise Pierce, Citizens' Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth (New York: Scribners, 1933) and Citizenship Education: A Survey of Requirements for Citizenship Education Among the 50 States (New York: Robert A. Taft Institute of Government, 1963).
5. James S. Coleman, op. cit., contains a number of essays on the inter-relationship of education and political development. An excellent bibliography is also found in this volume. See: Kenneth I. Rothman, op. cit., pp. 585-609; also Lynn Frederick Fischer, "The Impact of Political Socialization on National Integration in Africa" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1970).
6. Robert A. Levine, "The Internalization of Political Values in Stateless Societies," Human Organization, XIX, 2 (Summer, 1960). See also Levine, "Socialization, Social Structure and Intersocial Images," in International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. by Herbert C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), chap. 2.
7. David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

8. Aristide Zolberg, personal communication, April, 1972. Also see: Thomas Landon Thorson, Biopolitics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 69-70.
9. M. Kent Jennings, "Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967).
10. Alex Inkeles, "Social Structure and Socialization," in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. by David A. Goslin (New York: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), p. 631.
11. Herbert C. Kelman, op. cit.
12. James M. Becker, An Examination of Objectives, Needs and Priorities in International Education in U.S. Secondary and Elementary Schools (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, 1969), pp. 50-51. On this point also see Robert Angell, March to Peace (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969). See also "The Multinational Corporation," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. CCCCIII (September, 1972), David J. Blake, editor.
13. James M. Becker, op. cit., chap. 2.
14. An overview of this literature may be found in Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965); David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969); Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967. Dated, but still very valuable is the review of the literature by Jack Dennis, A Survey and Bibliography of Contemporary Research on Political Learning and Socialization (University of Wisconsin, Research and Development Center for Cognitive Learning, Occasional Paper, No. 6).
15. For examples of this early literature, see David Easton and Robert Hess, "The Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, VI, 3 (1962), 229-46; Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," The American Political Science Review, LIV (December, 1960), 934-43; Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization: The Theories of Authoritarian and Democratic Character," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLXI (1965), 81-92; Robert Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV (1960), 632-44.
16. Most of the literature is concerned with children's images of their own and other societies. Jean Piaget and Anna-Marie Weil, "The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and Relations with Other Countries," International Social Science Bulletin, III (1951); Gustav Jahoda, "Nationality Preferences and National Stereotypes in Ghana Before Independence," Journal of Social Psychology, L (1959); Gustav Jahoda, "Development of the Perception of Social

- Differences in Children from 6 to 10," The British Journal of Educational Psychology, L (1959); Gustav Jahoda, "Development of Scottish Children's Ideas About Country and Nationality, Part II: National Symbols and Themes," The British Journal of Educational Psychology, XXXIII (1963); Gustav Jahoda, "The Development of Children's Ideas About Country and Nationality, Part I: The Conceptual Framework," The British Journal of Educational Psychology, XXXIII (1963); Gustav Jahoda, "Children's Concepts of Nationality: A Critical Study of Piaget's Stages," Child Development, XXXV (1964); Eugene A. Weinstein, "Development of the Concept of Flag and the Sense of National Identity," Child Development, XXVIII (1957); Wallace E. Lambert and Otto Klineberg, "A Pilot Study of the Origin and Development of National Stereotypes," International Social Science Journal, XI (1959); Wallace E. Lambert and Otto Klineberg, Children's Views of Foreign Peoples: A Cross-National Study (New York: Appleton, Century Crofts, 1967).
17. Peter Cooper, "The Development of the Concept of War," Journal of Peace Research, II (1966), 1-7.
 18. Ibid., p. 4.
 19. Trond Alvik, "The Development of Views on Conflict, War and Peace Among School Children: A Norwegian Case Study," Journal of Peace Research, V (1968), 171-95.
 20. Leif Rosell, "Children's Views of War and Peace," Journal of Peace Research, V (1968), 268-76.
 21. Ibid., p. 271.
 22. Ibid., p. 271.
 23. Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 216.
 24. Jahoda, "Scottish Children's Ideas About Other Countries," op. cit., p. 107.
 25. Weinstein, "Development of the Concept of Flag and the Sense of National Identity," op. cit., p. 171.
 26. Harry Targ, "Children's Orientations to International Politics," Journal of Peace Research, II (1970), 94.
 27. M. Kent Jennings, "Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government," Midwest Journal of Political Science, III, 11 (August, 1967), 291-317.
 28. Ibid., p. 296.
 29. Inkeles, op. cit., p. 615.
 30. Herbert Kelman brings together the most significant contributions in this area in the volume on International Behavior, see supra.

In addition to his discussion, valuable insights may be found in Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Effects of Cross-National Contact on National and International Images," ibid., p. 117. George V. Coelho, Changing Images of America: A Study of Indian Students' Perceptions (New York: The Free Press, 1958); Claire Selltitz, June R. Christ, Joan Havel, and Stuart W. Cook, Attitudes and Social Relations of Foreign Students in the United States (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1963); Tamar Becker, "Patterns of Attitudinal Changes Among Foreign Students," The American Journal of Sociology, LXXIII (January, 1968), 431-42.

31. The concept of the "political self" as used here is based on Mead's notion of the social self, developed in George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). Drawing also on early work by Charles H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (Boston: Scribner, 1902), it reflects the influence of sociological theory and the concept of social role analysis in the development of political socialization theory.
32. Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt develop this concept of the "political self" more extensively in Political Socialization (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1969).
33. Stimulated by a series of seminars and discussions on political socialization led by Lee F. Anderson at Northwestern University, a series of research proposals and projects developed. Dealing with a variety of aspects of international socialization, all share the common interest in contributing to the development of a broader political socialization theory.
34. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970). Similar strategy for comparative research is also discussed in Raoul Naroll, "Some Thoughts on Comparative Method in Cultural Anthropology," Methodology in Social Research, ed. by H. M. Blalock and Ann Blalock (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).
35. Oran Young, "A Survey of General Systems Theory," General Systems, IX (1964), 61-80. See also, Oran Young, Systems of Political Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 16.
36. P. E. Jacob, Henry Teune, and T. Watts, "Values, Leadership and Development: A Four-Nation Study," Social Science Information, VII, 2 (April, 1968), 42-92.
37. The Army has served as both a socializing agent and an agent of political integration in the case of new immigrants. The youth movements, in some cases branches of political parties, and in most cases shaped by the pioneering orientation of the early Zionist movement are manifestly agents of political socialization.

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE

A. OBJECTIVE

The objective of the research is to examine the development of political orientations of young people in Israel toward the national and international systems. More specifically, it is the examination of the effect of political socialization by transnational movements on the development of international orientations.

B. THE SAMPLE

Israeli youth was selected primarily because it represents a fortuitous combination of research interest, familiarity with setting and language, and an optimum fit with the framework of an ongoing, broader research enterprise. Long-range plans call for a cross-national comparison of some of the data in this and other studies within this ongoing project. In accord with the prescriptions of Naroll¹ and Przeworski² for fruitful cross-cultural comparative analysis, I saw Israel as sharing a sufficient degree of "concomitant variation" with systems such as the British and American. At the same time, the unique characteristics of Israeli society, such as the natural laboratory setting of the kibbutz, provided the within-system variation demanded by the research orientation of this specific study.

The sample consists of a purposively selected research population of 599 Israeli pre-adults, 248 male and 351 female, at five grade levels:

123 from fourth grade (nine-ten years), 112 from sixth grade (eleven-twelve years), 93 from eighth grade (thirteen-fourteen years), 136 from tenth grade (fifteen-sixteen years), and 135 from twelfth grade (seventeen-eighteen years). The sample is further divided into two groups: 23 per cent of the respondents were born and raised in a kibbutz while the remainder was divided between the metropolitan areas of Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Of those not born in Israel, seven (1 per cent) immigrated before 1956, eighty-three (14 per cent) between 1957 and 1966, and 16 (3 per cent) since 1967.

Countries of origin represented are shown in the following table.

TABLE 2.1

COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN BY RESPONDENT'S PLACE OF BIRTH, MOTHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH AND FATHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH

Place of Birth	Respondent	Mother	Father
Israel	494	114	84
Asia-Africa (primarily Morocco and Egypt)	23	86	84
Europe (except England)	37	326	363
British Commonwealth	5	11	10
United States	12	14	16
USSR	23	27	20
Other	5	11	9
Total	599	589 ^a	586 ^a

^aInformation not available for all parents.

Of the total sample of 599, 228 are religious as defined by attendance in a religious state school, and 371 are non-religious;³ 137 are from a kibbutz and 462 are not.

Socio-economic status is frequently reported in terms of occupational status with which it is highly correlated in the United States. Data were collected in Israel but must be evaluated with caution. The high correlation does not obtain in Israel for a number of reasons. Ideologically, to work with one's hands, particularly on the land, has been an essential part of the Zionist creed which still holds high symbolic status. The kibbutz parents were difficult to classify: were they indeed farmers or blue or white collar workers or professionals? Other examples: bus drivers in the United States are classified as blue collar workers, while in Israel they may be classified as professionals or entrepreneurs with equal logic, since most are member-partners of long standing of the two large bus cooperatives.

A fairly high proportion--66 per cent--of the Jerusalem sample came from families connected with the Hebrew University. This included faculty and housekeeping staffs. The Kiryat Yam sample was largely recent immigrants (parents) and represented a lower than average socio-economic status, by occupational status as well as area of residence.

C. THEORETICAL DEFINITIONS

1. Orientations

Orientations are defined as the complex of attitudes, values, knowledge and behavior through which individuals organize their object relationships. Political orientations are defined as conceptualized by Easton and Dennis: knowledge, attitudes and values about the objects of the political system. Orientations will also be analyzed in terms

of the objects toward which they are directed. These include the three categories which complete the schema developed by Easton and Dennis and add one further dimension. Authorities, regime and political community are the three foci toward which political orientations may be directed in the nine-cell matrix proposed by Easton and Dennis. This research will be looking at political orientations toward these three objects but will also look at the orientations toward the international system. For both systems orientations will further be viewed as directed toward events and conditions in the child's socio-political universe which may impinge on his perceptions.

2. Involvement

This term may be used interchangeably with orientations, but does connote an additional emotional component which may or may not be part of the definition of orientations. Involvement implies some affect and expressed sense of engagement with the political community and process.

3. Transnational Movement

A transnational movement or group is defined as a group or activity or belief system which provides the individual in it with a set of orientations toward the world outside his national system. These are conceptualized as being related to but not contradictory to the set of orientations he may have toward the national system.

4. World-Mindedness

World-mindedness is defined as an orientation toward events in the world which sets them in a world-wide perspective rather than a national or even international framework. The emphasis is on the humanness of all peoples rather than their national identification.

5. National Identity

In contrast to national identification, which I see as an external categorization, I use national identity in the sense of an extended self-concept. It connotes a sense of "belonging" to the political community and a degree of involvement.

D. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Orientations will be compared in terms of six variables focusing on cognitive, affective and action-oriented dimensions.

1. Political Knowledge:

Level of knowledge is measured by an information test consisting of three questions each for the national and international system.

2. Sources of Information:

Sources of information are ranked on the basis of their importance to children for information concerning the two systems. Respondents are asked to select three out of six sources, and to rank these in order of importance.

3. Impact on Self:

Impact perceived is measured in terms of responses children give to a series of statements concerning events and conditions in their environment. They are asked to respond in terms of perceived influence (cognitive) and feelings (affective) and are scored on each item from very much to not at all. Several individual items are also used to measure their perception of the impact of the system.

4. Impact of the Self on System:

Impact on the system is measured in terms of a similar series of statements but eliciting responses as to what they feel they could do about the event or condition. In addition, several individual items are used to measure a sense of efficacy.

5. Social Problems: Violence:

A series of items dealing with violence are taken from the impact series. Children are also asked to respond to a series of individual items to measure their involvement with violence with each system.

6. Social Problems: Social Justice:

A series of items dealing with socio-political problems are taken from the impact series. Children are also asked to respond to individual items concerned with issues of social justice. Specific items for each instrument are included in the text.

E. RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

Data were obtained through a combination of written questionnaires and personal, taped interviews. I administered the written questionnaires.

I also conducted taped, personal interviews with 100 of these respondents. Due to considerations of time and finances, analysis of these interviews could not be completed. Plans at present call for an intensive analysis of a matched group sample from the data.

Research instruments were developed out of an original pool of 100 items pre-tested with children from the North Shore area of Chicago. After numerous revisions, a final version was pre-tested with 500 New Trier Township students at the fourth, sixth, eighth, tenth and twelfth grade levels,⁴ as well as 300 children in the Chicago parochial school system at the same age levels. The instruments were translated into Hebrew and certain modifications were made, such as elimination of some items of little or peripheral relevance to the Israeli sample, the adaptation of content in some of the items, and the development of additional items to tap dimensions peculiar to the Israeli sample

In addition, a scale on world-mindedness (Sampson and Smith, 1957) was administered to the Winnetka pre-test sample and to the Israeli sample. A short version of the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Troidahl-Powell, 1965) was also administered to the Israeli sample to tap hypothesized differences in personality traits between children raised in kibbutzim and in nuclear families.

A scale was constructed to measure the sense of national identity. It measures three component dimensions of this attitude and produced separate scores on each. The dimensions are symbolic, normative and functional. The scale consists of eighteen items, twelve multiple choice and six open-ended questions. Responses to open-ended questions are divided into nine categories, which were selected after preliminary reading of all questionnaires. Coding was done by me and an assistant independently. The two sets of coded responses presented few problems of disagreement.

F. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Statistical analysis was performed on a CDC 6400 at Vogelback Computing Center, Northwestern University. Program Fastabs in the SPSS package (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) allows for the computing of bivariate joint frequency distribution with varying levels of control variables. Fastabs displays the distribution of cases by their position on two or more variables. These joint frequency distributions can be statistically analyzed by tests of significance such as chi square and contingency coefficients. A significance level of .05 was selected, and chi square significance tests were applied.

Special programs were written to compute scores for scales on the questionnaire, for world-mindedness scores and for dogmatism scores. Another program was written to display the combinations and frequencies of combinations on the Source of Information section of the questionnaire. A final program was written to compute scores for the Identity scale.

The Appendix contains copies of the written questionnaire in Hebrew as well as of the oral interview schedule. An illustrative transcript from one interview is also available on request from author.

Copies of special programs written to analyze data are similarly available upon request.

NOTES

1. Raoul Naroll, "Some Thoughts on Comparative Method in Cultural Anthropology," in Methodology in Social Research, ed. by H. M. Blalock and Ann Blalock (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968)
2. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970).
3. Non-religious includes all those respondents attending a public school not identified as a religious school.
4. I administered these tests in the winter of 1969-70 to 500 students in New Trier Township: Fourth grade at Hubbard Woods School, Winnetka, Illinois; sixth grade at Skokie Junior High School, Winnetka, Illinois; eighth grade at Carleton Washburne School, Winnetka, Illinois; and tenth and twelfth grades at New Trier West High School, Northfield, Illinois.

CHAPTER III

A COMPARISON OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS AMONG ISRAELI PRE-ADULTS

Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations

In Chapter I, I identified the study as an exploratory analysis of the development of political orientations toward two overlapping systems. I propose to compare political orientations toward the national and international systems within the framework of a theory of political socialization. Within such a framework I propose to study international socialization by focusing on the effect of socialization by transnational movements on the political orientations of pre-adults.

Of central concern in the next two chapters is the question: Are there differences in the political orientations of young people toward the national and international systems? A corollary question is: Are such differences related to age?

The conceptual framework for this first part of the study is based on the view that the development of political orientations in pre-adults may be seen as the outcome of the process of political socialization into overlapping systems and that this outcome will be a function of the structure of the political system.

Underlying this framework are the following assumptions:

1. Young people are socialized simultaneously into the national and international political systems.
2. The national and international political systems have analytically comparable, yet empirically distinct political cultures.

3. The development of political orientations is a process which can be studied in terms of a cognitive-developmental learning model.

These assumptions are analyzed in the present chapter and provide the framework from which I develop predictions concerning the comparative outcome of the socialization process toward two overlapping political systems. These predictions are formulated at the end of the chapter.

In Chapter IV I report findings based on empirical testing of these predictions.

A. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The concept "political system" became an operational part of the political science lexicon with the publication of David Easton's A Systems Analysis of Political Life. In it he presents a detailed theory which has been applied to studies of varied topics related to the political process, including education, law, and his own work with Jack Dennis on political socialization.¹ The systems approach has become a familiar concept in social science literature and will, therefore, be discussed here only in gross outline.

The attempt to view global society as a political system derives partly from the growing evidence that a world-wide or global system is indeed emerging. Kenneth Boulding's view and interpretation of this development parallels that made familiar by Lady Jackson in popular literature. Boulding concludes that, due to changes in technology, particularly in transportation and weaponry,

. . . the world has become a spaceship, a small rather crowded globe hurtling through space to an unknown destination and bearing on its surface a very fragile freight of mankind and the atmosphere which inhabits men's minds.

This represents a very fundamental change in the condition of man, a change which furthermore only a few people have really appreciated. Up till very recently the human race was expanding on what was for all practical purposes an illimitable plain. It may have

been a "darkling plain where ignorant armies clash by night" as Mathew Arnold called it, but it was for all practical purposes an illimitable, if rough, plain. As long as there was always somewhere to go over the horizon, neither ignorance nor armies nor clashes could be fatal. If one civilization collapsed another could always rise a few hundred miles away. All history in other words, until very recently, has been local and has not involved the concept of the "sociosphere" or the total sphere of all human activity extending all around the earth.²

Lady Jackson's view is expressed in her usual succinct and direct style:

Most of the energies of our society tend towards unity--the energies of science and technological change, the energy of curiosity and research, of self-interest and economics, the energy--in many ways the most violent of all--the energy of potential aggression and destruction. We have become neighbors in terms of inescapable physical proximity and instant communication. We are neighbors in economic interest and technological direction. We are neighbors in the risk of total destruction.³

Her conclusion, that the world has become in many respects a single human community, which informs much of her writing and speaking, suggests the foundation on which a definition of global society as a political system may be formulated.

In some form, the existence, or the desirability of existence, of an international system has been recognized at least since biblical times, reflecting a sense of the community of mankind. In terms of international relations theory, the concept of an international political system was related to the growth of the nation-state. While it was never all-inclusive or universally recognized as such, it provided a point of reference. Historically, the international system has had different degrees of salience to different societies and to members within societies. It has been subject to stress to a degree which has led to changes in the system itself, but as an ideal type, I would argue, the concept has persisted.

In the past the unit of analysis in international relations theory was almost exclusively the nation-state, but changes in political

life have led to new approaches to an understanding of political systems. To cite a relevant example, twenty-five years ago the de facto government represented by the Va'ad Le'umi in Palestine, which had power to function in all areas except foreign policy--and in fact did carry on in this area as well--dealt with the Mandatory Power and the United Nations through the Jewish Agency for Palestine. The role of the Jewish Agency for Palestine as an agent in international affairs was the subject of much debate,⁴ not only in terms of defining its precise legal status under international law, but simply as an existential issue. The de facto position of both as governing bodies was never questioned. With de jure recognition of the State of Israel in 1948, their status was legitimized.

In contrast with this emphasis on the nation-state as the appropriate unit of analysis, Herbert Kelman and a group of outstanding scholars, primarily in the field of social psychology, developed theoretical approaches for analyzing what has become an empirically observable fact. His focus on the psychology of international behavior has served to draw attention to the increasingly widespread and increasingly significant interrelationships of individuals and groups from different nations in activities having direct impact on the political life of the international system. It thus reflects changing concerns and conceptualizations of the relevant units of analysis for international relations.

The conceptualization of the international system as a political system does not fit the definition of "paradigm" as formulated by Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions--one accepted by a community of scholars. Nevertheless, as a model which provides "permissible analogies and metaphors" and helps to "determine what will be accepted as an explanation and as a puzzle solution . . . ,"⁶ it will be developed in Eastonian terms for this analysis.

Easton sees the political system as a "set of structures and processes through which demands of the 'politically relevant members' are concerted into binding decisions and related actions."⁷ Two conditions are specified as "essential variables" of any political system: (1) that its members are able to make decisions concerning the allocation of values, and (2) that such decisions be accepted as authoritative by most members of the system most of the time. The foregoing criteria do not appear to qualify the international system as a political system.

Easton, however, proceeds to describe political systems as open, self-regulating, goal-directed and self-transforming units of behavior:

. . . they are influenced by what happens in their natural and social environments, (that) their members can take purposive decisions to change the course of events, and if necessary or desirable, (that) these decisions may include modifications or fundamental transformations of the system itself.⁸

He states as a further condition that no system for making and implementing binding decisions can hope to persist unless it can provide for the existence of some kind of political community, regime, and set of authorities.

From the vantage point of the child (or a newcomer to an existing political system), the socio-political environment is perceived in terms of events or conditions which have an effect on him. He learns to recognize and know, evaluate (and develop affective relationships toward), and act in relationship to this environment. Within the American system, the authorities and their representatives are early perceived in specific, personalized forms. Diffuse support and the development of a belief in the legitimacy of the authority structure are shown to occur early in childhood. Developing such a belief in the structural legitimacy of the regime is described by Easton as a characteristic system response to stimulate the input of support, a crucial element of system persistence.

It seems theoretically possible to view the process as related not only to persistence, but also to the "coming into existence" of a system. Thus no system for making and implementing binding decisions (accepted by most members most of the time) can come into existence unless it can provide some degree of political community, regime and set of authorities to which members will give support. Political socialization may be seen then as a process for creating support for a grouping in the process of becoming a system. Clearly there are structural-functional differences between the two types of system. There is the crucial difference in terms of which the nation-state is defined--the concept of the threat and use of force as the ultimate sanction, distinguishing it from other systems. Further, as Pye points out, a political system which is highly institutionalized and specialized will rely on different mechanisms in the socialization process than will one just emerging from a state of diffuseness. The lack of institutionalization of the international system is cited by a number of scholars. Kaplan states that the "international system is not a primary sphere of action in the same sense that national political systems are."⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau speaks of the "social pressures" in national systems which, unlike the situation in international society, tend to "keep dissenting groups within the bounds of law and order."¹⁰

The contrast between the peaceful, ordered political life of the national system and the violent lawlessness prevailing in the international society provide the most commonly cited evidence for an inherent difference between the two systems. This Hobbesian view of international society is indeed what most clearly distinguishes the early orientations of children toward the two systems.

The relationship between structural differences and the outcome of the socialization process is emphasized by Easton and Dennis. They point to the requirement inherent in the definition of political socialization that there be structural linkages and contact points through which the child learns to relate to the political system and suggest the implications of differences and deviations from their model.

In systems where authority objects are less capable of losing their abstract character--where they are less amenable to being personalized, to being made highly visible and salient, or where the collectivity of authorities cannot readily be typified by a few strategic individuals or types of roles--we would expect the child to establish contact with the system less readily, more clumsily and abstractly, and probably at a later, less impressionable age.¹¹

They continue:

It would be interesting, for example, to test our generalizations through cross-cultural research in such collegial regimes as Uruguay or in other systems which lack one or another of the properties that we have hypothesized as important to the manner in which the young child becomes or fails to become attached to the system in the United States.¹²

Following Easton and Dennis, much of political socialization research has focused on attitudes toward authorities. It is conceivable that for children in some political systems, types of authorities other than the President, the policeman, Congress, or analogous symbols may have significance. In Israel, for example, in addition to representatives of their own national political system, other images of authorities and regime may be salient or visible, i.e. the United Nations and its Secretary General, individual truce observers, or the Security Council in Special Session on the Middle East. Similarly, the concept of political community on an international level may have far greater relevance, both in terms of potential impact on members of society and in the importance attached to influencing it.

Regardless of the evaluative or affective perception of such factors, what is theoretically relevant is that these images may be conceptualized as embryonic elements of another political system perceived by children as linked to their lives in a manner which can be investigated empirically. I argue that, for analytical purposes, both the national and international system hold conceptual validity. Empirical investigation will focus on how children perceive these two systems and how their perceptions concerning the two systems differ, if indeed they do.

B. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE

A second assumption underlying the theoretical approach to the analysis states that the perception of an embryonic, emerging international political system by children reflects a growing international political culture, which may be viewed as empirically distinct from the national political culture. The concept of political culture has antecedents which may be found in the literature of historiography, social anthropology and the broad field of culture and personality.

James Nathan¹³ has compiled an exhaustive review of the origins and peregrinations of the concept, with particular reference to its significance for the international system metaphor. He has drawn on widely scattered sources in disparate disciplines to present a cogent argument for its use as an analytic referent in a comparatively-oriented analysis of global society. He concludes that the content of the system and of the culture appear to have the same referents and that the global society may be fruitfully viewed as a primitive but modernizing political system. His somewhat cavalier treatment of the national character studies growing primarily out of the culture and personality school of social anthropology reflect the view that what may be called the psycho-political

approach is "more than could stand lengthy academic scrutiny."¹⁴ In Chapter VII I suggest that, on the contrary, such an approach has the potential of clarifying the concept of political culture. It can provide a powerful tool for countering the criticism of this concept directed at it by those who view its use primarily as a residual catch-all in comparative analysis.

In order to establish the frame of reference within which the comparative analysis of the political orientation of Israeli children will be conducted, there are certain aspects of the political culture concept which need further explication. Its first formulation appeared in an article published in 1956 as part of a broad attempt to develop categories for comparative political studies. Here, Almond introduced the concept as follows:

Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. I have found it useful to refer to this as the political culture. There are two points to be made regarding the concept of political culture. First, it does not coincide with a given political system or society. Patterns of orientation to politics may, and usually do, extend beyond the boundaries of political systems. The second point is that the political culture is not the same thing as the general culture, although it is related to it. Because political orientation involves cognition, intellection, and adaptation to external situations, as well as the standards and values of the general culture, it is a differentiated part of the culture and has a certain autonomy. Indeed, it is the failure to give proper weight to the cognitive and evaluative factors, and to the consequent autonomy of political culture, that has been responsible for the exaggerations and oversimplifications of the "national character" literature of recent years.¹⁵

As restated in a later work, The Civic Culture, which Almond co-authored with Sidney Verba, political culture may be defined as "the particular distribution of patterns of orientations toward political objects among the members of a nation."¹⁶ Lucian Pye, in his study of Burmese national identity, offered a similar interpretation of the concept: "A political culture can only be found in men's minds, in the

patterns of action, feelings and reflections which they have internalized and made a part of their existence."¹⁷

However, Pye relates his conception of political culture more directly to the process of modernization. He sees political culture as the

. . . orientation to the political process of the individual and the collectivity. For both the individual and the polity the political culture is a product of the cumulative orientations of a people toward the political process.¹⁸

Similarly, in an effort to explore conditions of modernization, Nettl and Robertson conceptualize culture at the international level as

. . . consisting of three main layers--the "religious" layer, the "legal and diplomatic" layer and the "industrial" layer. . . . International legal and diplomatic culture has to do directly with the traditional patterns of interaction between nations insofar as these have been parties to diplomacy and participants in the application of international law.

They continue:

To this extent we should not simply view international law and diplomacy as arising from a global or near-global form of international exchange; but rather a cultural pattern which the new participants in the twentieth century international system have had to encounter as a datum of that system. . . . Thus this layer of culture has much to do with the general issue of international socialization.¹⁹

While this excerpt is taken from a study primarily concerned with the international socialization of elites, it may be applied to non-elite groups. In the context of the Israeli political culture, "cumulative orientations of a people toward the political process" and toward international law and diplomacy encountered as a datum of the international system (by the people) are clearly shaped and influenced by the position of Israel as a creature and object of that political process and that international system.

Pye argues that the socialization process as related to the development of self-image and process of nation building is crucial in

defining the spirit of politics. Extrapolating it can be argued that the national self-image, or political culture, can be considered crucial in defining the spirit of international politics.

Having posited the existence of two empirically distinct political cultures, I will now discuss the rationale for applying this framework to a comparative analysis.

Reference was made in Chapter I to the fact that most young people in contemporary society are socialized into overlapping political systems. These systems may be of the city, state and country for American children, or of the city, nation and emerging European community for the Belgian child. But in most instances there is the additional one of the world community into which children are socialized. Underlying this research is an effort to make a contribution to our understanding of how young people are "inducted into the political system" and of how they learn the appropriate roles and methods to either maintain stability or bring about changes in the political system; to be political actors.

Political socialization is a functional aspect of the political system and is, in fact, determined by the structure of the system. Thus a political system which is highly institutionalized and specialized uses different mechanisms in the socialization process than one which is emerging from a state of diffuseness.

While young people are socialized simultaneously to two overlapping political systems, the political culture of the national system may actually affect the socialization process toward the international system. This would be in accord with what is known of the institutionalization of patterns in the national system and the lack thereof in the international system.

Such a hypothesis is supported by a careful reading and interpretation of the diverse literature related to international learning.²⁰ The dominant theme in these findings appears to be that, in terms of content, children learn at a fairly early age to view the world and specific areas and peoples through the lenses of the dominant political culture of which they are a part. The East-West conflict which is reflected in the political orientation of many young Americans is not evident in the political orientation of children from Africa or Brazil, for example.²¹

Such an approach may be fruitful in learning more about the development of international orientations and will be explored in a later chapter. This chapter focuses on the differences between the processes and outcomes rather than the interaction between them.

As an operational concept, according to Almond and Verba, political culture has a certain autonomy which emanates from the political system. It is viewed as an orientation toward political objects; it is the political system as "internalized in the cognitions, feelings and evaluations of its population." People are inducted into it just as they are socialized into non-political roles and social systems.²² To provide a framework for the comparative analysis of political orientations of young Israelis toward the national and international political system, I will draw on the three-fold typology developed in the Civic Culture. These categories distinguish between the parochial, subject and participant orientations.

The parochial orientation "implies the comparative absence of expectations of change initiated by the political system,"²³ only a dim awareness of the central political regime and few, if any, internalized norms regulating relations to the regime.

The subject, by contrast,

. . . is aware of specialized governmental authority; he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; and he evaluates it either as legitimate or as not. But the relationship is toward the system on the general level, and toward the output, administrative, or "downward flow" side of the political system; it is essentially a passive relationship.²⁴

The participant orientation, according to Almond and Verba, is one in which the members of society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as "a whole and to both the political and administrative structures and processes."²⁵ In the Almond and Verba framework, the three types of political culture are scalar, thus:

The participant culture is an additional stratum that may be added to and combined with the subject and parochial cultures. Thus the citizen of a participant polity is not only oriented toward active participation in politics, but is also subject to law and authority and is a member of more diffuse primary groups.²⁶

I argued earlier that, just as national systems can have political cultures, the international system can have a political culture in the sense of the Almond and Verba definition: "The particular distribution of patterns of orientations toward political objects among members of the nation."²⁷ Just as Almond and Verba use their typology for a cross-national study, some of their vocabulary will be used in a theoretically oriented cross-system analysis of the socialization of children into the national and international political systems. In both environments, the national and international, there is a socio-political universe of events. The child perceives these events and conditions of his socio-political environment selectively. He must somehow order them, make sense out of them, and evaluate them. The vocabulary of parochial, subject and participant will be used to categorize and compare children's orientations and notions of the national and international system.

In addition to perceptual devices for looking at specific events and circumstances, children have general orientations toward their larger national and international socio-political environment. Some of the elements of this larger conception are their perceptions of its malleability, complexity and responsiveness. Further, children may have a general notion of their capacity to influence this environment and of their own competence in the system. An additional element here is the child's specific knowledge of the mechanisms, techniques, and possibilities for changing his environment and/or his relationship to his environment.

Borrowing the vocabulary, if not the exact meaning of the Civic Culture, the first taxonomic distinction of parochialism revolves around the criteria of children's cognitive awareness of events and conditions in their national system and the international system. In this analysis the concept further implies the notion of the child's level of information and the perceived relationship to both systems. A subject orientation implies an awareness by the child of an event or condition in the national or international system as impinging on him, which the parochial does not. The third, participant orientation, revolves around the notion of the child's participatory imagination. This would be simply the measured ability of the child to see himself not only as acted upon but acting in response to events and conditions in his national and the international system.

Almond and Verba, in their five-nation project, study perceptions of governmental processes and structures as reported by adult respondents. This study takes a broader view of political life while focusing on a more limited segment of the life cycle. The theoretical concern is how

children perceive, order and structure those events and conditions which touch them. The respondents in this sample are pre-adults, non-voters and non-participants in the actual governmental processes. Perception of events and conditions as they affect them and appropriate responses have not been learned experientially.

Survey evidence at the adult level indicates that the political culture typology approach would be an especially useful way of analyzing the development of children's orientations toward the international system. The adult literature on American attitudes toward foreign policy indicates that there is a basic difference in the "political cultures" of the national and international political systems. This literature also indicates that the political culture of the international system is predominantly parochial, as defined above, whereas the political culture of the national system is predominantly subject and participant.

A principal objective here is to explore the extent to which such differences in political culture in the two systems begin to emerge in childhood. It is not an untenable position that scholarly concerns about politics are basically elaborate literary commentary on the everyday thoughts and preoccupations of the common man and even children may have some conceptual understanding of the world. Targ²⁸ found that sixth-graders view the world with the same analytic notions of Real-Politik that are current in governmental and scholarly analyses. Similarly, in extensive pre-testing, it was found that many American youngsters eleven and twelve years of age have sophisticated notions of the aims of foreign policy and nuclear strategy. It would appear that larger disputes about the role, means and purposes of foreign policy find their roots in a common, diffuse, political culture, which includes pre-adults.

The criteria of effective state action, the reason and aims of foreign policy, and the role of the citizen are at the center of the current and historic debate on the determinants of state action. In the American context, the national interest has been the crucial concept. The national interest for some, like Walter Lippman, has had clear and self-evident guidelines that any intelligent observer with proper meditation, contemplation and experience can delineate.²⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, perhaps the most complete explorer and interpreter of this concept, has always seemed to hold that the national interest has an almost platonic essence about it.³⁰ To others it has not always been so clear. C. A. Beard searched through a substantial part of American history for the national interest and confessed he could not find it.³¹ It is not my purpose to examine various definitions of national interest ranging from the bare minimum of prudence to the more expanded views of what Arnold Wolfers once called the "Milieu Goals of Foreign Policy."³² The basic, seemingly irreducible minimum would seem to hold that at the very least the national interest means survival.

While there may be ambiguity on this conceptualization in the American context, there is none in the Israeli context. Questions such as the survival of what, who and at what level, relevant for other nations, seem to have been answered unequivocally for all Israeli respondents by recent history. The survival of the nation, Israel, is seen as a sine qua non for the survival of the Jewish people. An anecdote may be illustrative of this difference. In 1905, the Emperor of Japan served an ultimatum to the Emperor of Korea: Yield, or your people will be destroyed. The Korean Prince fled, knowing his state and its structure of authority would fall to the Japanese. The Korean Prince

had sacrificed the interest of the state for the survival of the nation. While this is a philosophical distinction of considerable appeal in the western nations in the nuclear age, it appears irrelevant in any debate in Israel.³³ World War II and the history of the world since 1945 have convinced the Israelis that the Final Solution proposed at that time for the Jews of Europe is a potential reality which any policy decision must take as its point of departure. The survival of the State of Israel and the survival of the Jewish people are seen as inseparable. They represent two aspects of the basic principle which can not be compromised.

Related to the question of national interest is the accompanying literature on political realism as a guide to state action. Realism can be the boisterous search for manhood in international activity best exemplified by T. Roosevelt, which is examined by Robert Osgood in his comparison of the Rough Rider to Nietzsche's Warrior.³⁴ It could be the cold-bloodedness of a Meinecke,³⁵ Machiavelli, or a kind of neo-atavism exemplified by Liska,³⁶ or it could be the simple, moving statements of that Mother-Figure, Prime-Minister of Israel, Golda Meir.

Idealists, visionaries, and fools--in this literature are found all those who tried to either transcend the necessities of state (whatever that may be or mean) or are blind to them in their common projection of their own humanity and sympathies to other men.³⁷ It is not, of course, entirely in keeping or, indeed, possible in a study of childhood political socialization to resolve the complexities of this argument--to find a proper definition of the ingredients of political realism or to inquire of the place of idealism in the making of foreign policies. But the analysis can, perhaps, contribute something both in assessing the common, ordinary criteria children use in making their political world meaningful

and perhaps to project these meanings on the wider screen of the theory of international relations as well as international education. The implications for increasing our understanding of the international behavior of individuals by such an approach are further explored in the writings of Kelman, et al, discussed earlier.³⁸

It may be relevant to suggest that the particular sample studied here presents unique aspects as well as generalized conclusions. The eleven-year-old boy who, not atypically, responded to the question, "What does the word 'peace' mean to you?" with a citation of the vision of Isaiah emphasizes the potential usefulness of research into childhood political socialization within a political culture framework. History, as taught in all Israeli schools, begins with the Bible.

An analysis of children's political orientations within the framework of the political culture typology may be thought of as having two dimensions: first, life circumstance, that is, an individual's perception of a relatively personal stake or self-interest in an event in his socio-political environment; and, second, a linkage of sympathy or idealism--where a child projects his own values, feelings of "rectitude" and idealism over the events and conditions of his environment to order them in a meaningful way. The tightest and most consistent intertwining of these two modes of analysis most likely occurs in the national system. For here the child is both taught to identify his humanity with those who share his own national label and to see his interest more inextricably linked to his fellow national. But it is not easy to speculate on what "natural" distinctions a child would make of events and conditions in the international system.

The two analytical tools described could help order the child's values, priorities and judgments in four ways. He could be indifferent

or apathetic to the great convulsions of international society. His national filter could be so effective as to be almost opaque. The policy implications of an apathetic public, if not clear, are at least disturbing for both the normative theorist and the sensitive statesman. Public support for policy involving hardships in the form of service or economic sacrifice could be more difficult to elicit from a body politic steeped in lethargy. Similarly, an ill-informed and uncaring mass base could easily be thought of as convenient prey for the demagogue or adventurer.

A public which has low cognitive awareness of the international system and little idea or interest in how events in the international environment affect it may be called parochial. We know the present international system is one of danger, hostility and conflict for all nations. We also know that one of the functions of the socialization process is systems maintenance. Thus if the norms, values and orientations of the public are such as to lead to systemic support, there may be somewhat less reason to suspect the system will change. Literature on public opinion and foreign policy suggests that there is a "permissive consensus"³⁹ which controls the action of statesmen only in the remotest sense. Democratic societies, with a broad base of consensus and a widely shared system of beliefs and values, are likely to permit their leadership to act in times of international crisis even when sectors of the public are in vigorous opposition.

A second mode of analysis might be of the position holding a sharply defined notion of rectitude and a poorly conceptualized notion of interest. In American history one can point to the failure of Wilsonian foreign policy. It has been well and justly excoriated for its unlimited conception of the possibilities of one nation to remake its environment without sufficient reference to the exigencies of power

politics.⁴⁰ Other sins, such as paternalism or missionary imperialism, are implicit in policies (of various governments) shaped by a Weltanschauung informed by ideals alone. In Israel the government faces increasing criticism for what is attacked as a "poorly conceptualized notion of interest."

Another view of the world may be had when international affairs are seen only in the light of self-interest without idealism to moderate such a view. The implicit prescription of this viewpoint is a pure Meineckian concept of *raison d'état*.⁴¹ However, in an age when nationalism is often seen as a destructive, if potent, force and where global society is seen more and more as interrelated and interdependent, this view is unlikely to find many adherents among responsible statesmen.

Finally, there is the pragmatic view which both children and statesmen possess. In this analysis ideals and self-interest are combined to interpret events and conditions. When such a view is combined with a reasonably idealistic estimate of the malleability of the environment to foreign policy, a sense of efficacy on the part of citizens and a generalized notion of authority, there exists a basis for sound policy making.

To summarize this discussion of political culture in the national and international system, it is important to note that they are indeed empirically distinct, and an approach using this typology for a comparative study is uniquely served by focusing on the development of political attitudes in young people.

C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS WITHIN A COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL LEARNING MODEL

The final assumption to be discussed states that the development of political orientations is a process which can be studied in terms of

a cognitive-developmental learning model. Political socialization is frequently defined as a process of political learning. In a recent article, Cook and Scioli summarize the literature and conclude:

Tracing through these statements reveals a collection of definitions based on a common reference point: socialization as a learning process. Regardless of the other terms introduced into the discussion of political socialization (e.g., acquisition) the concept of a "learning process" is the central component.

They go on to state that,

. . . within the set of definitional attempts cited, learning has been introduced as a primitive term and operates to define other terms, although the term itself (i.e. learning) has not been defined.⁴²

Acknowledging the validity of this criticism, it is yet defensible strategy to employ the learning concept within a theoretically oriented analysis. Political learning, defined as social learning,⁴³ is accepted within the scholarly community as a paradigm in the development of a political theory of political socialization.

In this study the emphasis is not on learning as such, yet it is quite clear that developmental theory is crucial to an understanding of the results of socialization. As Greenstein says in his article "The Ambiguity of Political Socialization,"

Political scientists often pay lip service to the desideratum of studying actual developmental processes of inculcation and absorption, but in fact few students of any aspect of human psychological development have found it feasible to make extended direct observations in situ of human development. This is true partly because of the practical difficulties in observing processes that often occur in private or come to pass in a staglamite fashion, slowly, over long periods of time. Longitudinal research is difficult to conduct even when it does not involve direct observations of socialization processes, given the problems of attrition on the part of both the studied samples and the investigators themselves.⁴⁴

An intensive analysis of how children adopt political attitudes and behavior is a legitimate approach to the study of political socialization for the learning theorist or the developmental psychologist.

But my primary intellectual concern here is with understanding the differences, if they exist, between the sequential development of political orientations toward the two systems. Rather than focusing on the internal processes of acquisition or learning, I direct my attention to content and self-perception with agents of socialization and age level as independent variables. Where appropriate, I use findings of developmental theory in an exploratory effort to generate hypotheses concerning the development of political attitudes. The cognitive-developmental model holds that the child's perceptions of the political world are modified and keyed to the state of his intellectual development. Thus, for example, generalizations about a class of political objects and perceptions of territorial entities can not be gained until the individual is capable of performing inductive and deductive operations and of understanding spatial relationships. As this model is relevant for the study of acculturation among very young age groups, I shall now turn to a brief review of the nature of intellectual development as illuminated by the findings of Jean Piaget.

Central to much of contemporary research on intellectual development and maturation is the work of the Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget. His work, together with the body of work developed by his followers and critics, provides the foundation on which the now substantial literature on cognitive-developmental learning theory is based. Of specific relevance for the study of political learning is his finding that intellectual maturation may be viewed as a growth process identified by stages which are distinguished by specific changes in mental operations. Each stage is seen as a prerequisite for the succeeding stage.

In exploring the applications of some of his concepts, Piaget was the first to examine the appearance and consolidation of national

identity and of belongingness or foreignness. In a study conducted with Weil,⁴⁵ Swiss children were asked questions about Switzerland and its cantons and were also encouraged to make simple drawings. The six-year-olds were aware of little more than their personal immediate territory. Although some of them might say that Geneva was in Switzerland, the two would be drawn as circles side by side and they would maintain that one could not be Swiss and Genevese at the same time. Between seven and eight years of age the idea of spatial enclosure was grasped, but the logical enclosure still caused them difficulty. By eleven years of age most were able to grasp the notion of the country with its related and included parts. When questioned about foreigners, the youngest children had considerable difficulty, foreign being something absolute rather than relative, so that foreigners appeared as people belonging to "other countries." Thus the Swiss could not be foreigners even when they were outside their own country.

In a subsequent study, Jahoda (1963) used interviews and performance tests with a group of Scottish children. The youngest, again, had no more than a vague grasp of local territory and in the test they typically arranged the pieces in such ways as to suggest that Glasgow was not included in Scotland. Not until age eleven could most of the subjects correctly express in verbal form the relationship Glasgow-Scotland-Britain and arrange the pieces of the test in correct order of size and inclusion.⁴⁶

Piaget has pointed to two changes in thinking between six and twelve. First, the child has to make considerable efforts toward "decentration," the broadening of center of interest, from the parochial to larger and more abstract entities. Typically, this development towards a clearer concept of "nation" comes after the appearance of nationalist

sentiment. Second, egocentricity has to give way to a "socio-centric" outlook and reciprocity, an ability to see matters from points of view other than his own and to recognize, for example, that what holds for one's self in a particular situation can also hold for others in an equivalent one.

In the Piagetian framework, abstract conceptualization does not occur with any frequency until approximately eleven. Since the sample on which the data are based has nine- and ten-year-olds at the lower range of the age continuum, the developmental model focuses attention on the two younger groups of the sample. It suggests that for the younger respondents, particularly fourth-graders, both the questions and the events which serve as antecedent referents will have different significance than for older children and this will be reflected in response patterns.

On the basis of the preceding discussion, the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter will be rephrased as predictions:

1. The political orientations of young people toward the national system will differ from their political orientations toward the international system.
2. The development of political orientations toward both systems is related to age.

The theoretical considerations presented in this chapter provide the framework for the empirical findings presented in the following chapter. Political orientations toward the two overlapping systems are compared along six dimensions. A quasi-longitudinal design consisting of five age groups of young Israelis is employed to facilitate the testing of predictions concerning age-related developmental patterns.

NOTES

1. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965) and "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, IX (1957), 383-400 contain his general formulation of the systems approach. It is further elaborated in David Easton and Robert Hess, "Youth and the Political System," in Cultural and Social Character, ed. by Seymour M. Lipset and L. Lowenstein (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 226-51. It has been used as a framework for the study in political socialization by David Easton and Jack Dennis, in Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969; in a study of education and the political system by Byron G. Massialas, Education and the Political System (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969); Michael J. Kirst, ed., The Politics of Education at the Local, State and Federal Levels (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutcheon Publishing Corp., 1970).
2. Kenneth Boulding, "Education for Spaceship Earth," in James M. Becker, An Examination of Objectives, Needs and Priorities in International Education in U.S. Secondary and Elementary Schools, Report to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare: Office of Education, Bureau of Research, July 1969 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1969), Appendix B.
3. Barbara Ward, Spaceship Earth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 14; also personal communication, Washington University Commencement Address, Clayton, Missouri, May, 1972.
4. Lya Dym, "The Jewish Agency for Palestine as an Agent in International Affairs" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1948).
5. Herbert C. Kelman, op. cit.
6. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 104.
7. David Easton, Children in the Political System, p. 49.
8. David Easton, ibid., p. 49.
9. Morton H. Kaplan, "Problems of Theory Building and Theory Confirmation in International Relations," World Politics, XIV (1961), p. 14.
10. Hans J. Morgenthau as cited by Chadwick Alger in "Comparison of Intra-national and International Politics," American Political Science Review, LVII (June, 1963).

11. David Easton, Children in the Political System, p. 324.
12. Ibid., p. 10.
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CHAPTER IV

A COMPARISON OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS AMONG ISRAELI PRE-ADULTS

Data and Findings

In this chapter I report the empirical findings based on data collected to test the predictions developed in Chapter III. Political orientations of all respondents were compared in six areas. These dimensions are:

- A. Political Knowledge
- B. Sources of Information
- C. Impact of System on Self
- D. Impact of Self on System
- E. Social Problems: Violence
- F. Social Problems: Social Justice

The first section compares the political orientations of young Israelis toward the national and international political systems in terms of political knowledge.

Empirical data in this chapter are reported as frequency distributions expressed in percentages. Calculated by computer these are displayed as bivariate frequency distributions. The chi square test of significance, appropriate where observations can be classified in discrete categories and treated as frequencies, was used in the statistical analysis of the joint frequency distributions. The level of significance was set at .05.

A. POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

Orientations were defined earlier as consisting of knowledge, values and attitudes. Greenstein speaks of cognitive (factual knowledge and identification), affective or emotional, and evaluative learning.

The literature shows substantial agreement that basic affective orientations toward political objects, groups and roles are acquired prior to the learning of substantive information about the political system.¹ The works of Piaget, Levine, Easton and Greenstein represent diverse approaches to the question of early political learning, but all point to the formulation expressed by Greenstein that "evaluative and affective knowledge (about political leaders) seem to precede the factual information on which they might be based."² It may be conjectured that what is true of political leaders can be extrapolated to apply to other representations of governmental authority and subjected to empirical analysis.

Normative democratic theory places knowledge high in the hierarchy of values for the citizen in a democracy. The programs of citizenship training which are required in most public school systems attest to the concern with imparting knowledge concerning the political system at an early age.³ Social studies curricula as well as a highly politicized environment contribute to the political socialization of the young Israeli. Political speeches and campaign oratory exhort the citizens not only to vote, but to vote for a specific party, emphasizing issue orientations and informed participation.

While it might appear that knowledge is in fact an essential component of orientations toward the political system, public opinion polls have shown strong views held on crucial issues for which little information

was available or where, upon investigation, opinions were found to be based on misinformation. This may simply reflect the relative significance of the salience of issues, as compared with a broad understanding of popular issues in terms of political participation.

The impact of information or knowledge on attitudes of adults has been studied extensively. William Scott analyzes the psychological and social correlates of international images in terms of cognitive structure and process.⁴ In terms of cognitive theory, he conceives the image of an object to be the "totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates the object." Its analytically distinct components are cognitive, affective and action oriented. Of these, the cognitive attributes are primary in that they provide the individual with an intellectual understanding of the object. Scott interprets a variety of empirical findings in terms of the proposed theoretical framework for analyzing images and concludes that images "may be shaped by actual happenings in the world or by normatively regulated information the person encounters," and that the individual, through his own cognitive and psychological make-up, provides the receiving system.⁵ This influence of cognitions on images which are central to the value and personality structure of the individual is related to attitudes in another recent study.

The effect of events on attitudes was studied by Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt in an effort to provide a theoretical approach to the broad problem of the distribution of attitudes as measured by public opinion data and survey research.⁶ They see "images" as possible links to the statistical distribution of attitudes and specify several relevant aspects of images. Images have cognitive and also evaluative content and

may be affected by external events such as spectacular, cumulative, government-manipulated events or any combination of these. Setting up an elaborate model to assess the impact of certain types of events on images with hypothesized effects, they proceed to test their model against specific events in recent history.

Deutsch and Merritt conclude that events do indeed have measurable effects on attitudes which even their crude model predicted with a high level of accuracy. Relevant to this study is their finding that for adults "almost nothing in the world would seem to be able to shift the images of 40 per cent of the population in most countries even within one or two decades," and that if events are less spectacular and cross-pressures greater, "the magnitude of opinion shifts declines to between 10 and 20 per cent." Significantly, they conclude by pointing to the "greater openness of adolescents and young adults to new images and impressions" and to the most important effect of external events on mental images, that such events "are most effective not in overwhelming but in eliciting the autonomous activity of man's individual and social mind."⁷ Knowledge may finally be taken as an indicator of interest. The citizen who knows and is interested in acquiring knowledge is more likely to participate in political activities.⁸

To assess the level of political knowledge, six questions were presented to the sample. Three concerned the national political system and three the international. Five questions were multiple choice, while the final question required specific information, namely, the identification of the major active participants in the Suez War of 1956. The six questions are presented below.

National:

1. The President of Israel is elected every ____ years.
2. Who elects the President of Israel?
3. Who makes the new laws in Israel?

International:

1. With how many countries does Israel have diplomatic relations?
2. Name the Prime Minister of France.
3. Who were the participants in the Suez War of 1956?

Responses were scored from 0 (no correct responses) to 3 (three correct responses) for each area.⁹

The exposure of Israeli children to information concerning events and conditions in the political world is high.¹⁰ In fact the ubiquity of radio and the almost universal compulsion to listen to "chadashot" every hour is a notable feature of Israeli life which even the most casual observer must note. The particular role of radio as a source of information is discussed in greater detail in the following section.

Based on the view of knowledge as an essential component of political orientations, the following predictions can be made:

1. The level of knowledge concerning the two political systems will differ.
2. Differences in the level of knowledge will be related to age.

Table 4.1 shows the findings on the comparison of the level of knowledge regarding the national and international systems.

The results are not statistically significant. It should be noted that relatively small percentages scored no correct answers at all for either system. By far the largest groups answered two items correctly, but for both systems the percentage declined for the highest scoring category. Knowledge of the international system would seem to be

somewhat more widespread on the basis of these results, with correct answers given to two or all three questions by 70 per cent and only 64 per cent for the national system.

TABLE 4.1

LEVEL OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

Score	National	International
0	8.6%	5.6%
1	27.2	24.7
2	44.7	43.4
3	19.5	26.3
Total	100.0%	100.0%

The students were also asked questions concerning Vietnam.¹¹ All respondents, including the youngest, had some information. This ranged from simple recognition for several of the fourth-graders to fairly sophisticated responses concerning origin, duration and significance of the events involved. Questions concerning the origin of Arab-Israeli hostilities elicited equally extensive responses, but with an even higher level of accurate information. Other questions concerning authorities and political parties showed almost universal familiarity with the leading names in government.¹² Although only 52 per cent of sixth-graders could correctly identify the official position of everyone they could name, the percentage went up to 80 per cent for the tenth- and twelfth-graders.¹³

A model derived from Piaget's work and theoretical formulation is used in the developmental aspect of the analysis. Based on this

model it is predicted that differences will be noted at the sixth grade level when abstract conceptualization becomes more frequent. It is further predicted that relatively little change will be evident between eighth, tenth and twelfth grade.

Table 4.2 presents findings on the relationship between age (grade) and the level of political knowledge.

TABLE 4.2
LEVEL OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE BY GRADE

Score	4th Grade	6th Grade	8th Grade	10th Grade	12th Grade
National					
0	19.4%	8.6%	0%	4.1%	4.9%
1	51.6	42.9	18.2	22.3	22.3
2	22.6	23.8	54.5	57.0	43.4
3	6.5	24.8	27.3	16.5	29.5
International					
0	16.1%	4.8%	4.5%	3.3%	5.7%
1	45.2	52.4	45.5	13.2	17.9
2	35.5	21.4	40.9	46.3	50.4
3	3.2%	21.4%	9.1%	37.2%	26.0%

The data show statistically significant association between grade and level of information concerning both national and international systems. In terms of the Piaget-based predictions, however, there appear to be deviations from the predicted pattern.

For national information there is clearly a break at eighth grade. One-half of those in fourth and sixth grade have one (or none) correct answer, compared to 18.2 per cent of those in eighth grade with a comparable score. For international information the break appears even more clearly at this level. Exactly one-half of those in eighth grade answer two or more questions correctly, while no more than two-fifths of those in fourth and sixth grade do, and more than three-fourths of those above eighth grade do.

A comparison of national and international findings shows a somewhat more random distribution of scores for international information than for national. This suggests that learning about the international system may proceed more along the lines of the accumulation model developed by Hess and Torney¹⁴ than is true of learning about the national system.

Both tenth- and twelfth-graders score higher for international than for national knowledge. Highest scores (two or three correct responses) were obtained by 73.5 per cent of the tenth-graders for national knowledge. For international knowledge this figure rose to 83.5 per cent. Of the twelfth-graders, 72.9 per cent scored high in the national area, with 76.4 per cent for the international questions. These results may be due to the high visibility and salience of international events to the Israeli public, as suggested above. A more plausible explanation may be found in the relatively greater interest of this age group in events which are seen as of direct concern. The inevitability of military service for all eighteen-year-old Israelis, regardless of sex, provides a highly personalized perspective.¹⁵

B. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

This section focuses on sources of information reported by young Israelis as most important to them. In the discussion of the level of political knowledge as an important component of orientations in the preceding section it was suggested that information as well as misinformation may contribute to the development of attitudes.

During the first years of life, the child is exposed primarily to the family, which thus becomes the main source of information. The family is the dominant socializing influence during the pre-school years and, in terms of political socialization, imparts mainly affective orientations toward political objects.¹⁶ As the child grows older and is exposed to school, peers and the public media, the influence of the family declines and, with this decline, its function as a primary source of information is taken over by other agents.¹⁷ The child comes under the influence of secondary sources as well as primary. As the sources change, the type of information acquired also changes, from the basically affective orientations to information and orientations of an increasingly cognitive content.

Research in the United States shows that the school is viewed as a major influence in the political socialization of children. Hess and Torney see it as the single most important agent:

The public school appears to be the most important and effective instrument of political socialization in the United States. It reinforces other community institutions and contributes a cognitive dimension to political involvement.¹⁸

The school as an agent of political socialization has also been the focus of attention in studies of developing countries. Its role in the process of national integration and development of a national identity has been explored by Fischer.¹⁹

An analysis of the socialization literature in psychology and anthropology suggests a gross dichotomization of sources of information for analytical purposes. One category consists of those which are impersonal, one-way communications. These include the public media, i.e. newspapers, magazines, radio and television. The other group includes those which are personal, (may) involve an exchange of ideas, and are cumulative.

The literature on communications media suggests that what people listen to, look at and perceive is filtered by their needs and wants. Hyman²⁰ points to the importance of studying the patterns of communication and their relevance to the process of political socialization. More recently, Pye has directed attention to the need to examine the potentialities of the mass media for influencing the cognitive dimensions of people's understanding of politics.²¹ In terms of children's orientations, the influence of television has not yet been sufficiently evaluated, but it seems clear that the relative influence of both school and family will be found to be attenuated as more research on this medium is reported.²²

I am interested here in exploring the question of whether there are differences in the patterns of utilization of sources of information for knowledge concerning the national and international systems. The data are analyzed in terms of these differences in patterns as indicated by the relative importance assigned to the various sources by the respondents, rather than in terms of the consequences of such choices.

The following list of six sources of information was presented to respondents:

1. Newspapers and Periodicals
2. Radio

3. Television
4. Teachers and Schools
5. Parents
6. Friends

Respondents were asked to select those three sources from which they obtain most of their information concerning events and conditions in the national political system and to rank them from (1) most important to (3) least important. They were then asked to do the same for international events. The same six choices were offered, but in different sequence.

My prediction is that different patterns in the utilization of these sources will be reported by respondents. More specifically, I predict:

1. The public media will be considered more important sources of information for both systems than the personal ones.
2. The public media will be considered more important for international information than for national.
3. Parents will be considered more important for national than international information.
4. Teachers and schools will be more important for national than international information.
5. Friends will be more important for national than international information.

Analyzing the same data on the basis of grade, the following predictions derive from the developmental model:

1. The public media will be chosen as more important than personal sources by all ages.
2. The importance of parents will decline with increasing age of respondents.
3. The importance of teachers will decline with increasing age of respondents.
4. The importance of friends will decline with increasing age of respondents.

There were two aspects to the analysis of the data. The first was an attempt to identify patterns of utilization of information sources which would have a bearing on the theoretically predicted dichotomization between impersonal and interpersonal sources. The second was to identify patterns which would provide evidence related to the predicted differential use of information sources concerning the national and international political systems. Findings were then correlated with age to explore the relationship between age and patterns of utilization.

Table 4.3 summarizes the findings. It shows what per cent listed each of the six sources among the three most important sources of information concerning the two political systems.

TABLE 4.3

SOURCES OF POLITICAL INFORMATION WITH PER CENT INCLUDING
EACH AMONG THREE MOST IMPORTANT

Source	National	International
Newspapers, periodicals	74%	80%
Television	43	50
Radio	75	74
Friends	10	10
Teachers, schools	18	10
Parents	42	27

The data in Table 4.3 clearly show that, for the sample as a whole, the public media rank significantly higher in importance as sources of information concerning both the national and international systems than do personal sources. One notable figure is the 42 per cent choice

for parents as a source for national information following closely the 43 per cent rating for television. In interpreting these data it must be kept in mind that Israeli television is not comparable to television in the United States. In Israel, as of 1970 and somewhat less so in 1972, television was available to a much smaller audience than were radio and newspapers. Furthermore, where television was available, its programming was limited to two or three hours each day. It can be speculated that the relatively high ranking for television reflects to some extent a response set due to its close association for respondents with other public media. It would be more appropriate therefore, to consider 74 per cent as the cutting point for distinguishing between public and personal sources.

Table 4.4 is a frequency distribution displaying both numbers and per cent of the sample who reported various three-way combinations as most important to them for information concerning the two political systems. Only those groupings reported by at least 2 per cent of the sample are included in the table.

It shows more clearly than does Table 4.3 the relatively greater reliance on public media for international information than for national information. Thirty-two per cent of the sample see public media as the significant source of national information, while 42 per cent depend on these primarily for international information. This greater reliance on the public media for international information is further emphasized by the gap between the first two groupings. Ten per cent separate those who rely only on these sources from those who substitute parents for television when they want information concerning the national system. When information concerning the international system is sought there is

a drop of 24 per cent between those relying solely on impersonal public media and those substituting parents for television (clearly the least significant).

TABLE 4.4
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PREDOMINANT COMBINATIONS
OF THREE MOST IMPORTANT SOURCES^a

Source	National		International	
	Per Cent of Respondents	Number of Respondents	Per Cent of Respondents	Number of Respondents
1. Newspapers Television Radio	32.0%	197	42.0%	254
2. Newspapers Radio Parents	22.4	134	18.0	110
3. Newspapers Radio Teachers	6.8	41	6.7	40
4. Newspapers Television Parents	5.0	30	4.3	26
5. Newspapers Radio Friends	5.0	30	3.8	23
6. Television Parents Radio	3.8	23	2.5	15
7. Newspapers Television Teachers	. . ^b	. . ^b	2.0	12
8. Newspapers Parents Teachers	. . ^b	. . ^b	2.0	12

^aDifference between 81.3% International (N=492) and 75.6% National (N=519) and 100% (N=599) for each is due to the fact that Table 4.5 and Figure 4.1 present only those combinations of the six sources selected by at least 2% of the sample.

^bLess than 2% in category.

The discussion of the findings on the relative importance of each of the sources will be elaborated in the context of the developmental model.

The developmental model derived from Piaget's work suggests that before the ages of eleven and twelve a notable increase in sociocentric orientations can be observed. Researchers in the American context have stressed the primary role of the schools as sources of political knowledge. However, Lambert and Klineberg, in their cross-national study of the development of children's attitudes toward foreign people, report no significant findings of school as a source of information.²³ They do report national differences with regard to the variety of sources mentioned and state that:

. . . the really significant cross-national trend has to do with age differences in sources of information about foreign peoples: typically the six year old children rely mainly on their parents, and on television and movies if these are available, whereas the ten and fourteen year olds make hardly any reference to people--parents, teachers or friends--as direct information sources.²⁴

The present sample does not include six-year-olds, but the trend reported by Lambert and Klineberg is echoed in the developmental trend which can be observed in the nine to eighteen-year-old span included. There is a further difference. Unlike the Lambert and Klineberg study which relied on open-ended interviews, the present data are drawn from forced choice type questions. Respondents were asked to rank six sources presented to them. Nevertheless, similar patterns appear, and similar age-related trends appear to be operating.

Tables 4.5 through 4.10, which follow, show findings on sources of information associated with grade. The first three tables present the data for the public media and the last three for interpersonal media,²⁵ in each case with per cent assigning it first, second or third rank in importance perceived by respondents.

Table 4.5 shows the ranking of newspapers by those who chose it as one of the three most important sources of information. There were 485 respondents in this category for the national system and 505 for the international system.

TABLE 4.5

SOURCES OF INFORMATION CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT BY GRADE:
NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS (RANK IN PER CENT OF GRADE)^a

Grade	Most Important	Second in Importance	Third in Importance
National ^b			
4	28.4% (21)	29.7% (22)	40.5% (30)
6	31.0 (27)	43.7 (38)	25.3 (22)
8	52.1 (37)	35.2 (25)	12.7 (9)
10	59.2 (64)	33.1 (40)	14.0 (17)
12	55.3 (73)	28.8 (38)	15.9 (21)
International ^c			
4	28.4% (21)	32.4% (24)	39.2% (29)
6	47.4 (46)	30.9 (30)	21.6 (21)
8	63.3 (50)	25.3 (20)	11.4 (9)
10	55.3 (68)	34.1 (42)	10.6 (13)
12	53.8 (71)	31.1 (41)	15.2 (20)

^aFigures in parentheses, in Tables 4.5 through 4.10, represent number of respondents in each category.

^bN=484.

^cN=505.

The per cent ranking it in first place increases with age, which reflects the reading and cognitive ability of the students and confirms the trend identified by Lambert and Klineberg.

More than half of those in the eighth through twelfth grades rate newspapers and periodicals as the most important source of national information (from a low of 52.1 per cent of eighth grade to a high of 59.2 per cent of tenth grade, with twelfth grade an intermediate 55.3 per cent). For international information again more than half of the sample turn to this source, with the range from 53.8 to 63.3 per cent. Younger students, notably fourth graders were less likely to regard newspapers and periodicals as primary sources.

Radio presents a somewhat different pattern. Of 486 respondents who chose radio as one of three most important sources of national political information, only 62 (12.8 per cent) placed it last among the top three. Among the 486 choosing it for international information only 86 (17.7 per cent) placed it third, in contrast with those ranking it first. It reflects the point made earlier about the widespread practice of listening to radio news, both in private and publicly. Even the younger children are influenced by this national preoccupation. Contrary to the pattern for newspapers, there does not appear to be an increased preference for radio with age, nor is there any significant difference between its utilization as a source of national and information. Table 4.6 shows findings on radio as a source of information.

TABLE 4.6

SOURCES OF INFORMATION CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT BY GRADE:
RADIO (RANK IN PER CENT OF GRADE)

Grade	Most Important	Second in Importance	Third in Importance
National ^a			
4	38.9% (28)	45.8% (33)	15.3% (11)
6	50.0 (47)	30.9 (29)	18.1 (17)
8	44.4 (32)	38.9 (28)	16.7 (12)
10	47.3 (61)	44.2 (57)	8.5 (11)
12	40.8 (49)	50.0 (60)	9.2 (11)
International ^b			
4	44.4% (32)	30.6% (22)	25.5% (18)
6	38.8 (38)	42.9 (42)	17.3 (17)
8	30.6 (22)	50.0 (36)	19.4 (14)
10	38.9 (49)	46.8 (59)	14.3 (18)
12	42.0 (50)	42.0 (50)	16.0 (19)

^aN=486.^bN=486.

Table 4.7 shows how television was ranked in importance by those respondents choosing it as one of the three most important.

The choice of television among the top three was made by fewer respondents than newspapers and radio. A total of 314 included it for national and 344 for international information. The table shows a declining emphasis on this source with age for the first ranking and an overall more prevalent choice for it in third place, reflecting greater awareness of reality with age. There is a somewhat greater reliance on television

for international information than for national, and greater reliance on it by the younger age groups.

TABLE 4.7

SOURCES OF INFORMATION CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT BY GRADE:
TELEVISION (RANK IN PER CENT OF GRADE)

Grade	Most Important	Second in Importance	Third in Importance
National ^a			
4	21.1% (15)	19.7% (14)	59.2% (42)
6	28.2 (11)	33.3 (13)	38.5 (15)
8	18.2 (10)	27.3 (15)	54.5 (30)
10	12.7 (10)	24.1 (19)	63.3 (50)
12	15.5 (11)	29.6 (21)	53.5 (38)
International ^b			
4	33.9% (20)	33.9% (20)	32.2% (19)
6	31.4 (16)	25.5 (13)	43.1 (22)
8	23.3 (14)	26.7 (16)	50.0 (30)
10	19.1 (17)	22.5 (20)	58.4 (52)
12	11.6 (10)	37.2 (32)	50.0 (43)

^aN=314.

^bN=344.

Turning now to the interpersonal sources of information, Table 4.8 shows how teachers and schools were ranked. A total of 160 respondents selected teachers among the three most important sources for national information and 97 for international information. This supports the prediction based partly on earlier research findings,²⁶ that teachers are more significant sources of information for the national system, since much of what is learned about the national system is learned in school

TABLE 4.8

SOURCES OF INFORMATION CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT BY GRADE:
TEACHERS AND SCHOOLS (RANK IN PER CENT OF GRADE)

Grade	Most Important	Second in Importance	Third in Importance
National ^a			
4	54.4% (30)	27.3% (15)	18.2% (10)
6	22.2 (6)	40.7 (11)	37.0 (10)
8	35.7 (5)	14.3 (2)	50.0 (7)
10	11.1 (4)	41.7 (15)	44.4 (16)
12	3.8 (1)	23.1 (6)	73.1 (19)
International ^b			
4	21.4% (3)	42.9% (6)	35.7% (5)
6	8.0 (2)	32.0 (8)	56.0 (14)
8	0 (0)	58.3 (61)	41.7 (5)
10	3.6 (1)	18.0 (5)	75.6 (21)
12	5.6 (1)	16.7 (3)	77.8 (14)

^aN=160.^bN=97.

More information concerning the national political system emanates from the schools than does information concerning the international political system. The number of those considering teachers and schools as most important reflects a downward trend with age which is also in accord with findings reported by Lambert and Klineberg. This trend is significantly greater for international than national information.

Table 4.9 shows the relative rankings for parents.

TABLE 4.9

SOURCES OF INFORMATION CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT BY GRADE:
PARENTS (RANK IN PER CENT OF GRADE)

Grade	Most Important	Second in Importance	Third in Importance
National ^a			
4	34.2% (25)	42.5% (31)	23.3% (17)
6	29.2 (21)	42.5 (20)	23.3 (31)
8	15.0 (6)	35.0 (14)	50.0 (20)
10	11.3 (6)	22.6 (12)	64.2 (34)
12	8.9 (4)	22.2 (10)	66.7 (30)
International ^b			
4	35.7% (15)	33.3% (14)	31.0% (13)
6	21.3 (13)	27.9 (17)	50.8 (31)
8	6.3 (2)	18.7 (6)	71.9 (23)
10	5.1 (2)	28.2 (11)	64.1 (25)
12	6.3 (2)	15.6 (5)	75.0 (24)

^aN=283.

^bN=206.

Supporting the prediction that parents are more important as sources of national information, 283 respondents included parents among the three sources most important to them for national information, and 206 for international. Again the age related pattern is clearly in the direction of decreasing importance of parents as an information source

with age. The trend is again more pronounced for international information.

Finally, Table 4.10 shows data on the ranking of friends as one of the three most important sources of information.

TABLE 4.10
SOURCES OF INFORMATION CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT BY GRADE:
FRIENDS (RANK IN PER CENT OF GRADE)

Grade	Most Important	Second in Importance	Third in Importance
National ^a			
4	20.0% (2)	30.0% (3)	50.0% (5)
6	15.0 (3)	5.0 (1)	80.0 (16)
8	10.0 (1)	20.0 (2)	70.0 (7)
10	8.0 (2)	24.0 (6)	64.0 (16)
12	4.8 (1)	14.3 (3)	76.2 (16)
International ^b			
4	0% (0)	33.3% (2)	66.7% (4)
6	10.0 (1)	20.0 (2)	70.0 (7)
8	16.7 (1)	16.7 (1)	66.7 (4)
10	21.7 (5)	17.1 (4)	56.5 (13)
12	0 (0)	11.1 (2)	83.3 (15)

^aN=86.

^bN=64.

Here, again, the prediction of friends being more important for national than international information is supported. A total of

eighty-six respondents selected this source for the national system compared to only sixty-four for the international system. In fact, of those selecting friends as a source for international information, almost none ranked them in the most important category. The prediction of greater reliance on friends as a source of information with age is borne out only for the third ranking, which includes the largest absolute number. This may, in fact, support the prediction. Not placing friends first or second is realistic--but including this source in third place may indicate a desire to be sure that the role of peers is affirmed.

A brief summary of the findings in this section relates them to the predictions stated in the introduction to the section. Findings show that public media are considered more important sources of information than are interpersonal sources, for both the national and international systems. Public media are further regarded as more important sources of international than national information. These findings confirm the first two predictions.

The following three predictions deal with the relative importance of inter-personal sources for national and international information. Findings show that parents, teachers and schools and friends are considered more important sources of national than international information, thus confirming these predictions as well.

Turning to the final group of predictions the findings confirm that public media are more important information sources than are interpersonal ones, regardless of age. Findings also confirm the predictions that the importance of parents, teachers and schools as sources of information will decline with age. The findings do not confirm the final prediction that the importance of friends will decline with age. These findings

must be interpreted with caution. A much smaller percentage of the sample included friends than was true of any other source. Of those who did, more than half ranked them third. Any conclusions based on this limited sample must be considered tentative.

C. IMPACT OF SYSTEM ON SELF

In the preceding two sections, the level of knowledge and patterns of utilization of information sources in the two political systems were compared. It was predicted that there would be differences in the level and kinds of knowledge concerning national and international systems. It was also predicted that sources of information would be utilized differentially for the two systems.

In this section I am more directly concerned with analyzing linkages with the political system. How does the individual perceive this linkage? Is the knowledge that a declaration of war by his country will inevitably influence his life as significant to him as an awareness that the tapping of private telephones in Tel Aviv will influence his life in Arad? An awareness that outputs of the political system influence one's life may be purely cognitive or it may also have strong emotional aspects. Involvement is a composite of cognitive, affective and action-oriented participatory components and may be defined as engagement in political life. In terms of the political culture typology, individuals can be classified into groups according to their degree of involvement.

Based on the classification of ideal-types as developed by Almond and Verba, the parochial orientation exhibits little or no involvement. With little awareness of the political system or of any interactive relationship with it, the individual does not perceive the system as having

any effect on him. The subject orientation implies some awareness of the political system. It may reflect a recognition that decisions of a representative of the political system may and, in fact, do have some impact on the life of the individual. I would argue that there is some involvement if there is some perceived impact. It may be on a cognitive or affective level, it may be supportive or disruptive, but it must minimally represent some perceived interaction.²⁷

At the beginning of Chapter III, I suggested that the national and international systems be viewed as two analytically comparable but empirically distinct political cultures. Political socialization was defined as a functional aspect of the political system, determined and shaped by its political culture. Since political socialization is a function of the structure of the system which has been established as being different for the national and international systems, the outcome will also be different. Furthermore, involvement with the two systems will be different and individuals may not hold parallel types of orientations toward the two systems.

To measure involvement it was conceptualized in terms of two component aspects, active and passive. Linkage with the system was compared in terms of perceived impact of the system on the self and perceived impact of the self on the system.

The approach taken here centers on the perceived impact of selected events and conditions in the socio-political environment on the life of the individual. How does the respondent perceive such events or conditions as impinging on his personal life? Does he "understand" that a world-wide depression will inevitably have an effect on his family in Israel? Does he respond with empathy to the emotional appeal of thousands starving in a distant land, identifying perhaps on a level of

common humanity? Without evaluating the relative significance of responses to such events or conditions, I attempt to ascertain whether there are differences in degree of involvement expressed toward comparable events and conditions in the national and international systems, in terms of perceived impact.

1. Perceived Impact

In order to analyze respondents' perception of their own relationship to the system, a measure of perceived Impact of the System on Self was constructed. A set of twenty headlines was presented to respondents, ten concerning national events or conditions and ten concerning international events or conditions. For each system, respondents were asked to what extent they perceived the event as having some effect on their own lives. Reactions were sought in terms of both cognitive and affective perceptions. The affective dimension consisted of two parts, the first designed to elicit existence or non-existence of an emotional response, while the second sought to determine the intensity of such a response.

Responses were ranked from (1) not at all, to (2) some, to (3) very much. Respondents were scored on each scale with scores ranging from a possible low of seven to a high of thirty. All cases which did not have a minimum of seven responses out of ten per scale were eliminated from the analysis.

Scores on national scales were then combined to produce a National Index of Perceived Impact on Self and scores on international scales were combined to produce an International Index of Perceived Impact on Self. Figure 4.1 shows the twenty headlines used in the construction of impact scales.

Figure 4.1.--Continued

Statement	It would . . .	<u>Influence</u>			<u>Affect</u>			<u>Sadden</u>		
		1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3 ^a
19. Wave of Strikes--Important Industries Close, Many People Out of Work!										
20. Governments in Jordan and Syria Overthrown--Army Takes Over!										

^aEach of three separate scales (Influence, Affect, Sadden) offered three options for responses.

The first series offered the choices, (1) it would not influence, (2) it would influence a little, (3) it would influence very much. For the second scale, the same series of headlines was presented and respondents were asked to check whether (1) it would not affect them, (2) it would affect them a little, (3) it would affect them very much. This provided data for the scale measuring Affect. The third scale, Intensity, was based on responses to the same headlines, asking respondents to check whether it would (1) not make them feel sad, (2) make them feel a little sad, or (3) make them feel very sad.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the following predictions were tested in measuring perceived impact of the system on self:

1. The national system will be perceived as having a greater impact on the self than the international system.
2. The perceived impact of the international system on the self will increase with age.

Findings on perceived impact are shown in Table 4.11. Even a brief glance at these findings shows clear differences in perceived impact of the two systems, strongly supporting the first prediction. The national system is, in fact, perceived as having greater impact on the

self than is the international system. The mean score of perceived influence is 23.81 for the national system compared to 20.99 for the international system. Mean scores for affect are 22.45 and 18.79, respectively, and for intensity the mean scores are 22.95 and 18.95. It is interesting to note that, while the difference in mean scores is statistically significant for all three components of the Index, the differences among the national means are smaller than are the differences among the international means. While understanding and being cognitively aware of the influence of certain events in the international system on their lives, it appears that respondents are less affected emotionally (relative to the cognitively perceived influence) by events in the international system than in the national system.

TABLE 4.11

IMPACT OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM ON SELF

Type	National	International
<u>Influence</u>		
Mean	23.81	20.99
Median	24.11	21.03
Mode	24.00	20.00
<u>Affect</u>		
Mean	22.45	18.79
Median	23.03	18.42
Mode	24.00	17.00
<u>Intensity</u>		
Mean	22.95	18.95
Median	23.33	18.70
Mode	23.00	19.00

To present a measure of total Impact, scores on all three scales were combined to produce an Index of Perceived Impact of the System on Self. Index scores are shown in Table 4.12 and confirm the finding

that the national system has a significantly greater impact than does the international system.

TABLE 4.12
SUMMARY INDEX^a OF IMPACT OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM ON SELF

	National	International
Mean	69.21	58.73
Median	70.47	58.15
Mode	71.00	56.00

^aIndex combines three scales: influence, affect, intensity.

To test the prediction that perceived impact of the political system will increase with age, the findings on each scale, with a breakdown by grade, are presented in Tables 4.13 through 4.15. These findings show the percentage in each age group which scored high and low for the different components of perceived impact.

The theoretically derived prediction that the international system will be perceived as increasingly significant to the life of the individual with increasing age is supported by the findings on the cognitive scales. Data reflect a decrease in the percentage of those who perceive the national system as having a high degree of influence, with a range from 80 per cent at fourth grade to over 68 per cent at twelfth grade. By contrast, the impact of the international system is perceived as high by an increasing percentage of respondents with increasing age except for a deviation at tenth grade. Those who see the international system as having a strong influence range from 21.3 per cent of the

fourth grade to 46.7 per cent at twelfth grade. The change is particularly notable between fourth and eighth grade when increasing sociocentrism and reciprocal thinking appear. This is reflected in the sharply increased percentage of sixth grade respondents who express a cognitive awareness of the impact of the international system, and again for eighth grade respondents. The evidence suggests that, for this sample, the effect of sociocentrism becomes stronger at a slightly later age than suggested by Piaget and his followers. The findings on the affective dimensions of perceived impact show apparently random patterns and do not support the prediction.

TABLE 4.13

PERCEIVED INFLUENCE (IMPACT) OF SYSTEM ON SELF BY
GRADE AND TYPE OF SYSTEM

Grade	National		International	
	Low	High	Low	High
4	20.0%	80.0%	78.7%	21.3%
6	21.6	78.4	65.8	34.2
8	25.0	75.0	53.4	46.6
10	29.8	70.2	58.9	41.1
12	31.9	68.1	53.3	46.7

TABLE 4.14

PERCEIVED AFFECT (IMPACT) OF SYSTEM ON SELF BY
GRADE AND TYPE OF SYSTEM

Grade	National		International	
	Low	High	Low	High
4	5.9%	94.1%	77.1%	22.9%
6	33.6	66.4	81.1	18.9
8	43.0	57.0	82.6	17.4
10	52.5	47.5	83.5	16.5
12	53.7	46.3	76.9	23.1

TABLE 4.15

PERCEIVED INTENSITY (IMPACT) OF SYSTEM ON SELF BY
GRADE AND TYPE OF SYSTEM

Grade	National		International	
	Low	High	Low	High
4	22.0%	78.0%	83.3%	16.7%
6	29.4	70.6	81.7	18.3
8	38.6	61.4	79.5	20.5
10	48.9	51.1	84.2	15.8
12	45.5	54.5	82.1	17.9

A combined index of all three components in Table 4.16 confirms the positive association of high impact and age for the international system.

TABLE 4.16

PERCEIVED IMPACT^a OF SYSTEM ON SELF BY GRADE AND
TYPE OF SYSTEM

Grade	National		International	
	Low	High	Low	High
4	31.2%	68.8%	74.4%	25.6%
6	13.5	86.5	58.6	41.4
8	17.0	83.0	51.1	48.9
10	20.6	79.4	55.3	44.7
12	18.5	81.5	48.1	51.9

^aImpact = Composite score of influence, affect and intensity scores.

On this measure the change is more notable at the sixth grade level. Those who see the national system as having a high impact go from 68.8 per cent of fourth graders to 86.5 per cent of sixth graders. For the international system the corresponding figures are from 25.6 per cent to 41.4 per cent. For both systems these are the greatest age-related differences.

To illustrate the different patterns of distribution of impact of the two systems respondents were placed in smaller categories. In Figure 4.2, respondents are placed in four groups based on scores on each of three scales. Those scoring below the minimum of seven on each scale were eliminated from the analysis. For the national index this eliminated 2.5 per cent of the respondents and, for the international index, 6.7 per cent. Those scoring low on each of the three scales comprising the Index were placed in the Low category; those scoring low on

two scales and high on one were placed in the Low-Medium category; those scoring low on one scale and high on two were placed in the Medium category; and those scoring high on all three scales were placed in the High category.


The four categories in Figure 4.2 indicate significant differences in perceived impact from the two systems. Almost three-fourths of the sample perceived a medium or high degree of impact from the national system, while less than two-fifths of the sample regarded the international system as having similar impact on their lives.

The four categories presented in Figure 4.2 were then cross-tabulated with grade. Findings in Table 4.17 below support those reported earlier. There are significant differences in the degree of perceived impact of the two systems for all ages.

Comparing the figures for the national and international systems, specifically in the High category, points again to the finding that predicted age related differences based on Piaget's sociocentric model are more applicable in the international area. Among fourth grade respondents 31.1 per cent perceive the national system as having high impact, while 50.5 per cent of those in sixth grade do. But a gradual decline brings the per cent perceiving high impact back to 30.4 per cent in twelfth grade. With regard to the international system high impact is perceived by only 2.2 per cent of those in fourth grade and between 8.9 per cent and 9.2 per cent of all those in higher grades. This provides support for the finding that, with age, the international system is seen as an increasingly significant influence on the life of the individual.

Figure 4.2.—Impact of Political System on Self:
By System (in Per Cent)

Per Cent of
Respondents



* Low on three scales.

** Low on two scales, high on one.

*** Low on one scale, high on two.

**** High on three scales.

TABLE 4.17

IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
ON SELF BY GRADE^a

Grade	Low	Low-Medium	Medium	High
National				
4	15.6%	32.2%	5.6%	31.1%
6	12.6	11.7	24.3	50.5
8	17.0	18.2	22.7	42.0
10	19.9	24.8	23.4	31.2
12	17.8	25.9	25.2	30.4
International				
4	54.7%	33.5%	7.9%	2.2%
6	54.8	27.0	9.2	9.0
8	51.1	25.0	14.8	9.1
10	53.9	27.0	8.5	9.2
12	47.4	25.9	17.0	8.9

^a Deviation from 100 per cent accounted for by elimination of low scores from analysis.

2. Legitimacy of the Political System

An additional measure of the relative influence of the national and international system on the lives of children was provided by exploring normative values held. It is possible to perceive the political system as influencing one's life without experiencing any degree of involvement. The system may be regarded as an inevitable external reality, as in the ultimate totalitarian fantasy of Orwell's 1984.

The particular issue to which this question is addressed concerns a central concept of political theory—the question of legitimacy of authority. A definition of authority as the capacity to use force as the ultimate sanction points clearly to differences, both qualitative and quantitative, between the national and international political systems. It would be impossible to measure orientations to analogous objects. However, it is not my concern here to compare objective realities, but rather to compare subjective orientations as reflected in the responses of young people.

The question of attitudes toward authority is one area which has been studied extensively within the political socialization framework. However, it has been analyzed almost exclusively within the national political system. Research on children's attitudes toward world government or world community is very limited and restricted to isolated questions and items, peripheral to the central objective of the studies in which they were included.

Children's perception of authority has been studied in the context of the family as a socializing agent and considerable controversy has been generated by discussion concerning the influence of the family in this area. The father is regarded as a major figure in the transmission of political beliefs by a number of political scientists, particularly those who use individual psychology or personality concepts as the basis for explaining individual political behavior, specifically in regard to perception of authority. The relationship of family authority patterns and cultural patterns has further contributed to this focus on the influence of the family. Levine's finding that family influence is high where parental authority patterns agree with patterns of authority in the polity

is relevant for developing countries as well as those with established patterns of authority.²⁸

The transfer of authority patterns in early childhood has been noted, particularly in countries where authority figures are highly visible and available for personalization, as in the United States. The international system, however, provides no analogous institutionalized system of authorities. To compare the development of orientations toward authorities, therefore, an attempt is made to extrapolate potential behavior from expressed values. Children's perceptions of legitimacy are inferred from an expressed willingness to submit to authority and are taken as a gross indication of relative degree of legitimacy accorded two political systems.

A series of statements was presented to the students in order to determine their response to questions of political legitimacy and the degree of authority they would be willing to accord the political system, both national and international. The findings are shown in Table 4.18.

Quite clearly, a much larger proportion of the respondents are willing to assign a high level of legitimate authority to the national system than to the international system. On the other hand, the data on the national system show significant differences. The three parts of question (3) deal with routine functions of citizenship. Supporting the government's right to demand the payment of taxes, military service and compulsory school attendance were 83.8 per cent, 75.7 per cent and 73.6 per cent of the sample, respectively. It is noteworthy that, while there have recently been several cases of individuals in Israel protesting military service, more than three-fourths of respondents consider this the unquestioned prerogative of government. As Table 4.19 shows,

of those respondents closest in time to service, more than four-fifths agree, although the percentage decreases from 88.4 per cent of the eighth grade to 80.6 per cent for the twelfth grade.

TABLE 4.18
HIGH LEGITIMACY ACCORDED TO AUTHORITY BY SYSTEM

Area of Authority	High ^a	Don't Know ^b
<u>National</u>		
1. Government may open mail (if this will help stop crime)	45.0%	11.4%
2. All laws should be obeyed	65.1	9.6
3. Government should insist on:		
Payment of taxes	83.8	
Military service	75.7	
School attendance	73.6	
<u>International</u>		
1. There should be a World Government	17.3	
2. World government should guarantee the welfare of all	35.1	
3. A world authority should be responsible for the education of all people	57.4	

^aHigh = Agreement with statement.

^bThese two items offered a "don't know" alternative, which is discussed in text.

Almost two-thirds, with one-tenth in the "don't know" category, agree that all laws should be obeyed. This response is amplified by data in an open-ended question to be discussed in Chapter VI. However, less

than one-half of the sample are willing to grant the government the right to open mail. The question was deliberately tied to a domestic type of consideration so as to avoid the potential contamination by security considerations. It seems fair to hazard the conjecture that, had it been left open or related to the safety of the nation, the percentage willing to accord government the right to infringe on personal liberties would have been substantially higher.

The world (government) items also reflect interesting discrepancies. More than one-half are willing to delegate authority for educational matters to an international body, while more than one-third do so for the cause of welfare. Yet less than one-fifth are willing to give up sovereignty to a world government. In light of other data and findings in the study, it is suggested that this again reflects the sense of relative isolation in a hostile political world, despite the defensive mechanism employed by some of the children in the oral interviews.²⁹ Table 4.19 presents findings on these items correlated with grade.

One final item is included which measures impact of the international system on the self. Again, respondents were asked to agree, disagree or express no opinion. Findings in Table 4.20 show that 67.3 per cent agreed with the statement, "Tastes of young people in clothes and music are influenced by the tastes of young people in other countries."

There were 16.0 per cent who disagreed and 16.7 per cent had no opinion, out of a sample total of 563. Of the "don't know" group, more than 50 per cent were in fourth and sixth grade. There was a clear trend toward greater agreement with the statement with age.

Since the statement involves neither political knowledge nor abstract conceptualization, it provides an opportunity to explore the question of egocentrism and sociocentrism as posed by Piaget and Weil.³⁰

TABLE 4.19

HIGH LEGITIMACY ACCORDED TO AUTHORITY BY SYSTEM
AND BY GRADE^a

Area of Authority	Grade				
	4	6	8	10	12
National					
1. Government may open mail (if this will help stop crime)	47.1%	36.9%	43.2%	50.4%	46.0%
2. All laws should be obeyed	64.1	72.0	71.6	60.0	60.9
3. Government should insist on:					
Payment of taxes	77.1	73.4	88.5	90.0	88.0
Military service	48.1	73.6	88.4	85.7	80.6
School attendance	67.6	70.0	77.0	70.0	82.7
International					
1. There should be a World Government	33.3%	28.6%	19.1%	11.5%	12.5%
2. World government should guarantee the welfare of all	60.0	46.0	41.7	29.5	28.6
3. A world authority should be responsible for the education of all people	80.0	73.7	53.1	56.2	46.2

^aHigh = Agreement with statement.

TABLE 4.20

IMPACT^a OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM ON SELF, BY GRADE

Grade	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree
4	36.9%	29.0%	34.1%
6	57.6	26.1	16.2
8	68.2	21.6	10.2
10	80.0	11.4	8.5
12	81.5	3.0	15.6
Total	67.3%	16.7%	16.0%

^aItem: Tastes of Young People in Clothes and Music are Influenced by the Tastes of Young People in Other Countries.

Stating that the emotionally immature organism is "essentially an ego-centric one and, hence, is not yet capable of relating to others with empathy or reciprocity," they suggest this as the reason why the very young child can not understand why a Frenchman who is a foreigner in Switzerland would not also be a foreigner in France. Sociocentrism appears only at a somewhat later stage when the child is able to think in reciprocal terms.

Comparing the data in my findings with theoretical expectation, there appears to be strong support for this explanation. While the strongly-disagree group comprises 4.6 per cent of the total sample, 12.4 per cent of the fourth graders are in this category. Combining the two disagree categories gives a total of 33.7 per cent of fourth graders, compared to 16.0 per cent for the entire sample. This finding is also confirmed by the work of Adelson and O'Neil, who note the gradual evolution

of sociocentric thinking, with the biggest changes between the ages of eleven and thirteen,³¹

In conclusion, the section on impact on the self supports the prediction that respondents will perceive the national system as having greater impact on their lives than does the international system. This appears to be the case in the scales which assessed the reaction of children to specific issues and events in their socio-political environment. It also appears to be the case when children are presented with normative statements concerning the two systems and are asked to express their opinion concerning the authority which should be given the two systems. On the final item, which deals primarily with an awareness of the world outside with no threat to the national system implied, more than two-thirds acknowledged the influence of the outside world. Similarly, relative to education, an item less directly security-related, more than one-half would be willing to surrender some rights to an international authority. Yet in relation to all items, it appears clear that children have different orientations toward the two systems.

D. IMPACT OF SELF ON SYSTEM

The operational definitions of perceived impact of the system on self and perceived impact of the self on system were derived from the theoretical definition of involvement. This concept was defined in Section C as reflecting some form of engagement in political life; minimally, an awareness of being acted upon by the political system.

David Easton and Jack Dennis develop the concept of efficacy in an article on the child's acquisition of regime norms.³² They point out that the concept of political efficacy as it has been used in research on adults appears to be a complex of attitudinal clusters rather than a unidimensional one and suggest that political efficacy might best be

defined by conceptualizing it in terms of a number of analytically distinct elements. Five items are discussed: a "sense of the direct political potency of the individual, a belief in the responsiveness of the government to the desires of individuals, the idea of comprehensibility of government, the availability of adequate means of influence; and a general resistance to fatalism about the tractability of government to anyone, ruler or ruled."³³ These five items comprise an efficacy scale in the analysis.³⁴

The approach to involvement from an active point of view in this section is closely related to the concept of efficacy as defined by Easton and Dennis. Before exploring this further, it would be useful to restate the political culture formulation which informs the approach to the two aspects of involvement examined. As described at the beginning of the preceding section, individuals can be grouped on the basis of degree of involvement. A parochial orientation implies the comparative absence of expectations of change initiated by the political system and only a dim awareness of the central political regime. A subject orientation shows greater cognition, is affectively oriented toward the system and evaluates it, but can be characterized as essentially passive with very little, if any, perception that the individual can affect the system.

A participant orientation characterizes the member of a political system who "is not only oriented toward active participation in politics, but is also subject to law and authority and is a member of a more diffuse primary group."³⁵

Based on this formulation, different levels of participation and perceived impact of the self on system are anticipated in comparing

orientations toward the national and international systems. The following are specific predictions made and tested:

1. Perceived impact of the self on the national system will be greater than on the international system.
2. Perceived impact of the self on both political systems will increase with age.

The instrument used here is similar to that of the preceding section. The list of headlines illustrated in Figure 4.1 was presented to respondents. Instead of the three categories of responses on perceived impact of the system on them, respondents were asked to indicate for each item whether they thought they could "do something about it." They were asked whether they could do (1) nothing, (2) something, or (3) much, about the event or condition described. Scores were computed as in the section on impact of the system on the self.

Positive responses were interpreted to reflect a sense of efficacy; of confidence that the individual could indeed influence the political system. The measure was intended to assess efficacy as a subjective perception of respondents' linkage to the political system. It was not concerned with the objective reality of what, in fact, a twelve-year-old or even sixteen-year-old could do about poverty in Jerusalem, to cite one example.

It should be mentioned here that in the open-ended interviews in which 16.5% of the sample were interviewed, similar questions were asked. In response to questions regarding both their ability and willingness "to do something about" problems such as pollution, riots, poverty and war, respondents clearly interpreted these questions to mean what would they do if they could (age, means, etc.). Patterns found were similar to those reported below.

After calculating scores for each respondent measures of central tendency were compared for the national and international systems. Table 4.21 presents these findings.

TABLE 4.21
IMPACT OF SELF BY SYSTEM

	National	International
Mean	19.70	13.27
Median	19.33	12.87
Mode	18.00	10.00

Findings show significantly higher scores for the national system than for the international system. The mean of 19.70 for the national system compared with the mean of 13.27 for the international system reflects a significantly greater degree of efficacy in relation to the former. This further substantiates the conceptualization of the national system as being close to the participant end of the political culture continuum than is the international system. Respondents clearly see themselves as more likely to have an effect on the national than on the international system.

Turning again to the developmental model, the sociocentric development is reflected in the changing perceptions of efficacy which respondents express toward the two systems. Efficacy toward the international system appears to be low for all age groups. However, the data on the national system reflects the expected break at the lower end of the age range. Table 4.22 presents findings on grades four to twelve in categories of low and high categories of efficacy toward the two political systems.

TABLE 4.22

IMPACT OF SELF ON SYSTEM, BY SYSTEM AND GRADE

Grade	National		International	
	Low	High	Low	High
4	57.0	43.0	93.6	6.4
6	74.1	25.9	93.5	6.5
8	70.1	29.9	93.1	6.9
10	77.8	22.2	98.5	1.5
12	68.7	31.3	93.2	6.8

Before proceeding to a discussion of the findings, a second measure will be reported. Drawing on earlier studies of efficacy within the national system, a number of items were used to explore perceptions of efficacy. The national and international items do not attempt to measure the difference in pragmatic approach, but rather the normative orientation toward the two systems.

Individual items were used to measure the level of perceived impact on the political system. Respondents were asked to express agreement or disagreement with a series of statements designed to measure the components of efficacy discussed. Five items measured efficacy as related to the national system and two items measured efficacy related to the international system. Findings are presented in Table 4.23.

With the exception of statement (3) reflecting a widespread adult response to the proliferation of issues and problems, there is clearly a significant difference in the percentage of those expressing

a high degree of efficacy toward the two systems. Yet it may be helpful to look more closely at each system. In response to statements concerning the national system, there is a spread from 87.1 to 35.3 per cent.

TABLE 4.23
IMPACT OF SELF (EFFICACY) ON SYSTEM

Statement	Agree ^a	Don't Know	Disagree ^b
<u>National</u>			
1. My parents don't have any say about what government does.	12.3%	25.4%	62.4%
2. When we become adults we will not have any influence on what government does.	12.5	33.2	54.4
3. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.	53.0	11.8	35.3
4. So many other people vote in elections that it won't matter much whether I vote when I become an adult.	8.9	4.0	87.1
5. The political views and activities of young people are very important.	78.9	11.6	9.5
<u>International</u>			
1. World leaders pay no attention to what ordinary people want.	29.2	31.5	39.3
2. Countries will go to war regardless of what individuals do.	37.6	16.6	45.8

^aItem 5: Agree = High Efficacy.

^bAll other items: Disagree = High Efficacy.

Socialized in a democratic political culture which places a high value on participation, 87.1 per cent of respondents insist that their vote will matter in the future. The low figure of 35.3 per cent consists of those disagreeing with the statement that sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on. The frustration reflected in the fact that more than one half of the sample agrees with the statement undoubtedly reflects adult views of politics together with a personal perception of the issues involved.

It is interesting to note the difference between the 87.1 per cent who express the normative commitment to the exercise of the franchise at some future time, and the percentage of those who perceive it as an efficacious act. While it is important to vote, only 62.4 per cent feel that their parents' vote actually influences the government, and even less, only 54.4 per cent, expect their own future vote to influence the government.

The breakdown by grade in Table 4.24 shows a strong positive association between age and efficacy relative to the national political system. Indeed, the range for twelfth grade respondents is from a low 48.1 per cent who feel efficacious when viewing the complex national political situation to 94.1 per cent who insist that it will matter whether they vote.

While the focus is on a comparison of expressed efficacy toward the national and international systems, it is of some interest to note differences within the system as well. For the first international item (world leaders pay no attention to what ordinary people want), there is a decrease in efficacy from fourth grade (46.7 per cent) to twelfth grade (31.9 per cent), perhaps reflecting an increasingly realistic--

TABLE 4.24

HIGH IMPACT^a OF SELF ON SYSTEM BY SYSTEM AND GRADE

Statement	Grade				
	4	6	8	10	12
National					
1. My parents don't have any say about what government does.	33.9% (52.1)	47.3% (35.7)	53.4% (33.0)	79.3% (10.7)	88.8% (3.0)
2. When we become adults we will not have any influence on what government does.	21.7 (50.8)	42.9 (39.3)	60.2 (34.1)	61.4 (29.3)	81.5 (15.6)
3. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.	15.8 (29.5)	28.6 (11.6)	36.4 (12.5)	40.4 (7.1)	48.1 (3.7)
4. So many other people vote in elections that it won't matter much whether I vote when I become an adult.	66.0 (9.3)	82.1 (6.3)	90.9 (3.4)	96.5 (1.4)	94.1 (1.5)
5. The political views and activities of young people are very important.	63.5 (27.1)	73.2 (14.3)	81.8 (6.8)	82.0 (9.4)	89.6 (3.7)
International					
1. World leaders pay no attention to what ordinary people want.	46.7% (35.6)	38.4% (23.2)	44.3% (25.0)	39.3% (32.9)	31.9% (38.5)
2. Countries will go to war regardless of what individuals do.	44.5 (24.4)	43.8 (28.6)	51.2 (11.4)	40.1 (16.1)	50.8 (5.2)

^aHigh Impact = Disagreement with all statements except National (5). High Impact for National Item (5) = Agreement with statement.
() = Don't Know responses.

and cynical--view of political life. The cynicism is somewhat attenuated by the 38.5 per cent (almost two-fifths) of all twelfth grade respondents who place themselves in the "don't know" category.

The second international item (countries will go to war regardless of what individuals do) results in different findings. For this question, the percentage in the "don't know" category is substantially smaller than for the preceding question. Except for fourth grade, the trend is again toward a decrease in expressed efficacy with age, with tenth and twelfth grade almost equal (43.8 per cent and 44.0 per cent, respectively). For those expressing high efficacy, on the other hand, there is a difference of more than 10 per cent between tenth and twelfth graders (40.1 per cent and 50.8 per cent, respectively. More than one-half of the twelfth grade respondents disagree, reflecting the view that individuals can do something about nations going to war. This may be interpreted as a greater sense of efficacy, possibly related to the more active and militant role of youth in Israel in the past three to four years. It may also be attributable to the realistic prospect of military service which faces every Israeli youth on reaching age eighteen and to a desire to wish for some degree of control over events.

Summarizing this section on perceived impact of the self on the system, it can be said that this aspect of orientations again reflects the difference in orientations toward the national and international systems found earlier.

Sections C and D measured two aspects of involvement, conceptualized as perceived impact of the system on the self, and perceived impact of the self on the system. To focus again on the larger question of a comparison of political orientations toward the national and international

systems, findings from these two measures were combined into an Involvement Index. Scores on the Index were divided into four categories, and were labeled parochial, subject, subject-participant and participant orientations, breaking down the political culture typology into smaller categories.

The specific prediction to be tested states that: political orientations toward the national system will tend to cluster around the subject-participant end of the continuum, while those toward the international system will tend to cluster around the parochial-subject end of the continuum. To test the prediction, scores on the Involvement Index were plotted for each system and are shown as a bargraph in Figure 4.3.



The differences between the orientations toward the national and international systems can be seen in this graphic presentation. The national distribution shows a clear trend in the direction of greater frequency in the subject-participant and participant ranges of the distribution. The international distribution is weighted to the left, confirming the expectation that here a larger percentage of respondents will be located in the subject range of the distribution. The findings concerning the modal distribution in the two systems are statistically significant.

Turning once again to the developmental expectations, it is predicted that the distribution pattern will be related to age and that the pattern will evidence a greater degree of randomness for international orientations than for national.

Findings in Table 4.25 show significant association of age with political orientations toward the national system, but not the international system. Findings again are inconclusive with regard to the

Figure 4.3.—Distribution of Political Orientations Toward National and International Systems: By Political Culture Type

Per Cent



expected evidence at sixth grade for increased sociocentrism, suggesting instead that perhaps a somewhat later age may be more appropriate in terms of political orientations.

TABLE 4.25
DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS, BY SYSTEM
AND GRADE

Grade	Parochial	Subject	Subject-Participant	Participant
National				
4	11.2	12.4	47.2	29.2
6	7.1	26.8	51.8	14.3
8	1.1	26.1	55.7	17.0
10	5.0	32.6	56.0	6.4
12	1.5	23.0	66.7	8.9
International				
4	30.7	46.6	21.6	1.1
6	27.0	54.1	17.1	1.8
8	18.2	60.2	18.2	3.4
10	27.9	60.0	10.0	2.1
12	22.2	63.0	13.3	1.5

On the basis of the literature on adult participation referred to earlier, which deals primarily with the American political system, as well as on the findings of Almond and Verba in their cross-cultural study, the distribution of modal types of national orientation in Israel

would be expected to parallel rather closely the American and British patterns. Israel too is a democratic, highly literate and participation-oriented system.

Data available from studies done by Nathan³⁶ and Remy³⁷ afford an opportunity to compare these distributions of political orientations among Israelis with those found among American and British respondents.

Table 4.26 shows a cross-national comparison of these findings.

TABLE 4.26

CROSS-NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS,
BY SYSTEM

Orientation	Britain ^a	U.S. ^a	Israel
National			
Parochial	25%	20%	5%
Subject	43	27	25
Subject-Participant	28	42	56
Participant	4	11	13
Total Number	584	255	565
International			
Parochial	34%	26%	25%
Subject	55	54	57
Subject-Participant	10	18	15
Participant	1	2	2
Total Number	585	255	562

^aTable adapted from Nathan (1972) and Remy (1972).

The pattern for all three national samples reflects the cross-system differences predicted by the Almond and Verba model. However, there are notable between-nation differences. The American and Israeli samples show the predicted modal types of orientations: subject-participant toward the national system and subject toward the international system. The British sample deviates in that the modal category for both systems is subject, reflecting an apparently much smaller degree of politicization among the British than among either American or Israeli. One further difference is that between the American and Israeli sample. While the relative distribution of political orientations toward the international system is quite similar, the pattern of national orientations reflects a significantly higher degree of involvement with the political system for Israelis than for Americans. This high level of politicization of the Israeli public will be discussed further in Chapter V.

E. SOCIAL PROBLEMS: VIOLENCE

Violence runs as a continuing thread through the course of human history, expressed in literature, art, scientific exploration and politics. Aggression, as a basic human drive, has been studied extensively in the literature of psychology, and as a form of political behavior by political scientists. One of the central problems of politics has been, and remains, the resolution of conflict and the political history of mankind, from the Bible through the Greek philosophers and early medieval political theorists to the theorists of the enlightenment and of our day, provides ample evidence of the persistence of this problem. Both in terms of individual psychology and group relations, it has remained the most vexing and challenging issue.

Two persuasive arguments lead to consideration of issues related to violence as a fruitful area in which to study and compare orientations toward the national and international systems. The first is derived from the traditional national-international differentiation and the second from a reading of the political events of the past decade. The classical view of the national and international systems as polarized ideal types was discussed earlier. As expressed by Riggs, "At one extreme is the political order characteristic of the nation state: at the other is an anarchic system of inter-state relations."³⁸

The literature on international socialization, while scarce, contains a number of studies in which children's attitudes toward war and peace are analyzed. As indicated in Chapter I, these findings suggest that development of children's orientations toward violence and conflict in the two systems proceeds in directly opposite directions. Further, a summary statement would conclude that children learn to regard conflict and violence in the national system as unexpected and illegitimate, while in the international system it is both expected and justified.

Among those who have studied children's attitudes toward conflict, Cooper, studying the development of the concept of war among children, comments that "in the imagery and experience of children a linkage exists between personal, social and international conflict but with an accompaniment of increasing justification for war." He further points out that "children learn games and competitive norms of play early in their lives using concepts like cheat, bully, and courage which are then applied to reasoning about war."³⁹

In another recent study focusing on German children, 90 per cent of a sample of 565 students in West Berlin public schools aged ten to

seventeen expressed the belief "that there is something inside people that causes war."⁴⁰

The second consideration concerns violence as a phenomenon of contemporary political life familiar to citizens of most political systems. Since this study is concerned with the socio-political environment to which children are exposed, violence is clearly one issue of which even young people are aware. War and guerilla activities as well as protests and riots are part of the environment of the Israeli pre-adult, and can be analyzed within the framework of a comparative analysis.

Any effort to improve our understanding of the process by which young people acquire political orientations must deal with this crucial element of violence. My basic question here, as in preceding sections, is whether there are differences in this area in young people's orientations to the national and international political systems. And my prediction, again, is that respondents will indicate a greater concern with violence in the national system than in the international.

Two approaches were used to measure the extent to which children react and respond to violence. The first involved constructing an index based on responses to nine items in the headline series which dealt with violence.⁴¹ Two indices were constructed, one for the items related to the national system and one for items related to the international system. Responses were scored from (1) low involvement to (3) high involvement and total scores were divided into five categories.

Table 4.27 presents the findings on involvement with issues of violence in the two systems.

TABLE 4.27

INVOLVEMENT WITH VIOLENCE IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

Degree of Involvement	National	International
Low	16.5%	19.7%
Low-Medium	32.4	43.4
Medium	35.8	28.9
Medium-High	14.4	7.1
High	0.9	0.9

The data provide support for the hypothesis that children are more involved with problems of violence in the national than the international system. More than half the respondents expressed at least a medium degree of involvement on the national level, while only 37 per cent did so for the international system. The modal category for national involvement was medium while for international it was low-medium.

Age has been singled out as an important variable in the development of orientations toward the world at large and "other peoples," as shown by Piaget and Weil. On the basis of the sociocentric model of development, it is predicted that the level of involvement with problems of violence will increase with age.

Table 4.28 shows the findings on violence correlated with grade. These findings support the Piagetian developmental theory. For both systems there is increasing involvement with increasing age, particularly between the fourth and sixth grades. The one category indicating only a nominal change is a high level of involvement in the national system.

There is almost no change at all until the tenth grade, when involvement drops by a third. There is a parallel break in the pattern of international orientations. The upward shift in concern from the sixth grade on for the international system would seem to reflect an increasing awareness with age of the implications of international violence.

TABLE 4.28

INVOLVEMENT WITH VIOLENCE IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS BY GRADE

Grade	Low	Medium	High
National			
4	66.7%	14.4%	18.9%
6	34.2	47.7	18.0
8	44.3	37.5	18.2
10	52.1	36.4	11.4
12	48.9	38.5	12.6
International			
4	83.4%	13.3%	3.3%
6	56.7	36.0	7.2
8	52.2	36.4	11.3
10	62.8	28.6	8.6
12	62.2	28.9	8.8

In obtaining data from oral interviews, the students were asked specific questions regarding the two areas of violence being considered here. In all cases, when pressed for definitions of violence within the

country, the respondents cited student protests, religious protests or political demonstrations. This was in 1970 and before the Israeli version of Black Panther demonstrations made their appearance. Findings in the following section on social justice may provide some clues as to what might be expected with regard to the recent growth of minority group public demonstrations and protests.

To probe the question of social violence further, the respondents were asked whether they would be willing to "do something." In discussing demonstrations which had taken place shortly before data were collected, many felt that they would in fact like to do something to stop them, although younger children were more likely to express this as "something should be done." From the data available from the oral interviews, in which riots and demonstrations were discussed, it is clear that children do see these events as affecting their lives. And as the literature on relevant research points out, children project learned norms of future activities, such as voting.

The findings in response to whether children would be willing to "do something" about domestic violence are reported in Table 4.29.

TABLE 4.29

WILLINGNESS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT RIOTS AND
DEMONSTRATIONS IN JERUSALEM

Grade	Nothing	Something	Much
4	13.8%	43.9%	42.3%
6	14.3	46.4	39.3
8	9.1	62.5	28.4
10	19.1	55.3	25.5
12	17.0	54.1	28.9

Questions of international violence presented interesting problems during the research. On the one hand it appeared that the children had to see everything in the context of the security situation of the country. On the other hand they were prepared to almost deny the seriousness of the military situation. They related all problems to Arab-Israeli hostilities, while at the same time asserting that Israel "has many friends" and "even the U.S.S.R. is not an enemy. They just want to help their friends, the Arabs."

A book which appeared in Israel shortly after the Six-Day War, and in England in an English translation shortly thereafter, consists of taped, open-ended discussions among kibbutz members who served in that war. The interviews reflect the conflicts experienced concerning war and violence. "These young people hate war" but, as Gerald Caiden writes in a recent review of The Seventh Day,⁴²

. . . reluctantly find themselves proficient at it as the only way they see of guaranteeing their own physical survival, of protecting the product of their love and labor, of ensuring a meaningful inheritance for their children, and, no less significant, of preserving the historical links between Jews and their ancient homeland. Reviewing contemporary history and understanding international power politics, they believe they have no alternative but wish it were otherwise. Philosophically resigned to "what will be, will be," they add a plaintive prayer that it may not all be in vain.⁴³

The same contradictions between Jewish ethical teachings and the imperatives of the political situation reflected by the participants in these discussions are reflected in the data obtained from my sample in oral interviews. It would suggest that for this particular sample, at this particular time, violence is difficult to isolate from its security context for a meaningful analysis. Comparative analysis is further complicated in Israel by the close interrelationship between national and international areas of life, particularly as related to conflict and violence.

In addition to the scale discussed earlier, two individual items were used to measure attitudes to violence. One measures attitudes toward violence in the national area and one in the international area. The items are clearly not equivalent, yet they do add a further dimension to an understanding of how children perceive violence. The findings are shown in Table 4.30.

TABLE 4.30

AGREEMENT ON SELECTED STATEMENTS RELATED
TO VIOLENCE, BY GRADE

Grade	Agree	Disagree
War Is Never Justified		
4	50.0%	50.0%
6	43.9	56.1
8	25.6	74.4
10	24.6	75.4
12	23.5	76.5
Only Police Should Have Arms		
4	60.0%	40.0%
6	38.2	61.7
8	32.6	67.4
10	20.9	79.1
12	35.3	64.7

These findings indicate a sharp break at the sixth grade level for the national item. Response to the statement that war is never

justified actually shows a break only at the eighth grade. But in drawing on the oral data and the context of the research, it must be stressed again that questions of war and arms can not be separated from the all-pervasive security consciousness of the country. In light of this, the upward shift in terms of age in the percentage of those agreeing that "only police should have arms" coupled with the downward shift for agreement that "war is never justified" is highly significant. Both probably reflect the political reality of a country which has never experienced peace. In a society where almost every adult male is in the active reserve and there is constant awareness of potential and actual guerrilla activity, arms assume a special importance.

F. SOCIAL PROBLEMS: SOCIAL JUSTICE

The final dimension on which orientations toward the two systems are compared is one I shall call Social Justice. An analysis of political life, particularly in a democratic society, may fruitfully be cast in the form of an inquiry into Who gets What, When and How (or Why), as suggested by Harold Lasswell. It might be pursued further with the paraphrase, Who does not get What, When and How (or Why). Normatively, equality and social justice rank high as values in democratic societies.

The State of Israel came into existence as a modern nation in 1948. It was one of the first of the new states which made their appearances in the post-World War II period, but in fact it was not new. Historically speaking, it began where the second Jewish Commonwealth left off in 70 A.D., when Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans. It was the same Jewish people which returned to the international scene in 1948, in contemporary style, carrying the same heritage of biblical and prophetic injunctions. It was not new in a second sense as well. The State of

Israel had been a de facto nation, operating in all areas conventionally associated with nation states in the twentieth century, with the exception of its foreign affairs.⁴⁴ In the half-century since modern Zionism had brought approximately 600,000 Jews to what was known as Palestine, it had developed a national identity and ethos grounded in the historic Jewish identity and shaped by the strongly socialistic orientations of many of its earliest settlers.

The concept of the National Home as enunciated in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, confirmed in the League of Nations Mandate of 1922 and developed by the Jewish community, even prior to the influx of the refugees from Nazi persecution, was a utopian concept based on social equality. Zionism, which was the common ideology of all the settlers regardless of their specific political orientations, drew on the Jewish ethical teachings as far back as the prophets as well as on contemporary philosophies.

This was accepted by those settlers who came as orthodox Jews and those who had discarded their religious heritage en route. An example was one of the first official steps taken by the Zionist movement, the establishment of the Jewish National Fund in 1897. It was set up to buy land which would be held by the Jewish people in perpetuity. It would be reclaimed and cultivated by anyone who wished to do so under conditions of equality, but would revert to the people's ownership.

This concern with social justice based on biblical tradition as well as modern socialist ideology shaped the institutions and orientations of the new state. In terms of political socialization, it still pervades the curriculum, both formal and informal, of most young Israelis. Theoretically, it should provide a measure for comparing orientations toward the nation and the world.

The central question of this chapter is now restated in its usual components.

1. Does Israeli youth express a difference in concern for social justice with respect to the national and international systems?
2. If so, are such differences related to age?

A scale was again constructed, consisting of items extracted from the previously listed series of headlines. Results were scored from low to high on the basis of degree of concern indicated by the respondents. The results are shown in Table 4.31.

TABLE 4.31

INVOLVEMENT WITH SOCIAL JUSTICE, BY SYSTEM

Degree of Involvement	National	International
Low	3.7%	12.2%
Low-Medium	14.9	27.0
Medium	26.7	36.4
Medium-High	34.7	16.7
High	14.2	1.7

There is a clearly discernable difference in concern with social justice in the two systems. Less than one-fifth of the respondents exhibit a low or low-medium degree of involvement on the national level, but almost two-fifths do so for the international. For the two highest levels of involvement, the pattern is sharply reversed. Almost one-half of respondents express concern with issues of social justice in the national system, while less than one-fifth express similar concern for questions of social justice in the international system.

A second method used to assess relative concern with social justice was one based on responses to individual items. The particular items were selected because they do not focus on the role of government or other formal institutions. Instead, they tap the personal attitudes of young people toward others, both within the national system and in the larger, global system. Two items were used to measure national orientations and two, international orientations.

The following predictions were made:

1. Respondents will indicate a greater concern for problems of social justice within the national system than within the international system.
2. Concern with problems of social justice increases with age for both systems, with greater change for the international system.

The items and reported degree of consensus are presented in Table 4.32. The discussion will deal with both predictions. Results shown in Table 4.32 support the findings in this study and others reported earlier that age is a significant factor in the level of involvement with the political system. But the differences in the two statements concerning social justice in the national system are interesting.

Response to National Item 1 (open immigration) shows a much more significant shift with age, which is undoubtedly related to the fact that open immigration has been a central and highly emotional issue in Israeli society since pre-State days. In 1948, upon establishment of the State of Israel, the Law of Return was promulgated. It provides for unrestricted immigration and citizenship for any Jew who wishes to come to Israel. It was a highly emotional issue which drew total support from all sections of the population. Under the British White Paper of 1938, immigration of Jews to Palestine was to be restricted to a minimal quota each year,

TABLE 4.32

CONSENSUS ON SELECTED STANDARDS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

	Grade	Agree	Disagree
<u>National 1:</u>			
Immigrants should not be permitted to come into our country if they compete with our own workers.	4	50.0%	50.0%
	6	35.3	64.7
	8	14.2	85.8
	10	19.8	80.2
	12	9.9	90.1
<u>National 2:</u>			
It would be a mistake for us to encourage certain racial groups to become well educated because they might use their knowledge against us.	4	50.0%	50.0%
	6	61.6	38.4
	8	20.3	79.7
	10	28.0	72.0
	12	26.4	73.6
<u>International 1:</u>			
If necessary, we ought to be willing to lower our standards of living to cooperate with other countries in getting an equal standard for every person in the world.	4	83.3%	16.7%
	6	51.9	34.3
	8	43.7	56.2
	10	34.3	57.7
	12	41.6	58.4
<u>International 2:</u>			
We should teach our children to uphold the welfare of all people everywhere even though it may be against the best interests of our own country.	4	100.0%	0%
	6	52.0	48.0
	8	36.9	63.1
	10	34.6	65.4
	12	47.4	52.6

and even this was terminated by the outbreak of war. At that time, David ben Gurion, soon to become the first Prime Minister, declared that "we shall fight the White Paper as if there were no war, and we shall fight the war as if there were no White Paper." This the Yishuv

(Jewish community of Palestine) did. However, bitterness and frustration increased when Great Britain refused to lift immigration restrictions at the end of World War II. The experience of the Aliya Bet (illegal immigration during the years 1945-1948, when hundreds of thousands of Jews, survivors of the concentration camps in Europe, attempted to break the British blockade to enter Palestine in ships which were not seaworthy and in some cases sunk--with their cargo--made an indelible impression. Each Jew who came or was brought into the country (the movement was highly organized, primarily by members of the kibbutzim), usually at night at deserted beaches, signified a victory over what was considered an unjust law and a failure of the world community to force Britain to change its position.

The drive for open immigration was a central theme of Zionist ideology. The battle for immigration was regarded as perhaps the most heroic period of the movement. Thus, perhaps more significant than the Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of the Law of the Return expressed the self determination of the people of Israel three years after the end of World War II had officially closed the concentration camps.

From the even split among fourth graders, who do not yet comprehend the abstract values involved--and in some cases are a generation removed from the events described--the pattern changes with age until the twelfth grade where less than 10 per cent agree with the statement and over 90 per cent do not agree. It is quite clear that children internalize the prevailing political values of their society when they are as highly visible as they are in this particular case. The significance of the value of open immigration as a learned political orientation is underscored by the difference in response to the second statement.

It might be added parenthetically that these data were collected in 1970. In 1972 there was considerable discussion and reevaluation of the meaning of open immigration. The recent influx of Russian Jews appears to have caused some problems approaching the level of a crisis of conscience for Israel.

Another note of caution on interpreting the statement on educational equality is that, here again, the security issue may have influenced what appears to be a purely social issue. The most important finding bearing on the developmental model is that the change in pattern of orientations appears to come at approximately sixth grade as predicted by the model, with respect to the international system. On items dealing with the national political system, however, the break is more apparent at a later age, closer to eighth grade.

One final item posed for assessing concern with social justice is shown in Table 4.33.

TABLE 4.33

CONSENSUS ON SOCIAL JUSTICE WITH REGARD TO RACE

Grade	Agree	Disagree
Our responsibility to people of other races ought to be as great as our responsibility to people of our own race.		
4	80.0%	20.0%
6	83.0	17.0
8	81.7	18.3
10	65.6	34.4
12	78.4	21.6

The above statement was selected to measure involvement with problems of social justice in both systems. It is a largely normative statement and reflects a national consensus about accepting all newcomers. On face validity, the results show a high degree of world-mindedness on the part of Israeli youth and a high degree of involvement or positive concern with problems of social justice and should be viewed in conjunction with the findings in the preceding table.

The translation of "race" presented some problems of semantic equivalence which need further work to clarify the issues involved. As interpreted by consultants in Israel and by randomly chosen respondents, it was read as "people from other countries who look and act different."

Summary and Conclusions

The central hypothesis of this chapter is that there is a difference in the political orientations of children toward the national and international systems. This has been supported by the data in almost every dimension investigated.

Only in the first area, knowledge, do the results show that this variable is not a significant one for discriminating between national and international orientations. The data show that the level of knowledge concerning the two systems is not significantly different.

The second variable, sources of information, shows a striking difference in patterns of distribution. Public media are ranked much higher than interpersonal means of communication as sources of information for both political systems, with little variation between the two. But among interpersonal sources the distribution is significantly different. As one of the three most important sources for national information, 42 per cent chose parents, compared to only 27 per cent for

international. Eighteen per cent included teachers and schools for national information, compared to 10 per cent for international. The interpersonal sources are clearly considered more important for national information than international.

To compare involvement with the national and international political systems, it was hypothesized that children would react differently to events and conditions in the socio-political environments of the two systems. Measures were constructed to assess involvement in terms of two components of the concept. Section C measures perceived impact of the system on the self and Section D measures perceived impact of the self on the system.

Findings show that in both areas perceived impact is significantly greater for the national system than for the international system. An index constructed to combine the findings on these two components and measure involvement of both active and passive dimensions confirms that involvement with the national system is substantially greater than with the international system. Findings suggest that the prediction based on Piaget's sociocentric development may need revision when related to political orientations of children. Patterns of age related changes more frequently reflected a break at eighth grade than at sixth, toward the national political system. Orientations toward the international system did show changes more frequently at approximately the sixth grade level.

The last two measures on which orientations toward the national and international systems are compared deal with social problems, specifically, violence and social justice. The data show a greater concern with violence on the national level than on the international. These

findings, however, must be interpreted with caution. The political reality of Israel and its unique problems relating to security on the one hand and heavy immigration on the other preclude broad generalization from available data with regard to questions of violence.

Finally, involvement with social justice is also greater on the national level, but the overall involvement in this area is very high, as predicted.

In the next two chapters the impact of socialization by transnational movements on political orientations will be discussed.

NOTES

1. Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Basic Attitudes and Values Toward Government and Citizenship During the Elementary School Years, Pt. I (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1965), p. 4; Greenstein, International Encyclopedia, p. 7; and David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, VI, 3 (August, 1962), 236.
2. Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," American Political Science Review, LIV (December, 1960), 936.
3. Some of this literature is discussed in Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 1-5. Research on this civic training was conducted in the 1930's and includes: Bessie Louise Pierce, Citizen's Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth (New York: Scribner's, 1944); Charles E. Merriam, The Making of Citizens: A Comparative Study of Civic Training (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931); and Charles E. Merriam, Civic Education in the United States (New York: Scribner's, 1934).
4. William Scott, "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images," in International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. by H. C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), pp. 71-73.
5. Ibid., p. 100.
6. Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," Ibid., pp. 134-37.
7. Ibid., p. 184.
8. Robert Hess and Judith Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, p. 150.
9. Complete text of questions and possible choices may be found in the Appendix.
10. Rita R. Rogers, "The Emotional Climate in Israeli Society," The American Journal of Psychiatry, CXXVIII, 8 (February, 1972), 990.
11. The question on Vietnam was included as an additional test of level of knowledge. It consisted of the general question: Tell me something about Vietnam; followed by probes, asking: 1. Who is involved in the fighting there? When did it begin? What are the reasons for

the fighting? It was also hoped that this question, together with the questions regarding Israeli-Arab hostilities would free respondents to deal with issues other than violence. The finding that the overwhelming majority answered the question, "what is the most important problem Israel faces?" with a reference to security, was clear evidence that the ploy was unsuccessful in this regard.

12. Respondents were asked to name as many members of the cabinet, and in party leadership positions as they could recall. More than 90 per cent could name at least four.
13. Almost four-fifths of sixth grade respondents could name three (or more) cabinet members and correctly identify their portfolio.
14. Robert Hess and Judith Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, p. 20.
15. Until recently the exemptions for religious girls were granted almost routinely. A recent court decision however, found the general life style of a Rabbi's daughter who requested an exemption, suggested that mere identification as "religious" would no longer satisfy the criteria for exemption.
16. For the role of the family in political socialization, see Hess and Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children; Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics; and James C. Davies, "The Family's Role in Political Socialization," The Annals, CCCLXI (September, 1965), 10-19.
17. The most comprehensive inquiry into the agents of political socialization is that found in Hess and Torney, op. cit. They divide socializing contexts into three general types. The first type includes institutions of well-defined structure and organization: the family, school and church. The second type of socializing influence occurs in larger social settings. The most important of these social contexts are: social class, ethnic origin, and geographical region. The third type of influence in the socializing process derives from the child's personal characteristics, ibid., pp. 182-84. On agents of socialization, see also: Easton and Hess, "Youth and the Political System," p. 251; Greenstein, Children and Politics, pp. 9-15; and by the same author, International Encyclopedia, p. 6; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Personality and Political Socialization," Journal of Politics, XXIII, 2 (May, 1961), 341-52; William C. Mitchell, The American Polity (New York: The Free Press, 1962), esp. Chap. 7, "The Socialization of Citizens," pp. 145-78; and Hess and Torney, op. cit., pp. 182-228.
18. Hess and Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, p. 219.
19. L. F. Fischer, "The Impact of Political Socialization on Integration in Africa" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1970).

20. Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1959).
21. Lucian W. Pye, ed., Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
22. Some of the relevant research may be found in Hilde T. Himmelweit, A. N. Oppenheim, and Pamela Vance, Television and the Child: An Empirical Study of the Effect of Television on the Young (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958); W. Schramm, J. Lyle, E. B. Parker, Television in the Lives of our Children (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961).
23. Wallace E. Lambert and Otto Klineberg, Children's Views of Foreign Peoples, pp. 210-13.
24. Ibid., p. 213.
25. A program was written and run at Vogelback Computing Center, Northwestern University to summarize findings on this set of questions. The tables include only those media which were ranked first, second or third.
26. Lambert and Klineberg, op. cit.
27. Hess and Torney define political involvement as the emotional engagement and the wish to take part in the life of the political community. They focus on change over time in the life of the individual as reflected in a growth of interest in the nation and its government and an increasing desire to participate, see op. cit., p. 6.
28. Robert A. Levine, "The Role of the Family in Authority Systems," Behavioral Science, V (October, 1960), 295; also personal communication, May, 1971, seminar on Culture and Personality.
29. In response to the questions: "Does Israel have any enemies?" less than one third gave unequivocal answers. More than one half of those who listed the Arab states, prefaced their replies with comments to the effect that "they are not really enemies, they just think we want to take something that belongs to them." None felt that the Soviet Union was an enemy, rather it was seen as tied to the "other side" by undefined interests.
30. Piaget and Weil, op. cit., p. 562.
31. Joseph Adelson and Robert P. O'Neil, "Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, IV (1966).
32. David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," The American Political Science Review LXI, 1 (March, 1967).

33. Ibid., p. 29.
34. Ibid., p. 29.
35. Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 18.
36. James Nathan, op. cit., p. 328.
37. Richard C. Remy, op. cit., p. 204.
38. Fred Riggs, "The Nation-State and other Actors," in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, ed. by James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 90.
39. Peter Cooper, "The Development of the Concept of War," Journal of Peace Research, II (1966), 1-17.
40. Magnus Haavelrud, "Views on War and Peace Among Students in West Berlin Public Schools," Journal of Peace Research, No. 2 (1970), pp. 100-20.
41. The items included three items for each of the two systems. Each item was taken in each of the three forms presented to respondents, thus bringing the total for both systems to eighteen.
42. Gerald E. Caiden reviews the book, together with two other books on the Israel Defense Force, in The American Political Science Review, LXVI, 3 (September, 1972), 1046-48. The Seventh Day, ed. by Avraham Shapira (New York: Scribners, 1971) is subtitled Soldiers' Talk about the Six Day War. It consists of a series of discussions conducted and taped by selected interviewers with different groups of kibbutzniks who fought in the Six-Day War. It has been compared to All Quiet on the Western Front in its universally understood reflection of the feelings of the common soldier about war, fighting, death, destruction, hopes and fears.
43. Gerald Caiden, op. cit., p. 1047.
44. Lya Dym, op. cit. See also S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (New York: Basic Books, 1967); J. Dunner, The Republic of Israel, its History and its Promise (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950); Alex Weingrod, Israel (London: Pall Mall, 1965); Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961).

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION BY TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

The second major question of the study explores what is essentially as yet uncharted domain. The political orientations of young people are the outcome of the process of political socialization. In the course of this process, young people are simultaneously socialized to overlapping political systems. The national and international (or global) systems are two such political systems with which this research is concerned. It has been shown that both the content and sequence of the development of orientations toward these two systems differ significantly for youth in a variety of environments. The preceding two chapters demonstrate that these differences exist among Israeli youth as well.

Research drawn from a variety of sources and disciplines¹ suggests that there are clearly differences in the orientations toward the international system (as well as the national system) between members of any given national system. A recognition of the increasingly active role of the individual in world-wide activities and of the potential of such activities leads directly to a focus on factors influencing differential development. The questions raised include the following: Are there differences in the political orientations of young people within one political system toward the international system? What factors in the socialization process contribute to such differences?

The conceptual framework formulated in Chapter I states that the outcome of the political socialization process, in addition to being a function of the structure of the system, is also a function of the position of the individual within the system. Specifically, I argue that socialization by transnational movements, i.e., kibbutz and religion, will predict to greater involvement with the global system than will the absence of this socialization agent for a given member of the political system.

The hypothesized relationship between socialization by transnational movements and international orientations draws primarily on propositions found in two areas of research. The first consists of the rapidly growing body of literature on political socialization within the discipline of political science. The second is found within the broad area of social psychology, specifically, research by scholars who have concerned themselves with the study of the international behavior of the individual.

The political socialization literature represents a diversity of approaches, both theoretical and atheoretical. Most of it shares an underlying concern with increasing our understanding of the functioning of the political system and represents more or less successful efforts to contribute toward a general theory of political socialization. Such a theory, if indeed general, should be generalizable to a broad range of political systems and environments. To date, the vast majority has focused on the American political system. Yet within this literature are a number of studies which have begun to point to what Dawson and Prewitt describe as "discontinuities" in the political socialization of American children. Some have contended that previous theoretical formulations and resultant studies have given insufficient attention to

factors in the political socialization process which have differential effects on the outcome of the process.

As stated in Chapter I, the present study is not intended as a rigorous testing of theoretically deduced hypotheses. It is, rather, a rigorous attempt to develop exploratory hypotheses in an area in which little work has been done and which appears to this author to be one of crucial importance for the continued existence of political life. As suggested in another research context, it is hoped that "if and when our hypotheses are integrated with findings from other studies, they will take us a little further down that rough-hewn path that leads to a general theory of politics, or that state in scientific development where research is conducted with a conceptual scheme or model that, for research purposes, is widely accepted within the community of scholars."²

Herbert Hirsch (1969), in a study of political socialization in Appalachia, focused on four hypothesized agents of political socialization, i.e. family, peers, school and media. He found that these agents operated in two distinct ways: through interpersonal interaction and through more impersonal means, and analyzed them in terms of the process by which they transmitted political cues at different governmental levels.

Drawing on learning theory for a basic psychological framework, his objective is to provide a general theoretical framework explaining the process of socialization across cultures and subcultures. He contends that, while the primary agent of political socialization may differ from sub-culture to sub-culture and that, quite likely, the content of what is socialized may also differ, the process is the same. This proposition may be related to that of Jennings, who said that the American child is exposed to stimuli having to do with multiple levels of

government and politics. These levels are most commonly derived from the tripartite divisions of American federalism--local, state and national levels--plus the fourth level of international politics. It will be observed that this step-like gradation encompasses a dimension of scope or domain. Each level envelops successively wider domains of geopolitical space.³

Hirsch's analysis of the four basic agents operating in three areas of agent performance shows differential rankings for the four agents in three areas studied. He summarizes these findings by stating that

. . . the importance of these basic findings lies in the fact that the differentials in the rankings indicate that different cue stimuli are presented to the child on each governmental level.⁴

Relevant for the present study is the finding that agents of political socialization will function differentially at different levels of government and are related to the position of the individual.

In another study based on the same data (Jaros, Hirsch and Fleron, 1968), findings showed that Appalachian children were overwhelmingly cynical toward national political figures and institutions. They expressed a low sense of efficacy with regard to dealings with the federal government⁵ reflecting their position in the national political system as defined by membership in the Appalachian sub-culture. These findings and their implications for research on political socialization as a structural-functional aspect of the political system have influenced much current research in the field.

In a study on Black High School Students' Self-Image and Attitudes Toward Law,⁶ Anne Heinz explores the relationship between self and racial images and attitudes toward law among urban black high school

students. She focuses on the impact of legal institutions on adolescents as the affective components of their attitudes develop and come into contact with the "black pride message." One of the questions raised concerns the outcome of the political socialization process by which the American adolescent learns about and develops attitudes and orientations toward the law and legal institutions.

Attempting to isolate the effects of history, school programs and an Afro-American History course, the findings show that considerable change had taken place in the images of authority, race and self among black students during the five-year period studied. Heinz points out that, while it appears likely that most of the observed changes can be explained in terms of those which occurred among black adolescents generally, schools were most effective with those who had identified with the black consciousness and black pride movement.

She emphasizes a process of primary identification with the local ethnic groups rather than the nation, which provides the basis for the argument that the process of socialization within the political system may be quite different from that expected by the regime. As a consequence of the individual's interactions within his community (position), regime efforts to build support for itself were, in this case, "subverted, ignored or redirected. The sense of peoplehood did not encompass the entire culture, but rather the ethnic sub-society."⁷ In further emphasizing the importance of this process of political socialization within the systems analysis framework, she states that

The primary identification with the local ethnic groups rather than the nation has been one of the characteristics of the developing nations in Africa, for example. In their analysis of the development process, researchers have stressed the importance of education in changing the object of this identification to the nation. In those societies as well, the values that the youth learn may be

quite different, even antithetical to the aims of the national regime. Childhood learning may be one means of learning the values essential to the persistence of the system. The present study has suggested that the socialization process may be much more flexible and unstable than had been thought. The changes in basic images during adolescence, a time when these attitudes would have been expected to have stabilized, indicate that the content of the images that are learned (as distinguished from those that the culture teaches) is related to the group with whom the individual identifies--his significant others.⁸

Other studies pointing to the significance of group identification as a factor in the development of political orientations include those by Greenberg (1969) and by Kenyon (1967). Greenberg's comparison of black and white grade-school children in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia showed black children consistently expressing less support for the political system than white children. He further found that black students tended to become less supportive of the system with age.⁹ Kenyon compared black and white high-school students and found the black students to be more cynical than the white, but to be more deferential to political authority.¹⁰ This concept of deference was one of the variables considered by Heinz, who concluded that exposure and identification with the black consciousness movement significantly affected the degree of deference expressed.

The second source from which propositions concerning the function of position in the political socialization process are drawn is the literature on social psychology. Within this broad area, a number of scholars have in recent years explored variables influencing political orientations toward objects and processes outside the national political system of the socializee. The relevant factors for this analysis are those which may lead to multiple loyalties and affiliations.

In International Behavior--A Social-Psychological Study, Herbert C. Kelman as editor of this wide-ranging collection of in-depth studies defines the special contribution of the approach in terms of four

categories. Significant for the present research is the category dealing with "the study of the international behavior of the individual,"¹¹ During the past fifteen years there has been substantial research on this "human" dimension of international relations and he points to four specific areas on which research has focused. The first includes attempts to investigate attitudes toward international affairs and a developing focus on the psychological-social processes involved in the development of general orientations toward foreign policy issues.¹² A second area involves research on national and international loyalties, and focuses on the study of special sub-groups within a nation which have specific definitions of the role of the individual toward the national and international systems. It also raises the question of ideologies which have varying implications for international cooperation and multiple loyalties.¹³ A third area deals with studies of images and stereotypes of other nations. Some of this literature has been referred to earlier.¹⁴ The final group of studies includes those on cross-national contacts, involving research on the processes of interaction between nationals of different countries, nationals in other countries, and the effects of those interactions on international images and attitudes.¹⁵

Among the last is Pool's well-known study on the effects of travel on attitudes, in which he affirms that cross-cultural contacts result in "reduction of stereotyping--the shifting of the traveler's images from simple black and white perceptions to more qualified perceptions of the foreign reality."¹⁶ Similarly, a group of studies deals with the positive effects of an American sojourn on foreign scholars and students as well as the positive effects on their hosts and home societies.¹⁷ Coelho, Selltiz, et al. found that, with time, the foreigner

developed a more complex perception and more differentiated attitude toward Americans and American institutions.¹⁸ In this context, Kelman expresses his belief, in which I concur, that the international community also stands to benefit from cross-national interactions, since it "may increase commitment to an internationalist ideology among those who participate in them, thus contribute to the development and strengthening of international political institutions."¹⁹

A somewhat different emphasis is reflected in the work of Robert A. Levine who focuses on the interrelationship of socialization, social structure and inter-societal images. While his conclusions derive from an analysis of non-literate societies, his propositions are relevant for contemporary international behavior. He suggests three implications to be drawn from his findings. The first is that societal divisiveness leads to feelings of hostility and paranoia in a population. A second states that the principles of multiple affiliations and loyalties and residential dispersion tend to develop positive norms and behavioral dispositions. His final conclusion with implications for the international arena concerns a transference from national to international behavior. He suggests that socially integrated societies which show a form of open membership achievable by outsiders tend to develop conditions favorable to creating a subordinate order bound in similar open membership.²⁰

Within a political culture framework, it was hypothesized that for most people the international system has less salience than the national system. Findings in Chapter IV largely support this prediction. The question implicit here is whether there are any conditions under which the international system approaches that of the national

system in salience to the individual. As suggested, studies on the effect of transnational experiences, such as travel, business and education, have been shown to influence international orientations to a significant degree.²¹

A. POSITION AS A FACTOR IN THE PROCESS OF
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Based on the conceptualization of a transnational movement as one which may, in Kelman's formulation, "have specific definitions of the role of the individual toward the national and the international systems," I hypothesize that socialization by transnational movements will lead to an increased awareness of and greater involvement with the world or global system. Transnational movements are considered as agencies of "supra-socialization," conceptualized as a process similar to that by which the child is socialized into the national system. Theoretically it would conform to the same developmental and learning models as the process of socialization into the national political system.

A model based on political socialization by transnational movements would predict to more positive (cognitive, affective and behavioral) orientations toward the international system for those groups in a position to be socialized by transnational movements. The model predicts that, as membership in or identification with a sub-culture, be it ethnic, religious, racial or linguistic, affects political orientations toward the national system, identification with a transnational movement influences orientations toward the international political system. For adults this identification could be the consequence of membership in a transnational organization such as a professional group or multinational business.

The two transnational movements to be considered are identified as religious and kibbutz background. Religion as a focus of group identification influencing the outcome of the political socialization process has been studied by Edwards (1970) and others.²² There is also a vast literature on the impact of religion on attitudes.²³ The extensive literature on the kibbutz as a social system, as an educational experiment and as an experiment in child-rearing have made it a familiar phenomenon in the literature on socialization.²⁴ My concern here is the function of religion and kibbutz in the Israeli context in determining the position of the individual in the system in terms of the political socialization process. Both can, theoretically, be defined as political sub-cultures. They provide foci for group identification influencing the outcome of the political socialization process. It is possible that the development of political orientations toward the national and international systems are interrelated and interdependent processes. Both can be viewed as leading to the development of political identities. It is equally plausible to suggest that they are parallel but empirically independent processes. However, I am here interested in their function as transnational movements and, specifically, their influence on outward-directed orientations.

Judaism, with its connotation of peoplehood, transcends the conventional definition of religion. While Catholicism could with equal logic be said to do so, the dual concepts of the Jewish People as an entity and of the Diaspora lend support to the conceptualization of the Jewish religion as a transnational movement. The spontaneous outpouring of support, emotional and material, for Israel on the part of Jews throughout the world during the War of 1967 lend pragmatic support to this view.

In a recently published volume, Israelis and Jews: The Study of an Ethnic Identity,²⁵ Simon Herman of the Hebrew University offers valuable insights into the interrelationship between Jewish identity and religion. Among the questions of particular interest is one which asks students to choose two out of four reasons to justify the existence of the State of Israel. The largest number, 55 per cent, chose "the suffering of the Jews in the Diaspora as a people without a homeland." Forty-six per cent justified the existence of Israel in terms of the "pioneering resettlement of the country in recent times and the War of Liberation." In other words, more pupils based their claims to Israel on the suffering of Jews in the Diaspora (outside Palestine) than on the rights acquired by the sweat and blood of the recent settlers.

The sample consisted of 3,679 eleventh-grade students in 117 high schools throughout the country in 1964-1965. These were students who were born in 1948, the year the State of Israel was established. Another finding of interest is that 80 per cent expressed the view that their fate is bound up with the fate of the Jewish people (inside or outside of Israel).

His theoretical approach complements the conceptualization proposed in this study. I view Israelis in a transnational model projecting their identity outward, while Herman approaches his study by looking inward and focusing on the "confluence of two sub-identities."²⁶ He suggests that the relationship of two such identities can best be analyzed by regarding the person as "being in overlapping situations," i.e. as subject simultaneously to influences from two (or more) psychological situations. He explores the extent of the overlap between the two sub-identities, the degree of consonance between them, the extent of their

centrality, their salience in differing situations, their valence and relative potency.²⁷

To study the sub-identities, Herman asserts that it is possible to establish three analytically distinct identity continua: a Jewish identity continuum, a religious identity continuum, and an Israeli identity continuum. It is theoretically possible for one to score high on any one, two or three of the continua and low on any one, two or three of the others. The Jewish identity and the religious identity are the two continua which would contribute to the construct of a transnational movement identified as Religion.

The second concept to be considered as a transnational movement is the kibbutz. Kibbutz upbringing will identify a respondent as being exposed to political socialization by a transnational movement. The kibbutz was the creation of the early pioneers, largely Russian socialist radicals, who arrived in what was then Palestine in the first and second decades of the century. A collective settlement, which in its early days was solely agricultural, it was to be the beginning of a utopian socialist society.²⁸ Through the respective political parties with which they are affiliated, the kibbutzim have dominated the political life of the country since pre-State days. In 1969, with 3.4 per cent of the population, they held some 30 per cent of Parliament seats.²⁹ While affiliation with an internationalist socialist movement has become more a matter of creed than of deed, it remains as part of the ideological baggage to which the kibbutz child is socialized.

The school provided the context within which respondents were interviewed. The school system in Israel incorporates these two orientations and a brief history of the school system will clarify the

relationship between the school, the political system, and the trans-national movements.

Under the British Mandate, the Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) developed its own autonomous institutions, constituting a State within a State.³⁰ Two separate political frameworks shared the normal functions exercised by the governments of sovereign states. The Jewish Agency represented the Yishuv internationally: its relations to the Mandatory Government, the Arabs, foreign countries, and Jews throughout the world. The Va'ad Le'umi (National Council) and Elected Assembly, together with the Chief Rabbinate, were responsible for the religious affairs, jurisdiction in matters of personal status, welfare, medical care and education in the Yishuv.

During this period, between 1920 and 1948, the pattern of multiple political parties with rigid ideological platforms, which was bequeathed, with minor modifications through splits and mergers, to the State of Israel, evolved.³¹ The parties represented a broad spectrum; on one side were various labor parties ranging from the extreme Communists to the moderate Mapai, and on the other several small parties representing primarily economic interests and held together by their opposition to the labor movement. Of these, only the Revisionists and the General Zionists were able to develop ideological orientations which exerted significant influence. In the middle, and ready to join coalitions with either side, stood the religious parties, each with its own labor wing. The present Independent Liberal Party would also be ranged in this center arena and evolved from the small Aliya Hadashah Party, which entered the political arena in the 1940's.

These political parties crystallized under somewhat unusual conditions for political parties. They could not achieve their

ideological objectives by influencing the composition and policies of government agencies; they operated within the framework of a communal self-government which lacked power of coercion, since it was under foreign rule. They therefore attempted to attain their goals by direct constructive action of their own in the fields of agricultural settlement, urban development, economic enterprise, social and educational services and cultural life. Almost all domains of public concern were thus politicized and this tradition of the pre-State Yishuv has profoundly affected Israel's political life until the present time.³²

This politicization could be seen clearly in the educational system. The struggle for the social and cultural shape of the future Jewish State focused on the ideological orientation of education, which became a matter of supreme importance. In 1920, to preserve domestic peace within the Zionist Organization and to avoid a "Kulturkampf" between secular and traditionally religious Zionists, the internal autonomy of the system of religious (Mizrachi) schools was recognized. A few years later the same autonomy was granted the schools of the socialist labor movement and in 1948 the State of Israel inherited a system of education which consisted of a federation of three autonomous "trends" affiliated with political parties or ideological organizations.³³ The move toward a unified school system received considerable impetus after 1949, when the large-scale immigration of primarily Oriental Jews led to inter-party competition for the children of immigrants in the temporary immigrant settlements. In 1953 the Knesset passed the "State Education Law" which abolished the linkage of pedagogic and organizational trends in education with political parties. This law replaced the system of "trends" with "State Education." It specifies a uniform goal for all "State Education," to be based on

. . . the values of Jewish culture and the achievements of science, on love of the homeland and loyalty to the State and the Jewish people, on practice in agricultural work and handicraft, on pioneer (chalutzic) training, and on striving for a society built on freedom, equality, tolerance, mutual assistance, and love of mankind.³⁴

These basic aims reflect the traditional aims and values of the Labor Trend, yet through a Council for Religious State Education which advises the Minister of Education, the religious parties have not relinquished their influence on education. Indeed, the 1953 law provides that parents of children and adolescents liable to compulsory education may opt between "State Education" and "religious State Education." Important for purposes of this analysis is the fact that the latter is "State Education" as defined in the goals and objectives above, with the distinction that its institutions are religious as to their way of life, curriculum, teachers and inspectors. Children in religious schools, therefore, are exposed to the general educational program plus the added factor of a totally religious environment. Being "religious" in Israel is not merely a private matter of belief and observance. A religion which is credited by both its adherents and its opponents (who may be strongly anti-religious and have hopes of seeing Israel become a secular state) with having maintained the identity of a people through 2,000 years of dispersion must be viewed as a strong factor in the life of that people. Writing on Political Religion in the New Nations, David Apter states:

One difference between religion and other forms of thought is that religion has more power. So fundamental is its power that one cannot examine individual conduct or desires without reference to it. In that sense religion cuts into human personality in a way which ordinary ideological thought rarely does.³⁵

The kibbutz schools similarly have retained a degree of autonomy through their affiliation with political parties. But the special

situation is now reflected in the fact that three kibbutz seminaries train most of the teachers and principals, with the basic aim of ensuring that primary education in the kibbutzim conforms to their ideals and thus assures the continuity of the kibbutz movement. In contrast with the autonomy of religious State education, this autonomy of the kibbutzim is based on tacit agreements with the Ministry of Education. To date, it has been honored and one of the results has been a policy of educational segregation of kibbutz children (whose parents are mostly sabra--Palestine-born--or veteran European immigrants) from children of Oriental new immigrants. This conflict between the fear of creating competing foci of identification and loyalty and the official ideology to which the kibbutz movements subscribe along with the rest of the country represents one of the "crises of conscience" faced by the kibbutz movement at present. "Misug Galuyot" (the fusing of the various ethnic communities) is not only official ideology, but is at the root of the ideology which brought about the rebirth of the state of Israel and of which the kibbutz is still regarded as the symbol.

If a political culture is defined as a particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among members of the group, shaped and influenced by the shared internalized values of the group, then for analytic purposes we may call kibbutz and religion political sub-cultures in the Israeli context. I would further postulate that as a transnational movement takes on the characteristics of a political sub-culture and serves a group function, it will be more likely to affect the political orientations of those exposed to it as socializees.

One further point to be made concerns the congruence of socialization effects which is a function of this operation of the transnational movements through the schools. While there is disagreement as to the relative importance of school and family as agents of socialization in the American context, there appears to be general agreement that, together, these are the two most significant factors. Both transnational movements to be compared draw on this strength as primary agencies of socialization, since in both cases cues are transmitted through parents and schools.

The outcome of the political socialization process was conceptualized in Chapter I as a function of three factors: (1) The structure of the system; (2) the position of the individual within the system; and (3) the personality of the individual. The significance of all three factors in exploring the field of international socialization is not denied. Rather, I would argue that, while any general theory of political socialization, national or international, must include propositions concerning the effect of personality, it is not essential in a study which is concerned with a specific segment of such a theory. It can contribute insights and interpretations to a discussion of the variables which are central to this research in terms of explaining some of the variance, and for that reason a brief discussion of personality as a factor in the socialization process will be presented later. It will be related to measures of national identity and world-mindedness in Chapter VII.

B. PERSONALITY AS A FACTOR IN THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

As pointed out in Chapter I, the field of political socialization owes a substantial debt to the fields of psychology and social

anthropology. Socialization studies, as originally formulated and pursued by psychologists, devoted much attention to questions of child-rearing and personality.³⁶ Whereas the anthropologists early sensitized political scientists to socialization as a process for the transmission of cultural values, it was psychoanalysis which contributed hypotheses about socialization processes and personality development. The two most significant notions which psychoanalytic theory has contributed to an understanding of political socialization are the conceptualization of personality and attitudes as structural developmental phenomena and attention to the significance of early childhood experiences in the formation of political attitudes and values.

Drawing on these conceptualizations, the study of early child-rearing practices and their relationship to personality development has produced a number of important works.³⁷ Spiro's work, Children in the Kibbutz, is perhaps the most comprehensive study made of the system of collective education and child-rearing as practiced in a kibbutz in Israel. The kibbutz offers one of the few natural situations in contemporary society to study social conditions which could otherwise be duplicated only in an artificial situation. Though a part of Western society, its culture is radically different in many respects from that of most Western societies. The kibbutz, unlike most societies known to ethnography or history, practices comprehensive collective living, communal ownership and cooperative enterprise. Many communistic and utopian communities, including those established in the United States during the last century, were founded on principles of comprehensive collective living, but few adopted all the features characteristic of the kibbutz and, more important, none has survived. This is, in fact,

one of the major reasons for its importance to social science. Spiro suggests three aims of socialization research within anthropology applicable to political science as well. He views personality as central in an understanding of socio-cultural stability and socio-cultural change. Thus the investigation of socio-cultural functions of personality is the most important task of culture-and-personality research. Within this framework, he envisions three important contributions which socialization studies can make:

First, if techniques of problem solving and conflict resolution which characterize adult behavior are acquired in childhood, studies of socialization can discover the causal (ontogenetic) conditions of a great deal of social and cultural behavior. Second, if social and cultural systems are man's most important instruments for, as well as obstacles to, the satisfaction of his drives and needs, studies of socialization can discover the (ontogenetic) conditions which produce the psychological bases both for cultural conformity and change. Third, if early experience provides those perceptual-cognitive sets by which individual actors structure their world, socialization studies are crucial for an understanding of those cultural systems which constitute the projective systems of communities and societies.³⁸

Spiro warns that, while it was possible to study the effect of kibbutz culture on personality, it was not possible to study (except in a limited way) the effect of kibbutz personality on culture. By studying and comparing the political orientations of kibbutz children with those of non-kibbutz children, it is hoped that this study can contribute propositions which may be pursued in future research. Differences in the development and content of political orientations may be hypothesized as related to different personality types found in the kibbutz system in addition to being functions of kibbutz socialization. With second or third generation members of the kibbutz community or respondents, such differences can suggest further hypotheses concerning the effect of kibbutz socialization on the political culture of Israel.

Rabin points out in his study of kibbutz children, Growing Up in the Kibbutz,⁴⁰ that one of the major tenets in kibbutz ideology and in its philosophy of collective education is the inseparability of what may be termed "education" (studies) and "up-bringing" (personality development). He sees this philosophy as determining the approach to the educational process, especially in the primary school set-up. Both aspects are seen as a unitary process in the kibbutz educational process.

Rabin compares kibbutz and non-kibbutz reared children, making assessment of ego adequacy the focus of his investigation. His findings indicate higher ratings of overall maturity for kibbutz children; less hostility, on the whole, among kibbutz than among non-kibbutz children; and, more importantly, for kibbutz children this hostility is mitigated through sublimation and direction into communal and national goals. He concludes, "the facts are that kibbutz child rearing was designed to raise new kibbutz members, and is quite effective in doing so." The implications for political socialization are interesting, if not explicit. One of the structural functional features of the kibbutz is its democratic character. If the kibbutz succeeds in raising its young to support this system, this fact suggests a convergence of lines of research as outlined by Greenstein. He discusses Lasswell's essay on "Democratic Character," in which the author elaborates a hypothetical construct in part from the existing research on the anti-democratic character, in part by deductions from an analysis of the role requirements of democratic society.⁴² After identifying the components of such democratic character, Lasswell comments on the matter of socialization,

There is reason to believe that in some cultures the possibility of developing an outgoing democratic character is excluded at an early

period. The prevailing patterns of child care appear to induce early despair that profound gratifications can emanate from other human beings.⁴³

This, together with his conception of character strength--the capacity to withstand environmental pressure adverse to one's values--suggests new possibilities for bringing together largely unconnected strands of the literature on prerequisites of democracy: psychological writings and research on structural features of democracies and the typical belief systems to be found in them. The data obtained in this study will relate the psychological findings of Rabin's study and some original findings to the political socialization literature and will suggest specific questions for future research.

Questions raised here derive from theoretical formulations which posit that early childhood socialization does affect personality development. It is not assumed that certain psychological dispositions will be found to lead to predicted political beliefs and orientations. Rather, the position is that both personality factors and beliefs must be examined in a particular situation if we are to gain a better understanding of political behavior.⁴⁴ Greenstein states that "it is the political and social systems which provide the socializing environment for 'political' and 'politically relevant' personality development and the situation within which political action takes place."⁴⁵ Independently, Bettelheim, in Children of the Dream, concluded that the kibbutz, far more than nuclear families, constitutes a type of closed and autonomous sub-system within Israeli society, which gives rise to a sense of detachment and non-involvement in Israeli society and the world at large.⁴⁶ Rabin's findings do not confirm Bettelheim's thesis, but suggest what we may expect to find in terms of differences in political

orientations between kibbutz and non-kibbutz-reared children in terms of politically relevant personality factors, as posited by Greenstein.

A further consideration in relating personality variables to this discussion is that kibbutzim and their collective education system, far more than nuclear families, constitute an organizational link to larger social systems and, hence, generate within members a greater sense of involvement in national and international affairs. This notion is derived from an historical analysis of the role of the kibbutz in Israeli society and the ideological orientation of the kibbutz movement, regardless of party affiliation.⁴⁷ Research findings show that, while kibbutz children are relatively unconcerned with distant personal goals and ambitions, they are concerned with the more distant future and distant goals in the framework of the collectivity.⁴⁸ Hopes and aspirations for kibbutz, country and world are more often expressed by kibbutz youngsters than by those raised outside the kibbutz. This may be viewed as a characteristic primarily dependent upon the culture's (i.e., kibbutz) supply of molds in which personal expectancies, aspirations and anticipations may be formed.

The extensive literature⁴⁹ on authoritarian and related attitudes will not be reviewed here. I will simply summarize my reasons for drawing on it to the extent of using and discussing the concept of dogmatism developed by Rokeach.⁵⁰ The impetus of the classic study on the Authoritarian Personality arose out of a deep concern stimulated by events of World War II. The concept of authoritarianism represents an attempt to

. . . link deep-seated personality dispositions with the socially significant forms of belief and social behavior involved in adhering to a rigid and dogmatic ideology and in discriminating against outgroups.⁵¹

The ideological and religious characteristics of the two sub-culture groups suggest the personality traits related to the dogmatic syndrome are theoretically relevant.

Rokeach conceptualized dogmatism as characteristic of people with "closed minds" independent of their particular ideology. He combined this with a theoretical definition of "opinionation," another characteristic of close-minded individuals who accept or reject other people on the basis of opinion similarities.⁵² It is this interpretation of the authoritarian syndrome which is relevant to the findings in Chapter VII.

Returning now to the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, I will rephrase the questions and exploratory hypotheses as predictions. These predictions deal with the outcome of the political socialization process as a function of the position of the individual within the system. Data and findings on personality will be included in Chapter VII.

1. There will be a difference between the political orientations of kibbutz and non-kibbutz children and between religious and non-religious children.
2. These between-group differences will be greater for orientations toward the international system than for those toward the national system.

Orientations will be compared along the same dimensions as in Chapter IV. Data and findings are presented in the following chapter.

NOTES

1. Anne Heinz, "Black Pride as a System-Transforming Variable: Its Impact on Self-Image and Attitudes toward Authority" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1971); and Herbert Hirsch, "Political Socialization in Appalachia: An Inquiry Into the Process of Political Learning in an American Subculture" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1969). Both focus on differential development of political orientations toward the national system. Studies on public opinion and foreign policy are plentiful and inconclusive. They do point to a wide range of knowledge and interest. In the absence of any valid empirical findings concerning factors which may account for such differences, the inference that differential political socialization may provide a clue is a tenable hypothesis. A brief listing of the literature follows.
D. D. Farris, "Selected Attitudes on Foreign Affairs As Correlates of Authoritarianism and Political Anomie," Journal of Politics, XXII (February, 1960), 50-67; Bernard C. Cohen, The Influence of Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign Policy Making (World Peace Foundation, 1959); Alfred O. Hero, Voluntary Organizations in World Affairs Communication (World Peace Foundation, 1960); Lester Milbrath, "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy," in Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, ed. by James N. Rosenau (New York: Random House, 1961); James Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area," in Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. by J. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967); Milton J. Rosenberg, "Images in Relation to the Policy Process," in International Behavior, ed. by H. C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965); Robert A. Levine, "Socialization, Social Structure and Intersocietal Images," in International Behavior, ed. by H. C. Kelman; Irving L. Janis and M. Brewster Smith, "Effects of Education and Persuasion on National and International Images," in International Behavior, ed. by H. C. Kelman, pp. 188-235.
2. Nicholas A. Masters, Robert H. Salisbury, and Thomas H. Eliot, State Politics and the Public Schools (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), pp. 10-11, as cited in Michael W. Kirst, ed., The Politics of Education at the Local, State and Federal Levels (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1970), p. 219.
3. M. Kent Jennings, "Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), 291-317.
4. Herbert Hirsch, op. cit., pp. 46-55.

5. Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture," American Political Science Review, LXII (June, 1968).
6. Anne Heinz, op. cit.
7. Ibid., p. 316.
8. Ibid., pp. 316-17.
9. Edward S. Greenberg, ed., Political Socialization (New York: Atherton Press, 1970); also, "Black Children and the Political System," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXIV (Fall, 1970), 333-45; and Black Politics: The Inevitability of Conflict, readings compiled by E. S. Greenberg, N. Milner and D. J. Olson (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971).
10. Kenyon's study is reported by Edward S. Greenberg in "Black Children and the Political System: A Study of Socialization to Support," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXIV (Fall, 1970), 333-46.
11. Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior, p. 10.
12. Ibid., p. 11.
13. Ibid., p. 12.
14. Ibid., p. 12; see also Scott, op. cit.; Deutsch, op. cit.; Lember-Klineberg, op. cit.
15. Ibid., p. 13.
16. Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Effects of Cross-National Contact on National and International Images," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), p. 117.
17. Tamar Becker, "Cultural Patterns and Nationalistic Commitment Among Foreign Students in the U.S.," Sociology and Social Research, LV (July, 1971), 467-81.
18. George V. Coelho, Changing Images of America: A Study of Indian Students' Perceptions (New York: The Free Press, a Division of the Macmillan Co., 1958).
19. Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior.
20. Robert A. Levine, "Socialization, Social Structure and Intersocial Images," in International Behavior, ed. by H. C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966).
21. See Pool, op. cit.; Becker, op. cit.; and Coelho, op. cit.
22. Mary Edwards, "The Development of Children's Perceptions of Social Group Membership and Differences" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1971).

23. Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954).
24. The literature on the Kibbutz is vast, and only a sampling will be presented. References are grouped by general topic and orientation. Dealing with the historical development of the Kibbutz are J. Baratz, Village by the Jordan (London: Harville Press, 1954); N. Bentwich, "The Collective Settlements of Israel," in A New Way of Life (London: Shindler and Golomb, 1949); S. Diamond, "The Kibbutz: Utopia in Crisis," Dissent, V (1957), and by the same author, "Kibbutz and Shtetl: The History of an Idea," Social Problems, V, 2 (1957), 71-99; S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (New York: Basic Books, 1967); B. Halpern, "The Israeli Commune, Privacy and the Collective Life," Modern Review, III, 1 (1949); Henrik F. Infield, Cooperative Living in Palestine (New York: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1944); also Cooperative Communities at Work (New York: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1945), and Utopia and Experiment—Essays in the Sociology of Cooperation (New York: Frederic A. Praeger, Inc., 1955); E. Orni, "Kvutza and Kibbutz," in Forms of Settlement (World Zionist Organization, 1955); Richard Schwartz, "Democracy and Collectivism in the Kibbutz," Social Problems, V (1957), 110-36; M. E. Spiro, Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956); Y. Talmon-Garber, "The Family in Collective Settlements," The Third World Congress of Sociology, IV (1956); and "The Family in a Revolutionary Movement," in M. Nimkoff, ed., Comparative Family Systems (New York: Houghton-Mifflin & Co., 1965); Murray Weingarten, Life in a Kibbutz (New York: Reconstructionist Press, 1955).

An early review of the literature, uneven in coverage may be found in F. D. Harigan, "The Israeli Kibbutz—A Survey of the Literature," Psychiatric Abstracts, Series No. 9 (The National Institutes of Health, 1962).

Literature on the Kibbutz focusing more specifically on Education and Childrearing includes the following: Bruno Bettelheim, Children of the Dream (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1969), also "Does Communal Education Work? The Case of the Kibbutz," Commentary, XXXIII (1962), 117-26; also, Book Review of Peter B. Neubauer, ed., Children in Collectives: Childrearing Aims and Practices in the Kibbutz (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, Publisher, 1965), in The New York Review of Books, VII, 3 (1966); S. N. Eisenstadt, Book Review of M. Spiro, "Children of the Kibbutz," in American Anthropologist, LVIII, 5 (1956); Shmuel Golan, The Theory of Collective Education (Johannesburg: Hashomer Hatzair, 1952), and "Behavior Research in Collective Settlements in Israel: Collective Education in the Kibbutz," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XXVIII (1958), 549-56; Elizabeth E. Irvine, "Observations on the Aims and Methods of Child Rearing in Communal Settlements in Israel," Human Relations, V (1952), 247-76, and "Children in Kibbutzim: Thirteen Years After," Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, VII (1966), 732-38; Peter B. Neubauer, ed., Children in Collectives: Childrearing Aims and Practices in the Kibbutz (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, Publisher, 1965); Ch. Orlean, The Religious Kibbutz and its Development (Hebrew), (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hadati,

- 1946); E. I. Parsons, "Children of Kfar Blum" Midstream: A Quarterly Jewish Review, V, 3 (1959); A. I. Rabin, Growing up in the Kibbutz (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1965).
25. Simon N. Herman, Israelis and Jews: The Continuity of an Identity (New York: Random House, 1970).
 26. Ibid., pp. 26-30.
 27. Ibid., p. 30.
 28. See the literature, particularly, Melford E. Spiro, Kibbutz: A Venture in Utopia; Baratz, A Village by the Jordan.
 29. The Jerusalem Post, December 9, 1970.
 30. S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society, p. 304; see also Lya Dym, op. cit.; Judah Matras, Social Change in Israel (Chicago: Aldine, 1965).
 31. For a background and description of Israeli political parties and discussion of these developments see Benjamin Akzin, "The Role of Parties in Israeli Democracy," Journal of Politics, XVII, 4 (1955); E. E. Gutmann, "Some Observations on Politics and Parties in Israel," India Quarterly, XVII, 1 (1961); N. Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), Chap. 8; and Lester G. Seligman, Leadership in a New Nation (New York: Atherton Press, 1964).
 32. A detailed discussion can be found in B. Halpern, op. cit.; also valuable are S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Social Conditions of the Development of Voluntary Associates--A Case Study of Israel," in Scripta Hierosolymitana, Vol. III, ed. by R. Bachi (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1956); "The Process of Absorption of Immigrants in Israel," in Between Past and Future, ed. by C. Frankenstein (Jerusalem: Henrietta Szold Foundation, 1953); S. N. Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954); S. N. Eisenstadt and J. Ben-David, "Intergeneration Tensions in Israel," International Social Science Bulletin, VIII, 1 (1956); and A. Antonovsky, "Israeli Political-Social Attitudes," Amot (Hebrew), No. 6, 1963.
 33. Aharon F. Kleinberger, Society, Schools and Progress in Israel (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969), Chap. 1.
 34. Ibid., p. 123.
 35. David J. Apter, "Political Religion in the New States," in Old Societies and New States, ed. by Clifford Geertz (New York: The Free Press, 1963).
 36. In the first major assessment of the state of the field, both empirically and theoretically, David A. Goslin as editor has collected a comprehensive overview of the current usage of the term

socialization. He points out that its current usage and the conception of social learning as a specific field of inquiry are the product of developments in psychology and sociology occurring primarily during the past three decades; yet the interest in child-rearing and social development as underlying concerns goes back to the beginnings of man. His introduction provides the framework within which the field is explored. David A. Goslin, Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), see especially Pt. I, "Theoretical Approaches to the Socialization Process."

37. The work of Melford E. Spiro is perhaps the best-known, and his book Children of the Kibbutz (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958) is still considered the classic of its genre. Other studies by the same author are "Is the Family Universal--The Israeli Case," American Anthropologist, LVI (October, 1954), 839-46; also, "Education in a Communal Village in Israel," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XXV (April, 1955), 283-92; Bruno Bettelheim, "Does Communal Education Work? The Case of the Kibbutz," Commentary, February, 1962; by the same author, Children of the Dream (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1969); A. I. Rabin, "Culture Components as a Significant Factor in Child Development": Symposium 1960--Kibbutz Adolescents. Discussion of A. I. Rabin's "Kibbutz Adolescents" by Theodore M. Abel and Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XXI, 3 (July, 1961); also the following works by the same author: "Kibbutz Children, Research Findings to Date," Children, V (1958, 179-84; "Attitudes of Kibbutz Children to Family and Parents," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XXIX (January, 1959), 172-79; Growing Up in the Kibbutz (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1965); D. Rappaport, "The Study of Kibbutz Education and its Bearing on the Theory of Development," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XXVIII (July, 1958), 587-97; Anna Freud and Sophie Dann, "An Experiment in Group Upbringing," in The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, VI (New York: International University Press, 1951), 127-69; Elizabeth Irvine, "Observations on the Aims and Methods of Childrearing in Communal Settlements in Israel," Human Relations, V (1932), 247-75; Peter B. Neubauer, ed., Children in Collectives: Child-rearing Aims and Practices in the Kibbutz (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1965); A. Jarus, J. Marcus, J. Oren, and Ch. Rapaport, Children and Families in Israel: Some Mental Health Perspectives (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1970), see especially Pt. I.
38. M. E. Spiro, Children in the Kibbutz.
39. Ibid.
40. A. I. Rabin, Growing Up in the Kibbutz.
41. Ibid., p. 209.
42. Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLXI (September, 1965), 81-95.

43. Harold D. Lasswell, "Democratic Character," in The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), p. 497.
44. Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics, Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1967).
45. Fred I. Greenstein, op. cit.
46. Bruno Bettelheim, op. cit.
47. See the discussion of the historical and ideological origins of the Kibbutz movement referred to earlier in this chapter, and in the literature to which reference is made.
48. Rabin, Growing Up in the Kibbutz, Chap. 9.
49. An early review of the literature may be found in Richard Christie and Peggy Cook, "A Guide to Published Literature Relating to the Authoritarian Personality Through 1956," The Journal of Psychology, XLV (April, 1958), 171-99; the stimulus for much of this work was the publication of The Authoritarian Personality by T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Nevitt Sanford, and Daniel J. Levinson (New York: Harper, 1950); other discussions in the literature can be found in Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, eds., Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954); also Martha T. Mednick and Sarnoff A. Mednick, Research in Personality (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), Chap. 6.
50. Partly in response to wide-spread criticism of the concept of authoritarianism as it was developed by Adorno and his associates, Rokeach attempted to develop an approach to the question which would be "value-free" as contrasted with the approach which dwelt on concepts such as "potentially fascist" or "pre-fascist." In "Political and Religious Dogmatism: An Alternative to the Authoritarian Personality," Psychological Monographs, LXX, 425 (1956) and The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960), Milton Rokeach focuses on the "structure" of beliefs. He directs attention to the diversity of belief consistent with common psychological characteristics, which is inhibited by both the Marxian and Freudian heritage of the original research.
51. Rokeach, "Political and Religious Dogmatism: An Alternative to the Authoritarian Personality," op. cit.
52. Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

WITHIN-NATION COMPARISONS OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OF ISRAELI PRE-ADULTS TOWARD NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

Data and Findings

In Chapter I, it was proposed that agencies of political socialization be viewed as functioning in an overlapping manner. The outcome of the process of political socialization was stated to be a function of the structure of the system and of the position of the individual within the system. If a child is a member of, or subject to the influence of a transnational movement, he will undergo different socialization experiences than another child living in the same country, city, neighborhood, or even house. A simple model would, therefore, predict that all children in the national system will be socialized toward the national political system. In addition, those exposed to transnational movements will be socialized toward the international system. Differences in outcome would be more clearly evident in orientations toward the international system.

Utilizing the measures described in Chapter IV, I report on the findings of comparisons between groups along the same six dimensions. The first between-groups comparison on each measure will be for those exposed to kibbutz socialization and those not exposed to this additional process. The second comparison is between religious and non-religious respondents. The question to be answered is: Does political

socialization by a transnational movement lead to greater awareness of, or involvement with the world or global system?

The central hypothesis of this chapter phrased as a prediction is as follows: Young Israelis exposed to political socialization by transnational movements--kibbutz and religion--will evidence more international involvement than will those not exposed to this process.

Table 6.1 presents a breakdown of the total sample into the groups to be compared. The sample breakdown is not representative of the general population of Israel. Kibbutz respondents constitute 22.9 per cent of the sample, while in the Israeli population kibbutz members are only 3 per cent. Similarly, the religious respondents constitute 38.1 per cent of the sample, while in the population of Israel their share is 26.4 per cent (1970 statistics).

TABLE 6.1
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE POPULATION

Type	Number	Per Cent
Kibbutz	137	22.9
Non-kibbutz	462	77.1
Religious	228	38.1
Non-religious	371	61.9

The significance of knowledge concerning political events was discussed in Chapter IV. Proceeding on the same assumptions, it is expected that the level of political knowledge will reflect differences, specifically in the areas of international information. Section A reports findings on the comparison.

A. POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

If exposure to political socialization by a transnational movement leads to more world-minded orientations than does non-exposure to this agent of socialization, the following prediction can be made:

There will be a difference in the level of political knowledge of children socialized by transnational movements and those not socialized by transnational movements. Further, it can be predicted that: These differences will be greater in the area of international knowledge than national knowledge.

To test these predictions, the six-item political knowledge test was administered. Table 6.2 presents findings on the level of political knowledge for kibbutz and non-kibbutz children. Responses were scored from 0 (no correct responses) through 3 (three correct responses).

TABLE 6.2

LEVEL OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, BY GROUP: KIBBUTZ^a

Score	National		International	
	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz
0	14.3%	5.2%	4.0%	6.6%
1	29.4	25.9	27.0	23.5
2	33.3	51.4	28.6	52.1
3	23.0	17.5	40.5	17.8

^aN=339.

Findings must be considered inconclusive. The first prediction is supported, as there are indeed differences in the level of knowledge found in the two groups. However, the pattern is unclear. Only for the highest category can the findings be interpreted as supporting the prediction. Twenty-three per cent of kibbutz children compared to 17.5 per cent of non-kibbutz children scored 3 on the national test. On the international test, 40.5 per cent of kibbutz and 17.8 per cent of non-kibbutz children scored 3. The difference between kibbutz and non-kibbutz respondents is clearly greater on the international test.

But turning to the next highest category of two correct responses, the findings show 33.3 per cent of kibbutz and 51.4 per cent of non-kibbutz children in this category on the national test, while there are 28.6 per cent kibbutz and 52.1 per cent non-kibbutz children in this category on the international test. The difference is again much greater on the international test, but now it is the non-kibbutz sample which has a considerably higher percentage in this category. Combining all those who had correct responses gives a total of 96 per cent of kibbutz and 93 per cent of non-kibbutz respondents on the international test.

Returning to those in the highest scoring categories, the findings may be interpreted as a reflection of the generally acknowledged high quality of kibbutz schools: more than two-fifths of kibbutz children answered all questions correctly on the international test and almost one-fourth gave correct responses on all national items, compared with slightly more than one-sixth of non-kibbutz children on each test.

Data from the oral interviews tend to confirm these findings to the extent that they have been analyzed. The level of political

knowledge was relatively high for all children in Israel, with no significant differences between groups.

B. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The second dimension along which groups will be compared to measure the effect of transnational orientations concerns the sources of information cited by children as important. The sources which have received most attention in the political socialization literature are those considered primary agents of socialization: the family, school, and peer group.

Hirsch, in his study on political socialization in the Appalachian sub-culture, compares the respondents' rankings of seven agents of information transmission. He compares these rankings in terms of information concerning the local, state, national and international level. His findings show that agents hold different ranks relative to different levels of government. He concludes that there is evidence to indicate that the agents who communicate political information to the child are of two quite distinct types. A factor analysis performed on the measures of agent performance demonstrates the presence of two principal factors which, for his sample, account for 64.5 per cent of the variance.¹ On the basis of these findings, he divides the agents who communicate political information to the child into the same groups I discussed in Chapter IV. His findings provide empirically tested support for the theoretically based dichotomization of agents operating through interpersonal interaction, i.e. family, friends and school, and those agents operating more impersonally, i.e. radio, television and newspapers.

As a framework for comparing agents of socialization in terms of their function as information sources, this categorization has

greater heuristic value than that proposed by Hess and Torney.² While useful in a general study of the development of political orientations, their division of agents of socialization into institutions of well-defined structure and organization and those "exerting influence that occurs in the larger social setting" is less meaningful in this context. Since the purpose here is to evaluate the specific function of information sources, the interpersonal-impersonal distinction offers a more fruitful approach.

In Chapter IV it was predicted that mass media would be considered more important by children as sources of information concerning international affairs than national. Findings confirmed the prediction.

For this between-groups comparison, it is predicted that:

There will be differences in the relative importance assigned to mass media and interpersonal sources by each pair of groups; and these differences will be greater concerning international information than concerning national information.

Respondents were asked to rank six sources of information, selecting those three they considered most important as sources of information concerning the national and international political systems. Table 6.3 shows findings for the kibbutz-non-kibbutz comparison.

For national information, the percentage of kibbutz respondents ranking mass media (newspapers, radio and television) among the top three was 96.6 per cent, 95.0 per cent and 35.8 per cent, while for non-kibbutz respondents the figures were 95.3 per cent, 96.0 per cent and 70.1 per cent. The only notable difference was in the figures on television, and this must be attributed largely to the absence of

TABLE 6.3

SOURCES OF POLITICAL INFORMATION WITH PER CENT RANKING EACH AMONG
THREE CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT BY GROUP: KIBBUTZ

Source	National		International	
	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz
Newspapers	96.6%	95.3%	84.1%	81.0%
Radio	95.0	96.0	98.3	95.5
Television	35.8	70.1	46.6	74.8
Teachers & Schools	35.8	29.6	29.1	15.3
Parents	56.0	55.0	47.0	37.0
Friends	26.6	13.5	18.3	9.8

television from the kibbutz child's daily life. In fact, it is interesting to speculate on why more than one-third of kibbutz respondents did include this source among the top three and the most plausible interpretation is response set. As sources for international information there is a slightly different distribution between the two groups. Among kibbutz children 84.1 per cent, 98.3 per cent and 46.6 per cent included mass media as the top three, while 81.0 per cent, 95.5 per cent and 74.8 per cent of non-kibbutz children assigned top ranking to mass media. The greatest difference, again, was evident in the figures for television, although the gap was only 28.2 per cent. In summary, looking at radio and newspapers as the more relevant media, the difference between kibbutz and non-kibbutz children is greater for international information than for national.

Differences between the two samples are more significant with regard to interpersonal sources. Teachers and schools are included in the top-three category by 35.8 per cent of kibbutz sample and 29.6 per cent of non-kibbutz sample as a source of national information. For international information almost twice as many kibbutz children (29.1 per cent) include this source as do non-kibbutz children (15.3 per cent).

Parents are included among the top three sources for national information by 56 per cent of the kibbutz sample and 55 per cent of the non-kibbutz sample. For international information, as predicted, the difference is again greater, with 47 per cent of the kibbutz and 37 per cent of the non-kibbutz samples including this source among the top three.

The last group of the interpersonal sources consists of friends. While the first prediction is again confirmed by the findings, the second is not. For both national and international information, the group including this source among the three most important is twice as high (in percentage) among kibbutz children as among non-kibbutz children. Specifically, 26.6 per cent of kibbutz and 13.5 per cent of non-kibbutz children include friends among the three most important sources for national information, and 18.3 per cent kibbutz and 9.8 per cent non-kibbutz children include this source among three most important for international information.

To summarize the findings on this between-groups comparison, it may be stated that the findings confirm both predictions. There are differences in the relative importance assigned to mass media and interpersonal sources of information by kibbutz and non-kibbutz respondents.

Findings also confirm the prediction that these differences will be greater with regard to international information.

Greater reliance on interpersonal sources by kibbutz children may be interpreted as a function of the structure of the kibbutz. It serves not only as a referent for group identification, but also as an extended family. It has been pointed out in the kibbutz literature³ that the concept of the extended family has been misapplied in some of the discussions of kibbutz family life. Israeli researchers have pointed to the close family (primary) relationship for kibbutz parents and children, which is frequently minimized by the use of the "extended family" concept. Bearing in mind this caveat, I use "extended family" not as a substitute for, but as an addition, to the traditional concept.

There are two significant consequences which flow from this conceptualization. There is an assumption of basic agreement on political orientations and commitment to the national and international political systems among members of the kibbutz. If kibbutz children relate to others in the kibbutz as members of an extended family, this includes parents and siblings as well as teachers and friends. Furthermore, interpersonal sources are those which have been shown to reinforce each other, and early affective orientations. The congruence of cues flowing from what is ideologically a conflict-free environment reinforces political orientations.

Findings show that kibbutz children rank interpersonal sources higher than do non-kibbutz children, for both national and international information. However, the significance of the kibbutz as a transnational socialization agent is confirmed by the finding that the greater reliance of kibbutz children on interpersonal sources is

substantially greater when they turn to sources for international information. Since a specific world orientation is part of the kibbutz ideology, the findings on relative importance of sources of information predicts a strengthening of international orientations for kibbutz children.

The findings showing higher rankings for interpersonal sources of information among kibbutz children are in accord with those found in the literature on kibbutz upbringing. Rabin found "cathexis to peers . . . more intense than in our society. . . ,"⁴ a finding supported in my data showing that not only do twice as many kibbutz as non-kibbutz children rank friends among the three most important sources of information but they do so for both national and international systems.

Another finding reported by Rabin is of interest here. He reports less intense attachments to parents among his kibbutz sample compared to a non-kibbutz sample. This would suggest that identification with parents as learning models would be less frequent or intense for kibbutz than for non-kibbutz respondents. My data do not support this hypothesis. Further, when viewed in the light of findings reported by Hess and Torney⁵ that parents decrease in salience to children with age as sources of news, my data raise interesting questions.

Table 6.4 shows comparative data on the rankings of parents as the most important source of information. The table presents findings for kibbutz and non-kibbutz children in sixth and tenth grades.

The findings that parents decrease in salience with age are supported by the data in Table 6.4. However, the parents' role as a source of information appears to undergo a much more gradual decline for kibbutz children than it does for non-kibbutz children. As a source for

TABLE 6.4

PARENTS RANKED AS MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE
OF INFORMATION, BY GRADE AND KIBBUTZ

	National	International
6th Grade		
Kibbutz	28.6%	20.0%
Non-Kibbutz	35.3	9.4
10th Grade		
Kibbutz	15.8	15.4
Non-Kibbutz	9.4	0

national information, parents are ranked first by 28.6 per cent of kibbutz sixth graders, dropping to 15.8 per cent for kibbutz tenth graders. But the corresponding figures for non-kibbutz respondents is a decline from 35.3 per cent to 9.4 per cent. As a source of international information, 20.0 per cent of kibbutz sixth graders rank parents as most important, while 15.4 per cent of the tenth graders do so. Among non-kibbutz respondents this choice is made by 9.4 per cent of the sixth graders but by none in tenth grade.

Clearly, the decreasing salience of parents as a source of information is supported by these findings. More significant for an understanding of the process of international socialization, however, is the pattern for the two groups. For the kibbutz sample, less than half of those ranking parents first in sixth grade drop them from first place as sources of national information by tenth grade and only one-fourth do so as sources of international information. Among non-kibbutz respondents a much more precipitous drop in ranking is evident. Only

one fourth of those ranking parents first on national information in sixth grade still do so in tenth grade and none of the almost one-tenth who did so for international information in sixth grade do so in tenth.

The relatively greater proportion of kibbutz respondents who continue to cite parents as important sources of information with increasing age may be attributable to the close relationships between all interpersonal sources. It also suggests an explanation for another of Rabin's conclusions, that the kibbutz does, in fact, succeed in raising its young to support the goals and ideals of the kibbutz.⁶ It appears that the less intense attachment to parents which he found does not lessen the role of parents as learning models by identification. Turning now to the second transnational movement, religion, two groups will again be compared in terms of the sources of information considered important. The same predictions are made as for kibbutz. Findings are presented in Table 6.5.

Again, the significant differences lie in the importance assigned to interpersonal sources as compared to mass media. Respondents rank mass media substantially higher in importance than interpersonal sources for national and also international information. The prediction that religion, as a transnational movement, will have greater impact in the international area than in the national is supported by the following figures, drawn from the data on interpersonal sources. Three per cent more religious respondents rank teachers and schools among the most important sources for national information than do non-religious respondents. As a source of international information the difference is 8 per cent. Parents are included by 19 per cent more of religious respondents than non-religious for national information, but

TABLE 6.5

SOURCES OF POLITICAL INFORMATION WITH PER CENT RANKING EACH AS AMONG THREE CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT, BY GROUP: RELIGION

Source	National		International	
	Religious	Non-Religious	Religious	Non-Religious
Newspapers	90.8%	98.7%	100.0%	100.0%
Radio	94.3	97.4	99.4	94.1
Television	41.3	75.0	53.0	77.6
Teachers & Schools	33.1	29.7	23.4	15.5
Parents	66.8	48.2	55.6	30.4
Friends	22.4	12.9	14.2	10.3

the difference for international information is 25 per cent. For friends the difference is almost 10 per cent for national information and 4 per cent for international, thus reversing the pattern and showing a greater difference in the national area. The difference in peer group ranking focuses attention on the social structure of the kibbutz, with its emphasis on peer relationships and interactions.

Findings generally are similar to those found for the kibbutz sample, both indicating significantly higher reliance on interpersonal sources than for the sample not socialized by transnational movements. The data thus far presented support the prediction that socialization by either kibbutz or religion leads to more positive international orientations than does the political socialization process to which all children are exposed. They do suggest a greater family influence for these groups than has been reported by American and French studies on

family influence.⁷ Findings also indicate that, while a shared commitment to the values of the transnational movements studied may be assumed, it is clear that information concerning the international political system is an area in which parents represent significant models. The relatively greater dependence on interpersonal sources for political cue stimuli concerning the international system also suggests that this be viewed as learning "under conditions of partial reinforcement" as discussed by Brim.⁸ If early childhood learning is most important and lasting just because it is learned primarily from interpersonal sources, then the relatively higher dependence of transnational socializees on parents may be interpreted as related to more positive world-minded orientations.

C. IMPACT OF THE SYSTEM ON SELF

Two assumptions guided the approach followed in this section. The first states that most people exhibit a low level of political involvement, either national or international. The second assumption is that, for most people, involvement with the national political system is greater than involvement with the international system. These assumptions are supported by the findings reported in Chapter IV. It was shown that the modal distribution of political orientations exhibited significantly different patterns for the national and international political systems. In terms of the political culture model, the modal type for national political orientations was subject-participant, while the modal type for international political orientations was subject.

The theoretical formulation for this aspect of the analysis states that the outcome of the political socialization process is not only a function of the structure of the system, but also of the position

of the individual. To paraphrase, while all children in the national system will be socialized by the national political system, the effect of socialization by transnational movements is an additional process, one I have called supra-socialization. Thus the first theoretically derived prediction states that: Socialization by transnational movements will lead to a higher level of perceived impact of the international system on the self than will the absence of this supra-socialization.

It is further predicted that: These between-group differences will be greater for those who indicate a high degree of national involvement. Based on the findings in Chapter IV, the following model is presented to illustrate the expected distribution of political orientations toward the national and international systems.

Fig. 6.1.--Expected Frequency Distribution of Political Involvement Scores

Frequency Rank	International	National
Highest	Low	Low
Second	Low	High
Third	High	High
Lowest	High	Low

As shown in Figure 6.1, the model predicts that for all respondents measures of political involvement will show the largest numbers in the category scoring low on both international and national involvement. A smaller number will score low on international and high on national involvement. The third group will include those scoring high on both international and national involvement, and a relatively small group

will score high on international and low on national measures of involvement. Based on the two predictions at the beginning of this section, it is expected that findings for those socialized by transnational movements will show significant deviations from the proposed model, particularly for the group showing a high level of national involvement.

Involvement is seen again, as in Chapter IV, broken down into two components: impact of the system on the self, and impact of the self on the system. In this section, impact on self will be compared for the two pairs of groups and in Section D impact on system will be analyzed.

To measure this combined impact of the national and international political system on the self, an index was constructed, based on the scores obtained by respondents on the scales measuring impact of the system on the self. This was done for each of the components of impact as measured, including influence, affect and intensity components. For each of the scales, scores were divided into high and low, with a uniform cutting point established. Cross-correlation of the national and international scores on each of the scales produced the findings shown in Table 6.6. They show the perceived influence of the national and international systems on kibbutz and non-kibbutz children.

The pattern for non-kibbutz children conforms to that predicted by the model. The largest percentage of respondents, 87 per cent, report low perceived influence of both systems. The next group, 55 per cent, report high influence of national and low influence of international. The third group consists of those reporting high influence of both the national and international systems, down to 45 per cent of the sample, and the smallest group, 13 per cent, report high degree of

influence perceived emanating from the international system and low from the national.

TABLE 6.6

IMPACT (INFLUENCE) OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS ON THE SELF BY SOCIALIZATION AGENT: KIBBUTZ^a

International	National	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz
Low	Low	83%	87%
Low	High	45	55
High	High	55	45
High	Low	17	13

^aN=564.

Turning to the kibbutz side of Table 6.6, the pattern is seen to deviate from that predicted by the model. Again the largest group, 83 per cent, falls in the category of those perceiving low level of influence from both systems. The next category, those reporting high national influence and low international, drops to 45 per cent of the sample. But it is the third category, those perceiving high level of influence from both systems, which deviates most strikingly from the predicted pattern. For kibbutz children who perceive the national system as having a high degree of influence on themselves, more than half also see the international system as very influential and less than half classify it as low in influence. The last category, consisting of those perceiving the international system as having a high degree of

influence and the national system low, includes 17 per cent of the kibbutz sample.

Using the same index for comparing the combined scores of national and international impact in terms of affective and intensity dimensions, the findings are also in accord with those predicted by the model. Kibbutz respondents exhibit higher levels of perceived impact of both systems, but the differences are greater for the international system. Table 6.7 shows findings on affect and Table 6.8 reports findings on intensity. In neither of the two tables do the findings show

TABLE 6.7

IMPACT (AFFECT) OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS ON THE SELF, BY SOCIALIZATION AGENT: KIBBUTZ^a

International	National	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz
Low	Low	91%	94%
Low	High	56	74
High	High	44	26
High	Low	9	6

^aN=506.

the dramatic reversal apparent concerning the cognitively perceived influence of the international system, but in both cases it is clear that the difference in perceived impact of the international system between kibbutz and non-kibbutz children who report low national impact is small. Contrariwise, for those reporting high national impact, the difference between kibbutz and non-kibbutz children is significantly larger. In both cases the association is statistically significant.

TABLE 6.8

IMPACT (INTENSITY) OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS ON
THE SELF, BY SOCIALIZATION AGENT: KIBBUTZ^a

International	National	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz
Low	Low	90%	92%
Low	High	66	80
High	High	34	20
High	Low	10	8

^aN=553.

Turning to the second transnational movement, the same comparison is made for religion. The findings confirm the pattern predicted by the model, except for the first measure of impact, influence, which shows that for the religious group which perceives the national system to have high impact, 64 per cent perceive the international system as low and 37 per cent as high in impact. For the non-religious sample the findings are 45 per cent and 55 per cent, respectively. It appears that for non-religious respondents a high perceived impact of the national system is more likely to be accompanied by a high level of perceived impact from the international system than is the case for the religious respondents. Tables 6.9 through 6.11 show these findings.

Findings for religion generally do support the predictions of the model in terms of the patterns of distribution of political orientations. But they do not support the prediction that religion as a transnational movement will have a significantly greater impact on international than on national orientations.

TABLE 6.9

IMPACT (INFLUENCE) OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS ON
THE SELF, BY SOCIALIZATION AGENT: RELIGION^a

International	National	Religious	Non-Religious
Low	Low	83%	88%
Low	High	64	45
High	High	37	55
High	Low	17	12

^aN=564.

TABLE 6.10

IMPACT (AFFECT) OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS ON
THE SELF, BY SOCIALIZATION AGENTS: RELIGION^a

International	National	Religious	Non-Religious
Low	Low	90%	95%
Low	High	75	64
High	High	25	32
High	Low	11	5

^aN=511.

TABLE 6.11

IMPACT (INTENSITY) OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS ON THE SELF, BY SOCIALIZATION AGENT: RELIGION^a

International	National	Religious	Non-Religious
Low	Low	92%	92%
Low	High	78	75
High	High	22	25
High	Low	8	8

^aN=503.

Before turning to a more detailed discussion of the findings reported above, the effects of religion and kibbutz on the perceived impact of the system on the self will be probed further. Controlling for religion, findings of a cross-tabulation of the national and international impact scores are presented in Tables 6.12 through 6.14.

TABLE 6.12

INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS ON THE SELF, BY SOCIALIZATION AGENT: KIBBUTZ, CONTROLLING FOR RELIGION^a

International	National	Religious Kibbutz	Religious Non-Kibbutz
Low	Low	80.6%	87.0%
Low	High	48	81
High	High	52	19
High	Low	19	13

^aN=226.

Table 6.12 shows the combined influence of both systems on the self, with the sample broken down into those socialized by both religion and

kibbutz and those socialized by religion but not by kibbutz. Table 6.13 presents findings on affect for the same groups and Table 6.14 shows the findings on intensity.

The findings, all statistically significant, confirm the significance of kibbutz as the discriminating factor in predicting differences in international orientations as measured by perceived impact of the system on self.

TABLE 6.13

IMPACT (AFFECT) OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS ON THE SELF, BY SOCIALIZATION AGENT: KIBBUTZ, CONTROLLING FOR RELIGION^a

International	National	Religious Kibbutz	Religious Non-Kibbutz
Low	Low	90%	89%
Low	High	63	89
High	High	37	11
High	Low	10	11

^aN=172.

TABLE 6.14

IMPACT (INTENSITY) OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS ON THE SELF, BY SOCIALIZATION AGENT: KIBBUTZ, CONTROLLING FOR RELIGION^a

International	National	Religious Kibbutz	Religious Non-Kibbutz
Low	Low	88%	97%
Low	High	33	76
High	High	67	24
High	Low	12	3

^aN=217.

In Chapter V, I presented theoretical propositions and considerations which led to the prediction that both kibbutz and religion would socialize to international orientations. The measures thus far presented have generally supported this prediction. In spite of differences found between kibbutz and religious samples, the findings show a considerably smaller percentage of religious than non-religious children expressing low perceived impact of both political systems and, conversely, a considerably higher percentage of religious than non-religious children expressing a low level of perceived impact from the national system but a high impact from the international system, while the predicted correlation between religion and international involvement is not as high as for kibbutz, clearly children socialized by these transnational movements exhibit higher levels of international involvement than do other children.

It is possible to speculate on a number of factors contributing to the findings. First of these is the possibility that, while religion is indeed a transnational movement which influences orientations toward a global view, it may be in the direction of a specific world-view rather than what is conceived as a world-minded orientation. Gordon W. Allport and J. Michael Ross studied the relationship of personal religious orientations and prejudice. After summarizing previous psychological and survey research, they report three generalizations concerning the relationship between subjective religion and ethnic prejudice which appear fairly well established in the literature: (1) On the average, church-goers are more prejudiced than non-church-goers; (2) the relationship is curvilinear; and (3) people with an extrinsic religious orientation are significantly more prejudiced than people

with an intrinsic religious orientation. Developing a scale to measure intrinsic and extrinsic orientation, they conclude by proposing a fourth generalization reported as an amplification of the third. "The finding is that a certain cognitive style permeates the thinking of many people in such a way that they are indiscriminately pro-religious and, at the same time, highly prejudiced."⁹ The relevance of this approach derives from the theoretically and empirically demonstrated relationships between prejudice and ethnocentrism (as well as authoritarianism) which, in turn, was found negatively related to world-mindedness.¹⁰ Further, Rokeach (1960) found non-believers to be consistently less dogmatic, less authoritarian and less ethnocentric than believers. It may be that the effect of religion in influencing toward global orientations is a function partially determined by the distinction between religious attitudes that are "intrinsic, extrinsic and indiscriminately pro" and that "to know that a person is in some sense religious is not as important as to know the role religion plays in the economy of his life."¹¹

The relationship between religion as defined in this study and a measure of closed-mindedness will be further analyzed in the next chapter. It does serve to emphasize the point made by Greenstein concerning the "complexity of connection between psychological data and behavioral outcomes, both at the individual and collective levels."¹² Greenstein also reminds us that "psychological data alone are never sufficient for explaining behavior, since behavior is a joint function of situational stimuli and psychological predisposition. Nevertheless, because different persons vary in their reactions to similar stimuli, psychological data—i.e. the residues of socialization—often are

necessary for explaining or predicting behavior."¹³ I am interested in the interpretation of the residues as well as of the central substance.

A second approach to interpreting the findings may be found in the normatively oriented influence of religion. More than other influences on the life of the individual, religion instills normative values. Thus the eleven-year-old boy cited earlier, who defined peace in terms of the vision of Isaiah, reflected the normative value of peace and cooperation among nations in the context of prophetic Judaism. A girl of the same age, living in a religious kibbutz in the Jordan Valley with the Jordan River as the boundary between the kibbutz and Jordanian territory, defined peace in possibly more normative-empirical terms. Having lived all her life within earshot of exploding shells, she saw peace as the possibility of "walking down to the Jordan on a Shabbat afternoon, as Shabbat should be."

The influence of the normative aspects of religion, with their emphasis on the brotherhood of men, may also be reflected in the denial of hostile or non-friendly attitudes toward Israel on the part of other nations, which was far more prevalent among religious than non-religious respondents. While these findings are taken from oral data,¹⁴ which has only been partially analyzed and must therefore be interpreted with caution, they do indicate that further study in this area of attitudes and values would be fruitful.

As in Chapter IV, this between-groups comparison will focus on a number of statements expressing normatively oriented attitudes to the two levels of political life. For these items, it is predicted that: Those socialized by transnational movements will exhibit greater

willingness to accord legitimate authority to the international system than will those not socialized by transnational movements. Table 6.15 breaks down the findings on attitudes toward authority for kibbutz and non-kibbutz respondents.

The prediction for this between-groups comparison directs attention primarily to the findings concerning international orientations. Differences in national orientations are not expected to be significant and are not directly relevant to the theoretically specified influence of transnational socialization. Yet a look at the findings in Table 6.15 warrants at least taking note of these differences. The difference between kibbutz and non-kibbutz respondents on the question of the right of the government to open mail is less than 1 per cent. Yet twice as many kibbutz respondents are uncertain, and less willing to deny the government this power. Reflecting a similar preference for granting the government greater power are the findings concerning the statement that all laws should be obeyed. Here 14 per cent more of kibbutz respondents than non-kibbutz respondents agree.

The final item shows a relatively small difference on the government's right to insist on the payment of taxes (as compared with the options of encouraging citizens to pay or leaving it up to the citizen) between the groups. However, on the issue of military service and compulsory education, the differences appear quite significant. It appears that on all national items where there is a significant difference between the two groups, it is in the direction of the kibbutz sample's greater willingness to accord power and legitimacy to the national government. This could be seen as support for the view that kibbutz children grow up to become more conformist, as suggested by Bettelheim. But in the

TABLE 6.15

HIGH LEGITIMACY ACCORDED TO AUTHORITY, BY SYSTEM AND
AGENT OF SOCIALIZATION: KIBBUTZ^a

Area of Authority	Kibbutz		Non-Kibbutz	
	High	Don't Know	High	Don't Know
National				
1. Government may open mail (if this will help stop crime)	44.4%	18.5%	45.3%	9.1%
2. All laws should be obeyed	75.9	7.5	61.6	10.2
3. Government should insist on:				
Payment of taxes	81.5	. .	84.4	. .
Military service	82.4	. .	73.9	. .
School attendance	84.0	. .	70.8	. .
International				
1. There should be a world government	19.2%	. .	12.0%	. .
2. World government should guarantee the welfare of all	36.4	. .	34.2	. .
3. A world authority should be responsible for the education of all people	58.5	. .	54.2	. .

^aHigh=Agreement with statement.

light of other findings, some of which will be discussed in the following chapter, it appears more likely to be a reflection of the high degree of involvement with the goals of the kibbutz movement, implemented by the government for what is regarded as the national purpose.

The specific findings relevant to the predicted outcome of transnational socialization confirm the prediction that transnational socialization will lead to greater willingness to see the international system as a legitimate authority. On all three international items, a higher percentage of kibbutz socialized respondents express agreement than do non-kibbutz respondents. It is interesting to note that, for both groups, agreement increases substantially as the content of the items becomes more general. One-fifth of kibbutz respondents agree that there should be a world government, with all national governments abolished, but almost three-fifths agree that a world authority should be empowered to direct what is taught in the area of history and politics in all countries. The corresponding proportions among non-kibbutz respondents go from one-eighth to more than one-half. It is fair to interpret these findings as reflecting a lesser threat perceived from the world-understanding oriented educational item than from the world government item, phrased as it is. The significant finding is that kibbutz does, indeed, appear to socialize toward a more world-minded orientation.

Table 6.16 presents parallel data with a breakdown by the second transnational socializing agent, religion. The findings on the effect of socialization by transnational movements again confirm the prediction that it will lead to greater willingness to accord the international system legitimate authority. Comparing the effect of the two agencies of socialization, it appears that, on these measures of world-mindedness, religion has a stronger effect than does kibbutz.

The final item on perceived impact of the system on self compares the groups in terms of agreement with the statement: Young

TABLE 6.16

HIGH LEGITIMACY ACCORDED TO AUTHORITY, BY SYSTEM AND
AGENT OF SOCIALIZATION: RELIGION^a

Area of Authority	Religious		Non-Religious	
	High	Don't Know	High	Don't Know
National				
1. Government may open mail and tap telephones (if this will help stop crime)	44.2%	15.9%	45.7%	8.3%
2. All laws should be obeyed	70.1	9.8	61.6	9.5
3. Government should insist on				
Payment of taxes	76.2	. .	88.0	. .
Military service	75.0	. .	76.0	. .
School attendance	73.9	. .	73.3	. .
International				
1. There should be a world government	19.8%	. .	15.7%	. .
2. World government should guarantee the welfare of all	38.7	. .	32.8	. .
3. A world authority should be responsible for the education of all people	62.4	. .	54.4	. .

^aHigh=Agreement with statement.

people's taste in music and clothes is influenced by what young people in other countries like. On the face of it, this appears to tap a different dimension of orientations. Yet it may be interpreted as a

proposition derived from the concept of political culture. An interest in social and cultural aspects of other countries and a recognition of the interrelatedness of national systems reflects the national political culture as much as do patterns of voter participation. The recently displayed public indifference of the Chinese people to the diplomatic invasion by the United States may be viewed as an aspect of the political culture of China in this context.

Table 6.17 reports the findings on acceptance of these socio-cultural influences for both kibbutz and religious respondents.

TABLE 6.17
CULTURAL IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM BY
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION AGENT

	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree
Kibbutz	65.9%	28.9%	5.2%
Non-Kibbutz	67.7	12.9	19.4
Religious	60.6	25.7	13.7
Non-Religious	71.7	10.7	17.6

^aItem: Young people's taste in music and clothes is influenced by what young people in other countries like.

For this item findings appear to reverse those on preceding items. Socialization by transnational movements is associated with a lower percentage in agreement. Yet, a look at the "disagree" figures shows that for both kibbutz and religious groups those who disagree with the statement represent a smaller percentage than for non-kibbutz and non-religious respondents.

The most striking finding is the large percentage of responses of both kibbutz and religious respondents in the "don't know" category. This may simply be a function of the orientations of the specific transnational movements, which put a negative value on what is generally encompassed by the international youth culture. Or it may, with equal plausibility, be assumed that these concerns are lower on the list of priorities of kibbutz and religious children. For all groups, however, it is perceived as having greater impact than any other international item.

D. IMPACT OF THE SELF ON SYSTEM

The general definition of involvement includes the notion of a reciprocal relationship in which respondents perceive the system as responsive and themselves as capable of affecting the system. In this section, as in Section D, Chapter IV, the action-oriented component of political orientations will be examined.

In Chapter IV it was concluded that children generally exhibit a lower sense of efficacy with regard to the international system than with regard to the national system. The question to be answered here is whether socialization by transnational movements will lead to a greater sense of efficacy than will the absence of such socialization. Since it was defined as a process of supra-socialization, it is predicted that: Political socialization by transnational movements will lead to between-group differences; kibbutz and religious children will show evidence of a greater sense of efficacy toward the international political system than will non-kibbutz and non-religious children. This prediction is based on the theoretical expectations elaborated in preceding sections. In relation to the efficacy aspect of involvement, the

prediction is supported by the notion that children exposed to transnational movements will have more information concerning levers available for influencing the international system.

The measures used will be the same as those in Chapter IV, scales based on responses to headline items, in which respondents were asked how much they thought they could do about given events and conditions. As in Section C of this chapter, national and international scores will be combined into a taxonomy with four alternative combinations. Findings on both kibbutz and non-kibbutz and religious and non-religious comparisons are presented in Table 6.18.

TABLE 6.18
PERCEIVED IMPACT OF SELF ON POLITICAL SYSTEM, BY
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION AGENT^a

International	National	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Religious	Non-Religious
Low	Low	97.9%	98.2%	98.1%	98.2%
Low	High	80.0	87.3	81.3	88.3
High	High	20.0	12.7	18.7	11.7
High	Low	2.1	1.8	1.9	1.8

^aKibbutz and Religion.

Findings in Table 6.18 show no statistically significant relationship between either type of transnational socialization and sense of efficacy. Nevertheless, looking at the findings carefully, it is possible to see a pattern and to extrapolate from this. As predicted by the model used, when national scores are held constant the international score becomes more significant. For those with low national

scores on efficacy, there appears to be no difference in international scores. Looking only at those with high national scores, however, the trend predicted by the model does appear. For kibbutz respondents who have high national scores, 80.0 per cent have low international scores; for non-kibbutz respondents this figure goes up to 87.3 per cent. Conversely, of kibbutz subjects with high national scores, 20.0 per cent also have high international scores, while only 12.7 per cent of non-kibbutz subjects with high national scores have high international scores as well.

Analyzing the findings while controlling for religion adds little to an understanding of the transnational influence. The findings in Table 6.19 are similar to those for kibbutz and religion separately.

TABLE 6.19

IMPACT OF SELF ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, BY TRANSNATIONAL
SOCIALIZATION AGENT (MODIFIED)

International	National	(Religious) Kibbutz	(Religious) Non-Kibbutz
Low	Low	97.7%	98.6%
Low	High	81.0	81.5
High	High	19.0	18.5
High	Low	2.3	1.4

An analysis of individual items as utilized in Chapter IV may provide more insight into the effect of transnational socialization. The political culture model posited that the subject orientation typically reflects greater awareness of output of the system than input.¹⁵

An orientation toward distant (national or international) authority figures reflecting low expectations of responsiveness from such authorities has been found to correlate with feelings of low efficacy and low involvement.¹⁶ Table 6.20 consists of data obtained by asking respondents to agree or disagree with seven statements. These statements were used in Chapter IV, Section D to compare orientations toward the national and international systems. In this section they are used to compare the orientations toward both systems of those socialized by transnational movements and those not socialized by transnational movements. Table 6.20 presents findings on perceived impact of the self on the system for kibbutz and non-kibbutz respondents.

The findings on national items show that those exposed to transnational socialization evidence a higher level of perceived impact on the political system than do those not socialized by transnational movements. Differences range from 4.4 per cent on the item concerning the efficacy of parents vis-a-vis the political system to a difference of 8.5 per cent between kibbutz respondents who agree that the political views of young people are very important (80.9 per cent) and non-kibbutz respondents who support this view (72.4 per cent). Among the national items it is interesting to note that the lowest degree of efficacy is expressed in response to the item reflecting a general, wide-ranging frustration: Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on. More than one-half of kibbutz and almost three-fifths of non-kibbutz respondents agreed, thus expressing a low sense of efficacy toward the national political system. The highest degree of efficacy, expressed in the form of disagreement with the statement, was elicited by the item reaffirming

TABLE 6.20

PERCEIVED IMPACT OF SELF ON POLITICAL SYSTEM, BY
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION (KIBBUTZ)^a

Statement	High		Low	
	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz
National				
1. My parents don't have any say about what government does.	66.9%	62.5%	16.3%	11.1%
2. When we become adults we will not have any influence on what government does.	55.8	49.6	12.0	14.1
3. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.	36.6	31.1	51.3	58.5
4. So many other people vote in elections that it won't matter much whether I vote when I become an adult.	88.6	82.2	7.6	13.3
5. The political views and activities of young people are very important.	80.9	72.4	9.0	11.2
International				
1. World leaders pay no attention to what ordinary people want.	48.1%	36.6%	11.1%	35.0%
2. Countries will go to war regardless of what individuals do.	50.0	44.4	30.3	40.0

^aDisagreement=high perceived impact, except National (5), agreement= high perceived impact.

the normative democratic symbol of the ballot. There were 88.6 per cent kibbutz and 82.2 per cent non-kibbutz respondents who disagree with the observation that: So many people vote in elections that it won't matter much whether I vote when I become an adult.

Turning to the international items it is apparent that the prediction stated at the beginning of the chapter is confirmed. There is clearly a greater between-group difference on international items than on national items. In fact, there is a statistically significant relationship between kibbutz and a tendency to reject the view of a non-responsive international system to which respondents might be linked in a purely passive role.

Only 11.1 per cent of the kibbutz sample and 35.0 per cent of the non-kibbutz sample agreed with the statement that world leaders pay no attention to what ordinary people want. Three times as many non-kibbutz respondents as kibbutz respondents express low efficacy. At the other end of the continuum, 48.1 per cent of kibbutz and 36.6 per cent of non-kibbutz sample disagree, reflecting a high degree of efficacy. The findings clearly support the prediction that kibbutz socialization leads to greater perceived impact and potential impact on the political system. This conclusion may be further supported in the category of those who express no opinion, by 40.7 per cent of kibbutz and 28.4 per cent of non-kibbutz sample in this group. I would speculate that the large numbers in this category, for both groups, include many who perhaps can not disagree with the statement on pragmatic grounds, yet can not accept it and, thereby, acknowledge their helplessness and the futility of all effort.

Another interpretation may be found in the literature on the kibbutz. In Growing Up In The Kibbutz, Rabin compares personality

traits of kibbutz and non-kibbutz children. He comments on the "very benign environment and positive relationship with a number of giving adults," which shape the pattern of expected responses of the kibbutz child.¹⁷ He adds that kibbutz children tend to have a greater sense of control over their lives and notes "a large proportion of kibbutz respondents reporting positive feelings and feelings of success and confidence."¹⁸ His findings provide further support for the conclusions drawn from the data reported here.

Another measure of the impact children perceive themselves as having on the system may be found in the reactions to the statement that: Countries will go to war regardless of what individuals do. Here, too, a passive acceptance of events in the international system is reflected by agreement with the statement. This position would be in keeping with what is conceptualized as a parochial or subject orientation toward the international system. Findings show that, for the sample as a whole, 37.7 per cent agree, 45.7 per cent disagree and 16.6 per cent don't know (N=560). The breakdown by kibbutz (Table 6.20) shows that 50.0 per cent of kibbutz and 44.4 per cent of non-kibbutz sample agree, 30.3 per cent of kibbutz and 40.0 per cent of non-kibbutz sample disagree, and 19.7 per cent of kibbutz and 15.6 per cent of non-kibbutz sample don't know. Findings are not statistically significant, but the pattern of responses does show a distribution similar to the preceding item.

The smaller gap between kibbutz and non-kibbutz samples on this item may be related to the fact that there is a difference between the two statements which is reflected in these response distributions. This interpretation is supported by an analysis of the relative

percentage in the "don't know" categories. The first statement has strongly normative connotations about diffuse and distant authority figures. Children who have learned that authority figures are benign or are at least interested in their welfare need to deny the implied indifference to their needs. This would be in accord with the international socialization attributed to the kibbutz. The second statement concerning war represents a condition which, while it may also have normative components, is primarily a reality in the context of the Israeli child. Only 19.7 per cent of kibbutz and 15.6 per cent of non-kibbutz children have no opinion on this statement as compared with 40.8 per cent and 28.4 per cent for the statement on world leaders.

Data for the second transnational movement, religion, show somewhat different findings. Table 6.21 shows the breakdown by religious and non-religious socialization in categories reflecting high and low efficacy.

In this comparative analysis between religious and non-religious respondents it appears that transnational socialization does not lead to the predicted outcome. Uniformly, religious respondents express lower levels of efficacy with regard to the national political system than do non-religious respondents. Differences range from 8.6 per cent for the item concerning the futility of the individual's vote to 15.6 per cent on agreement with the statement that: when we become adults we will not have any influence on what government does. While in all cases religious respondents perceive themselves as having less impact on the national political system than do non-religious respondents, it should be noted that the smallest differences exist on those items on which there is broad consensus. The smallest difference between the two

TABLE 6.21

PERCEIVED IMPACT OF SELF ON POLITICAL SYSTEM, BY
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION (RELIGIOUS)^a

Statement	High		Low	
	Religious	Non-Religious	Religious	Non-Religious
National				
1. My parents don't have any say about what government does.	57.1%	65.8%	11.5%	12.8%
2. When we become adults we will not have any influence on what government does.	44.7	60.3	13.7	11.7
3. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.	30.0	40.6	54.7	50.3
4. So many other people vote in elections that it won't matter much whether I vote when I become an adult.	81.9	90.5	13.3	6.1
5. The political views and activities of young people are very important.	72.9	82.8	11.1	8.5
International				
1. World leaders pay no attention to what ordinary people want.	42.0%	37.6%	23.5%	33.1%
2. Countries will go to war regardless of what individuals do.	43.9	46.9	32.3	41.2

^aDisagreement=high perceived impact, except national (5), agreement=high perceived impact.

groups concerns efficacy at the ballot box—in the future. The ideal or norm of citizen participation is held in high esteem by all.

This deviation from the predicted outcome may be interpreted in light of the reality of domestic politics in Israel. Those affiliated with the religious political parties see themselves in the minority, with the majority acting through the government, eroding the religious foundation on which they want to see the State of Israel established and maintained. As noted earlier, there had been several specific incidents related to religious observance during the period when I was conducting my interviews and these undoubtedly affected the responses.

Transnational socialization was predicted to have differential effects on the international orientations of respondents. Thus religion is predicted to have a relationship to the child's perceived impact of himself on the system which is similar to that of the kibbutz. In terms of the confidence expressed with regard to the responsiveness of leaders, findings do confirm the prediction that socialization by religion will lead to a higher level of perceived efficacy with regard to the international system. Disagreeing with the statement that World leaders pay no attention to what ordinary people want, 42 per cent of religious and 37.6 per cent of non-religious respondents express a high level of efficacy in response to the first international item.

The final statement, that Countries will go to war regardless of what individuals do, shows 3 per cent less of religious than non-religious respondents expressing a strong sense of efficacy, with both groups representing less than one-half of their respective groups. On the other hand, looking at the figures for low efficacy, it can be seen that almost 10 per cent more of the non-religious sample are in this

category. Furthermore, while 12 per cent of the non-religious respondents had no opinion, almost one-fourth of the religious could not commit themselves to either extreme. Non-religious respondents comprised 3 per cent more of the high-efficacy group, but they also constituted 9 per cent more of the low-efficacy group. They dominated the extremes, while twice as many religious as non-religious respondents were uncertain.

E. SOCIAL PROBLEMS: VIOLENCE

The rationale for this section and the following discussion of social justice were presented in Chapter IV. The methodology here will parallel that of Chapter IV but will focus on a comparison of orientations toward both the national and international systems. Two pairs of groups will be compared, each pair consisting of one group which has and one which has not been socialized by a transnational movement. Questions raised include: Does such socialization tend to sensitize respondents more to violence in the international system than does its absence? Specifically, are children who have been exposed to kibbutz or religion socialization more likely to feel involved with issues or problems related to violence in the international system than are other Israeli children?

Based on the hypothesized relationship between transnational socialization and political orientations, it is predicted that: Those socialized by kibbutz or religion will show a higher level of involvement with international violence than will those not socialized by transnational movements.

Data were obtained with the instruments described earlier. Table 6.22 presents the findings based on the scale measuring involvement with violence in the national system.

TABLE 6.22

INVOLVEMENT WITH VIOLENCE IN NATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM,
BY TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT

	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Religious	Non-Religious
Low	54.1%	47.4%	55.3%	44.8%
Medium	30.4	37.4	30.1	39.5
High	15.5	15.2	14.6	15.7

Findings for kibbutz are not statistically significant, while for religion the relationship is statistically significant. For both groups involvement is less than for non-kibbutz and non-religious groups. Evaluation is difficult on the basis of these data alone. The lower level of involvement of religious children may be due to the meaning attached to the term "violence." Oral data indicate that, for all children in the sample, the concept of riots and demonstrations was related to particular types of incidents.¹⁹ These related to disagreement over degree of religious observance and the authority of the State concerning it. An example of this type of controversy concerned the question of whether television programming was to be permitted on the Sabbath. The Sabbath is the one day off for Israelis who work and study essentially on a six-day week basis. Television transmission is contrary to the laws of religious observance and the religious groups in Israel hold a pivotal position of political power. When Sabbath programming was inaugurated with the sanction of the Prime Minister, there were disturbances. To religious children these were appropriate levers for influencing governmental decisions. To the non-religious these

appeared to be riots and violence. This may account for a higher proportion of the non-religious who expressed strong involvement, i.e. anger, resentment, as contrasted with those expressing low levels of involvement. Since the particular kibbutz sample chosen for this study is also a religious kibbutz, this interpretation may be relevant to the kibbutz as well.

But the prediction stated earlier directs attention to the relationship of socialization and international orientations. Data for this set of findings are presented in Table 6.23.

TABLE 6.23

INVOLVEMENT WITH VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
SYSTEM, BY TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT

	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Religious	Non-Religious
Low	66.0%	62.4%	71.3%	57.9%
Medium	26.7	29.4	22.6	32.9
High	7.4	8.2	6.2	9.2

Findings are not statistically significant, and the most important finding is that the data do not support the predicted relationship. In fact, the difference in involvement with violence in the international system between kibbutz and non-kibbutz respondents is smaller than for national violence.

If the interpretation suggested for the findings on national violence is valid, the findings in Table 6.23 may be interpreted to support the prediction that transnational socialization will have greater impact on orientations toward the international system than toward the

national system. The difference in levels of involvement between kibbutz and non-kibbutz respondents is clearly smaller for the international political system than for the national political system.

Religion, on the contrary, is shown to be a statistically significant factor in determining degree of involvement with violence. Deviating from the expected findings, the data show religious respondents to be considerably less involved than non-religious respondents. The difference between the two groups is even greater for international violence than for national and it is quite clear that this test does not provide support for the predicted effect of transnational socialization by religion.

The deviant findings for both pairs of groups suggested a further probe into additional data on violence which was available in the questionnaire to add to an understanding of these findings. Table 6.24 contains data on an item which asked respondents to indicate what they might be "willing to do about riots in Jerusalem." The table presents findings for the kibbutz-non-kibbutz comparison.

TABLE 6.24

WILLINGNESS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS
IN JERUSALEM, BY TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT^a

	Nothing	Something	Much
Kibbutz	21.9%	48.2%	29.9%
Non-Kibbutz	13.2	53.2	33.6
Total Sample	15.2	52.0	32.8

^aNote: Six choices were offered; two items or less=something; more than two items=much.

Findings are statistically significant and point to the conclusion that kibbutz respondents are less likely to become involved in issues of domestic violence. Transnationalism is not associated with greater national involvement, but since the riots in Jerusalem were primarily centered on religious issues, it is interesting to look at the breakdown by religion. Table 6.25 shows willingness to do something about riots for religious and non-religious respondents.

TABLE 6.25

WILLINGNESS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS
IN JERUSALEM, BY TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT^a

	Nothing	Something	Much
Religious	18.9%	46.1%	35.0%
Non-Religious	13.0	51.7	35.3
Total Sample	15.2	52.0	32.8

^aNote: Six choices were offered: two items or less=something; more than two=much.

The relationship between religion and willingness to do something shows statistical significance. However, religious socialization again appears to dispose toward less involvement in problems of violence on the national level. The higher proportion of non-religious respondents willing to "do something" supports my contention that it reflects the resentment of the non-religious and anti-religious sector of Israeli public opinion directed toward what was construed as interference with the rights of the general public (in this case to watch television or use public transportation on the Sabbath).

The discussion of the material in The Seventh Day, in Section E of Chapter IV, is relevant here in assessing the deeper meaning of violence and war in the lives of young kibbutzniks. In struggling with the data obtained, both from the written and oral questionnaires, I am forced to conclude that a simple measure of violence can not adequately tap the tangled strands of the concept in the contemporary Israeli context.

In addition to the scales, two individual items were used to parallel the comparison of Chapter IV. The full text of the statements with which respondents were asked to express agreement or disagreement were: (1) An international police force should be the only group in the world allowed to have armaments; and (2) War should never be justifiable even as the only way to protect national rights and honor.

Table 6.26 presents a breakdown of the two items by kibbutz and religion.

TABLE 6.26

AGREEMENT WITH SELECTED STATEMENTS RELATED TO VIOLENCE,
BY TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT

Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Religious	Non-Religious
An international police force should be the only group in the world allowed to have armaments			
23.0%	34.2%	31.1%	31.8%
War should never be justifiable even as the only way to protect national rights and honor			
23.3%	31.6%	26.0%	31.6%

Neither set of findings shows a statistically significant relationship between transnational socialization and involvement with violence as measured by these items. What they do reflect is a national consensus on the precariousness of Israel's position in the world. I would be inclined to interpret the 11 per cent gap between kibbutz and non-kibbutz respondents as more rigid adherence on the part of kibbutz respondents to a strong nationalism which is still inextricably linked with security considerations. The alternative interpretation of seeing kibbutz respondents as more militaristic is not in accord with other findings on kibbutz youth.

A cautionary note is in order as a consequence of the preceding discussion. While verbal homage is paid to the need for extreme sensitivity in cross-cultural research, the desire for broader applicability of theoretical formulation places great stress on this commitment. There is evidence that culture does have a mediating effect on the process of socialization. The instrument from which the two items in Table 6.26 were taken has exhibited high reliability and validity. It has, however, had limited application in cross-cultural studies and present findings may be useful in raising significant questions concerning the development of measures to be used, as are the impact scales in Chapters IV and VI, as instruments for cross-validation in line with suggestions made by Campbell.²⁰ A broader concern with comparable systemic variables may be indicated for future research.

F. SOCIAL PROBLEMS: SOCIAL JUSTICE

The rationale for including this dimension in the study was discussed at some length in the context of the national-international comparison in Chapter IV. I traced the roots of the ideals of social

justice which have shaped the development of the State of Israel to the values of the early settlers. These values, in turn, were the outcome of a combination of the traditional concerns with social justice as expressed by the early prophets and the socialist ideals of latter day prophets such as Marx, Borochoy and Syrkin. For those who maintained their ties with orthodox tradition, a Jewish state meant an opportunity to observe biblical injunctions which could only be obeyed in a meaningful way by a people living in its own land and cultivating its own land. For those who outwardly rejected the bonds of tradition, who discarded the "God of the Phylacteries,"²¹ as the poet Tchernichovsky put it in his moving tribute To the God of Apollo, the Jewish state was to be an opportunity to live by the precepts of equality and justice drawn from their own as well as other sources.

The kibbutz movement and those committed to maintaining Jewish orthodox tradition without the crippling rigidity of the ultra-orthodox (who were not included in this sample) are, therefore, singularly appropriate to be evaluated as bearers of these values. If all Israeli children are exposed to these values as national goals, then children exposed to additional socialization by these two movements would be expected to evidence a more intense degree of adherence to them.

The central question of this chapter may be restated as follows:

1. Is there a difference in the level of involvement with issues of social justice for those socialized by transnational movements and those not socialized by such movements?
2. If so, are these differences greater with regard to the international system than the national?

The instruments used to obtain data for a comparison are those discussed and used in Section F of Chapter IV. Table 6.27 presents findings based on scales measuring involvement with questions of social

justice in the national and international systems. Each section shows a breakdown by kibbutz and religion to make possible between-groups comparisons.

It is predicted that those socialized by transnational movements will evidence a higher level of involvement with issues of social justice than other Israeli pre-adults and this level will be proportionately higher in the international area than in the national area.

TABLE 6.27

INVOLVEMENT WITH SOCIAL JUSTICE IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS,
BY TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT

	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Religious	Non-Religious
National				
Low	26.1%	17.8%	32.4%	11.3%
Medium	29.1	28.0	22.7	32.0
High	44.7	54.2	44.9	56.6
International				
Low	40.2%	40.5%	35.3%	36.8%
Medium	38.9	40.4	46.9	42.4
High	20.9	19.1	17.8	20.8

Findings do not confirm the predicted outcome concerning social justice in the national system. There is indeed a difference between the groups, but it is in a direction opposite to that predicted. Turning to the international findings, the difference is considerably

smaller and, in fact, for the kibbutz sample the findings do confirm the predicted outcome. A total of 59.8 per cent of kibbutz respondents and 59.5 per cent of non-kibbutz respondents express a medium or high level of involvement with issues of social justice in the international system. It is not a significant difference, except as compared with findings on the national scale. Religion also appears to discriminate less clearly for international involvement than for national, but the result is again contrary to the prediction.

Findings can be interpreted in the light of what was said earlier. These concerns with social justice, traditionally associated with religion and socialism, have become an integral part of the national value system and can not be used to discriminate between the groups under discussion. The fact that kibbutz respondents do show a slightly higher level of involvement than do non-kibbutz respondents while religious respondents show a slightly lower level (with regard to international issues) supports the findings in Chapter IV. When kibbutz and non-kibbutz samples were compared on national and international involvement while holding the religious factor constant, it was found that kibbutz was the significant factor discriminating between those expressing a high level of involvement with the international system and those expressing a lower level.

To probe further for an understanding of these deviant findings, the individual items used to measure concern with problems of social justice are again used. The first item states that Immigration should be closed if immigrants will compete with our own workers. The second states that There may be risks in encouraging certain groups to become well educated. Disagreement with these statements is interpreted as

reflecting a high concern for social justice within the political system, while agreement suggests a low level of concern. On both items the overwhelming majority expressed disagreement,²² but the relative percentage of those disagreeing with the second statement were substantially smaller. Table 6.28 presents findings on these two items with a breakdown by transnational movements to permit comparison.

TABLE 6.28

AGREEMENT ON SELECTED STATEMENTS RELATED TO SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE NATIONAL SYSTEM

	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Religious	Non-Religious
Immigrants should not be permitted to come into our country if they compete with our own workers				
Agree	16.1%	21.5%	22.1%	19.1%
Disagree	83.9	78.5	77.9	80.9
It would be a mistake for us to encourage certain racial groups to become well educated because they might use their knowledge against us				
Agree	27.6%	36.5%	29.9%	34.0%
Disagree	72.4	63.5	70.1	66.0

The findings in Table 6.28 confirm the prediction relative to the effect of transnational socialization for the kibbutz sample and for the religious sample with regard to the second item. The deviation of the religious sample from the expected pattern on the immigration item may be partly attributed to the specific impact of the waves of immigration preceding this data collection. The majority of the

immigrants who came to Israel in the fifties and sixties were orthodox Jews coming from the neighboring Arab countries. Much of this influx gravitated toward the larger cities and those sections of the city where large concentrations of observant Israelis live and work. Responses may reflect a reaction to this specific experience and its expression in adult attitudes, transmitted to youth.

Two items were used to measure level of concern with issues of social justice on a global scale. Respondents were asked to express agreement or disagreement with the following statements: (1) If necessary, we ought to be willing to lower our standard of living to cooperate with other countries in getting an equal standard of living for every person in the world; (2) We should teach our children to uphold the welfare of all people everywhere even though it may be against the best interests of our own country. Agreement was interpreted as a high level of concern and disagreement as a low level of concern. Table 6.29 shows the findings on both items together with between-groups comparisons.

The findings in Table 6.29 support the prediction that socialization by transnational movements tends to increase involvement with issues of social justice on a global level.

One final item dealing with expressed concern for others stated that "Our responsibility to people of other races ought to be as great as our responsibility to people of our own race." Table 6.30 shows a breakdown of the findings by transnational movements.

TABLE 6.29

AGREEMENT ON SELECTED STATEMENTS RELATED TO SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Religious	Non-Religious
If necessary we ought to be willing to lower our standards of living to cooperate with other countries in getting an equal standard of living for every person in the world				
Agree	42.9%	42.0%	45.2%	41.1%
Disagree	57.1	58.0	54.8	58.8

We should teach our children to uphold the welfare of all people everywhere even though it may be against the best interests of our own country

	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Religious	Non-Religious
Agree	47.8%	32.3%	46.5%	40.1%
Disagree	52.2	67.7	53.5	59.9

TABLE 6.30

LEVEL OF CONCERN WITH SOCIAL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM, BY TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT^a

	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Religious	Non-Religious
Our responsibility to people of other races ought to be as great as our responsibility to people of our own race				
High	77.3%	71.7%	77.4%	73.5%
Low	22.7	28.3	22.7	26.5

^aHigh=agreement with statement; low=disagreement with statement.

The above findings support the theoretical expectation that transnational socialization leads to greater international involvement than does its absence.

Summary and Conclusions

A brief summary of the findings in the chapter deals with each of the dimensions discussed. With few exceptions, which will be further discussed in Chapter VII, the findings support the central hypothesis of the chapter: There are differences in the political orientations of those Israeli pre-adults socialized by transnational movements and other Israeli pre-adults, and the former evidence a higher level of international involvement than do the latter.

The first variable, political knowledge, is used in one between-groups comparison only, kibbutz and non-kibbutz. Due to difficulties in access and time, it was not possible to administer the information test to the religious non-kibbutz sample. A breakdown of the findings by religion would, therefore, be simply a duplication of the kibbutz-non-kibbutz comparison.

Kibbutz is shown to be a statistically significant factor in the relationship between the level of political knowledge concerning the international system and transnational socialization.

The second dimension on which between-groups comparisons were made related to sources of information as reported by respondents. It was found that there are indeed, differences in the patterns of utilization of these sources between young Israelis socialized by transnational movements and those not exposed to this agency of socialization. For both kibbutz and religious respondents there are significantly larger proportions ranking interpersonal sources as most important--

compared to impersonal, mass-media sources--than for non-kibbutz and non-religious respondents. As predicted, these findings are more significant with regard to sources for international than national information.

Sections C and D measure relative involvement with the national and international political systems by comparing the groups in terms of perceived impact of the system on the self and perceived impact of the self on the system, respectively. Findings confirm the prediction that transnational socialization correlates positively with involvement and that this correlation is significantly higher with regard to international involvement than national involvement.

Individual items to probe and assess this dimension and, more specifically, respondents's sense of efficacy with regard to the two systems provide further confirmation for the findings.

The next section assesses the relationship of transnational socialization and level of involvement with issues concerning violence in the two systems. Predictions of greater involvement for transnational socializees are confirmed for the kibbutz sample, although religious respondents show some deviation from the predicted pattern.

The final section assesses this relationship in terms of concern with problems of social justice. This also confirms the predicted association between transnational socialization and increased involvement with problems of social justice. As for the preceding section, there are deviant findings for the religious respondents. With regard to both violence and social justice, findings confirm the prediction that the association is higher in the international area than in the national area.

NOTES

1. Herbert Hirsch, "Political Socialization in Appalachia: An Inquiry into the Process of Political Learning in an American Subculture" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1968), p. 53. He points to the possibility that the different governmental levels must be considered as variables in any study of "what" is learned, and from "whom." He also reiterates what is frequently understated in the literature: that the answers to the questions, "what is learned" and "from whom" involve complex interactions of variables rather than simple one to one correspondence.
2. Robert Hess and Judith Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 182-84.
3. Menachem Gerson, "Family--The Child and his Family in the Kibbutz," in Children and Families in Israel. Some Mental Health Perspectives, ed. by A. Jarus, J. Marcus, J. Oren, and Ch. Rapaport (New York: Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 1970), pp. 251-62. See also in same volume, M. Kerem, "The Environment"; G. Levin, "Infancy and His Early Childhood"; M. Segal, "School Age"; M. Alon, "Second Generation."
4. A. I. Rabin, Growing Up In the Kibbutz (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1965), p. 213.
5. Robert Hess and Judith Torney, op. cit., p. 165.
6. A. I. Rabin, op. cit., p. 209.
7. Philip E. Converse and George Depeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVI, 1 (Spring, 1962), 1-23.
8. Orville G. Brim, Jr., "Personality Development as Role-Learning," in Ira Iscoe and Harold W. Stevenson, eds., Personality Development in Children (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1960), pp. 127-59.
9. Gordon W. Allport and J. Michael Ross, "Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, V, 4 (1967), 432-43.
10. Ibid., see also John P. Robinson, Jerrold G. Rusk, Kendra B. Head, Measures of Political Attitudes, p. 303.
11. Allport and Ross, op. cit.

12. Fred I. Greenstein, "A Note on the Ambiguity of Political Socialization: Definitions, Criticisms, and Strategies of Inquiry," Journal of Politics, XXXII (1971), 969.
13. Ibid.
14. The specific questions asked in the oral interview (translated from Hebrew) were: What is peace? What does the word "peace" mean to you?
15. See discussion in Chapter IV.
16. Hess and Torney, op. cit.
17. Rabin, op. cit., Chap. 9.
18. Ibid.
19. Three questions included in the questionnaire provided data for this issue: What are some of the causes of riots and disturbances? Can you tell me about some riots or disturbances that took place in Israel during the past few years? How would you explain what riots and disturbances are to a child younger than you? (translated from Hebrew).
20. D. T. Campbell and J. C. Stanley, "Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research on teaching," in N. L. Gage, ed., Handbook of Research on Teaching (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 171-246; see also Eugene J. Webb, Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz, and Lee Sechrest, Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966).
21. Saul Tchernichowsky, "Before the God of Apollo," in A Golden Treasury of Jewish Literature (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1937), p. 619.
22. The discussion on the concept of immigration as a basic social value in Israel may be found in Chapter IV, pp. 126-29.

CHAPTER VII

WORLD-MINDEDNESS, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND POLITICAL IDENTITY: FURTHER THOUGHTS ON TRANSNATIONALISM

In Chapter IV, I presented data which confirm the prediction that there are differences in the political orientations of young people toward the national and international systems. In Chapter VI, I reported findings which confirm predictions that (1) there are differences in political orientations for young people socialized by kibbutz and religion and those not exposed to kibbutz and religion, and (2) that these between-group differences are greater for international than for national orientations.

While the findings are significant, certain deviant findings raise questions concerning possible interdependence between the two sets of orientations. One question raised was whether there is any relationship between factors associated with high international involvement and factors associated with high national involvement. The theoretical model utilized in Chapter VI predicted that low national involvement would be associated with low international involvement. It further predicted that high national involvement would be associated with either high or low international involvement.

The relatively higher incidence among kibbutz and religious respondents of high national and high international involvement led to a further analysis of the data. Two additional instruments included

in the written questionnaire provide data for this analysis and will now be discussed.

A. WORLD-MINDEDNESS

The scale to measure world-minded attitudes was originally developed by Donald L. Sampson and Howard P. Smith in 1955.¹ International tensions existing in the immediate post-World War II period provided the impetus for research into the effect of intercultural and education experiences aimed at the development of world-minded attitudes. It is one of the forerunners of the extensive literature on the psychology of international behavior further exemplified by the Kelman volume. It has been used with several groups of college students, but to my knowledge this is the first time it has been used for secondary and elementary level students.

The scale was developed to clarify the distinction between world-mindedness and international-mindedness. Sampson and Smith specified that the concept as used by them designated

. . . purely a value orientation, or frame of reference apart from knowledge about, or interest in international relations. We identify as highly world-minded the individual who favors a world-view of the problems of humanity, whose primary reference group is mankind, rather than Americans, English, Chinese, etc.²

Since orientations toward the international system is the subject investigated in the present study, the focus is not on orientations toward other nations but on the world outside the particular national system, and it was deemed theoretically and conceptually valid to use the world-mindedness scale to validate its findings.

The scale was translated into Hebrew and a number of concepts which could have presented problems in meaning were modified to approximate their meaning in terms of the Israeli setting. The problems of

semantic equivalence involved in verbal testing methods translated from one language to another were discussed by Phillips (1960). "The question of translation procedures has often seemed wrapped in a conspiracy of silence,"³ but this is a greater problem when attempting to describe a primitive culture with limited knowledge of the language used. As Rabin reports in his study of kibbutz children, modern Hebrew has been developed and modified under Western influence and is quite adaptable to translation to and from English.⁴

I was present while the questionnaires were administered and found that direct questions concerning meaning were raised only in the one fourth-grade class in which it was used and in two sixth-grade groups. Used in two sixth-grade classes in a school of high socio-economic status during pretesting in the United States, questions concerning meaning of the English version were raised by five students.

The scale consists of thirty-two items and is divided into eight sub-scales measuring dimensions of world-mindedness defined by the authors. These include: religion, immigration, government, patriotism, economics, race, education and war. The scales were constructed so that two items of each group are pro-world-minded and two are anti-world-minded. Respondents were asked to check each item according to their degree of agreement or disagreement on a Likert-type scale, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The possible range of scores is from 0 for extreme anti-world-mindedness to 192 for extreme world-mindedness, with 96 as the theoretical neutral point.

Table 7.1 shows the frequency distribution for the sample as a whole.

TABLE 7.1

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD-MINDEDNESS^a

	Number	Per Cent
High	180	55.4
Low	145	44.6
Total	325	100.0

^aHigh=pro-world-mindedness; low=anti-world-mindedness.

Theoretical expectations discussed in Chapter V lead to the prediction that: Children socialized by transnational movements will be more world-minded than will children not exposed to transnational socialization. Scores on world-mindedness with a breakdown by transnational movements are shown in Table 7.2

TABLE 7.2

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD-MINDEDNESS, BY TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

	Kibbutz	Non-Kibbutz	Religious	Non-Religious
High	57.8%	52.7%	56.9%	52.8%
Low	42.2	47.3	43.1	47.2

Findings support the prediction and are in accord with those based on instruments developed for this study. To probe further into the meaning of the scores, the distribution of scores on the eight subscales were analyzed. Table 7.3 presents findings for kibbutz.

TABLE 7.3

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD-MINDEDNESS SUB-SCALE
SCORES, BY KIBBUTZ

	Kibbutz		Non-Kibbutz	
	High	Low	High	Low
Religion	5.8%	94.2%	8.9%	91.1%
Immigration	23.4	76.6	21.1	78.9
Government	46.7	53.3	44.5	55.4
Economics	30.6	69.3	30.0	70.0
Patriotism	49.6	50.4	44.8	55.2
Race	37.2	62.8	20.2	79.8
Education	24.1	75.9	20.2	79.8
War	45.2	54.7	40.4	59.6

Findings in Table 7.3 support the earlier prediction by showing more pro-world-minded attitudes among kibbutz respondents than among non-kibbutz respondents on seven of eight sub-scales. The one sub-scale on which a smaller proportion of kibbutz (5.8 per cent) than non-kibbutz (8.9 per cent) respondents are in the pro-world-minded category is that of religion. The possibility of this finding being related to the fact that the kibbutz sample is also religious will be considered in analyzing findings of the second between-groups comparison. Table 7.4 breaks down the sub-scale scores by religious socialization.

The breakdown by topics provides further support for the prediction that transnationalism socializes to world-minded orientations. With two exceptions, kibbutz and religious socialization are associated

with more pro-world-mindedness than is exposure only to the national system. One exception is the sub-scale on religion when correlated with kibbutz. A second exception is education when correlated with religion.

TABLE 7.4

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD-MINDEDNESS SUB-SCALE SCORES, BY RELIGION

	Religious		Non-Religious	
	High	Low	High	Low
Religion	7.9%	92.1%	6.3%	93.8%
Immigration	22.9	77.2	18.7	81.3
Government	45.6	54.4	25.0	75.0
Economics	31.6	68.4	31.3	68.8
Patriotism	49.1	50.9	43.8	56.3
Race	33.7	66.2	18.7	81.3
Education	22.8	77.2	25.0	75.0
War	42.6	57.5	37.5	62.5

Less than 6 per cent of the kibbutz sample are ranked in the pro-world-minded category on the religion sub-scale, compared with almost 9 per cent in the non-kibbutz sample. For both groups this is substantially lower than the figures on every other item. At first glance the difference appears to be due to the fact that the kibbutz sample is also religious and, therefore, would tend to take a less tolerant and world-oriented viewpoint on this issue. This interpretation is complicated by the fact that Table 7.4, which shows findings

tabulated by religion, shows a smaller difference between the transnational group and the control group, and the trend is in the opposite direction (7.9 per cent of religious score high and 6.3 per cent of non-religious score high). A more valid interpretation may be found in a comparison of both tables. For both transnationally socialized groups and both control groups, the percentage scoring high on the religious dimension of world-mindedness is significantly lower than for any other item. The consistency of the deviant pattern for all groups suggests that it may reflect a widespread attitude traceable to what is still recent history in Israel, the period of World War II. I would speculate that a desire, or even willingness, to see Judaism as a religion disappear or merge with others may be equated in the minds of respondents with the destruction of 6,000,000 Jews during that period. Thus the findings would constitute an affirmation of an absolute value, survival.

There is independent support for this interpretation in the findings reported by Herman.⁵ In reporting on a sub-study, he states that a majority of students (59 per cent) gave unqualified endorsement to a statement that every Jew should see himself as if he were a survivor of the Holocaust. The relationship of this consciousness of being in the position of survivors and intensity of identity will be discussed later in the chapter.

The second exception is the subscale on education where the religious group scores lower on world-mindedness than does the non-religious group. It seems clear that this deviation is associated with the commitment to religious education. With a separate school system, maintained with great vigor, it is fair to assume that the findings reflect strongly held convictions that what cannot be rendered unto a Jewish national

government without compromise, can surely not be rendered unto an international Caesar.

Findings on two other items should be noted. For both transnational movements, the sub-scores on race show a substantially larger percentage in the pro-world-mindedness category than for respondents not socialized by kibbutz or religion. For the former it is 37.2 per cent, compared with 20.2 per cent for non-kibbutz respondents; for religion it is 33.7 per cent compared with 18.7 per cent for non-religious respondents. Since the items are phrased to tap attitudes on equality of opportunity and justice, they strongly support the findings on social justice reported in Chapter VI. Similarly, the items included under sub-scale war reflect attitudes tapped by the measure of international violence in Chapter VI. Here, again, respondents socialized by transnational movements exhibit consistently higher patterns of pro-world-mindedness (45.2 per cent and 42.6 per cent) than do control groups (40.4 per cent and 37.5 per cent).

The findings on world-mindedness confirm the predicted outcome of transnational socialization and substantially validate findings reported in Chapter IV.

B. NATIONAL IDENTITY

The second instrument to be discussed was one developed to measure the concept of national identity. It was included to provide data for a subsequent analysis of the data, and was designed to explore between-group differences which could then be correlated with personality variables. These data will provide the base for an analysis of the outcome of the political socialization process as the function of the personality of the individual.

The scale was developed to parallel the typology of parochial, subject and participant orientations toward the political system. Theoretically it is based on mechanisms described by Katz and Kahn (1966) which serve to integrate role systems, values, norms and roles.⁶ The three dimensions identified as components of national identity are symbolic, normative and functional. Operationally the concept relates role perceptions and linkages to inputs and outputs of the political system.

The three types of national identity may be broadly defined. A symbolic national identity is one based primarily on attachment to national symbols, i.e. the flag, national anthem or popular leaders. In the case of children this may provide a strong basis for an identity without, or prior to, any knowledge concerning the political system. The second type of identity is normative, subscribing to the ideals and goals of the society, but not necessarily reflecting an active involvement (thus similar to the subject orientation described by Almond and Verba). The functional identity reflects an acceptance of the goals of the society combined with the knowledge and willingness to consider alternatives, make choices, and take action. A list of questions for each scale together with scoring categories may be found in the Appendix.

Hypothesized relationships between national identity and political orientations are presented in Figure 7.1.

A breakdown of the sample by kibbutz and religion shows the distribution of types of national identity. Table 7.5 shows this distribution for kibbutz and non-kibbutz.

Fig. 7.1.--Types of National Identity and Associated Orientations^a

Object of Attitude	Symbolic	Normative	Functional
Flag, leaders	Strong and supportive	Mildly supportive	Mild to low
Role of an Israeli	Very important High level of conformity expected	As important as other roles	In terms of political and social responsibilities
Criticism of Israel Defense Force, Kibbutz or Gadna	Defensive, hostile		Tolerated if constructive (if based on anti-military views in case of army)
Involvement in political life		Passive	Active--greater participation
Policies which might weaken state	Oppose	Accept, if agreed upon by national leaders	Support if in national interest

^aAdapted from DeLamater, Katz and Kelman (1968). Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1969), p. 372.

TABLE 7.5

TYPE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY, BY KIBBUTZ^a

	Symbolic	Normative	Functional
Kibbutz	13.1%	40.5%	45.3%
Non-Kibbutz	28.0	32.0	38.0

^aDeviation of total from 100% due to incomplete responses eliminated from analysis.

Only 13 per cent of kibbutz children interpret national identity in symbolic terms, compared to more than twice that proportion of non-kibbutz children. For both the normative and functional view of national identity, the percentage is significantly higher for kibbutz than for non-kibbutz children. As with involvement, the findings may be interpreted as resulting from the greater degree of participation in group decision-making, which is part of the upbringing of the kibbutz child. It also supports findings showing kibbutz children more involved with the long-range principles and goals on which the State was founded. Since a functional-participant orientation to one's role as a citizen is highly valued in Israel, kibbutz upbringing clearly supports this value associated with national identity.

Table 7.6 shows findings on religion as a factor in determining the type of national identity.

TABLE 7.6
TYPE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY, BY RELIGION^a

	Symbolic	Normative	Functional
Religious	24.1%	34.6%	37.3%
Non-Religious	24.9	30.0	41.1

^a Deviation of total from 100% due to incomplete responses eliminated from analysis.

Findings differ from those on the first transnational movement and may be interpreted in the light of complex cross-pressures. There is a slightly lower percentage of religious (24.1 per cent) than non-religious (24.9 per cent) respondents in the symbolic category. A

normative national identity is reflected by a plurality of 4.6 per cent of religious, while a functional national identity is reflected by a plurality of 3.8 per cent of non-religious respondents. Religion, with its emphasis on symbols and behavioral patterns, is closely associated with a high level of norm adherence.

Research has indicated high correlations between religion and prejudice, dogmatism and ethnocentrism.⁷ In Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice,⁸ Gordon W. Allport and J. Michael Ross make a useful distinction referred to earlier. They discuss the relationship between prejudiced attitudes and personal practice of religion and point out that "it is the casual irregular fringe members of religious institutions who are high in prejudice; their religious motivation is of the extrinsic order. It is the constant, devout, internalized members who are low in prejudice; their religious motivation is of the intrinsic order." Characterizing the two types as two poles of subjective religion, the authors add that "the extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated lives his religion."⁹

The authors conclude that prejudice, like tolerance, is often embedded deeply in personality structure and is reflected in a consistent cognitive style. This is a cognitive style comparable to "undifferentiated thinking" or excessive "category width" as defined by Pettigrew.¹⁰ They note Rokeach's finding that the "dogmatic" mind is unable to perceive differences.¹¹

To take this analysis one step further, recall that I defined the outcome of the process of political socialization as a function of: (1) the structure of the system; (2) the position of the individual in the system; and (3) the personality of the individual. As was pointed

out earlier, while only the first two are strictly within the scope of this study, data were obtained within its framework for future analysis. Frequent reference in the literature on both kibbutz and religion identify psychological variables related to cognitive style and closed-mindedness as potentially of great significance. A shortened version of the Rokeach dogmatism scale¹² was, therefore, administered to the sample to be used in the contemplated analysis, and a brief statement of relevant findings is presented here.

Among those scoring high on dogmatism there was no significant difference between the religious and non-religious groups. In fact, 20.4 per cent of religious respondents were highly dogmatic, and 22.3 per cent of non-religious respondents were in this category. On the basis of available data it is impossible to conclude whether this religious group would fall within the intrinsically motivated religious category described by Allport. It does warrant the interpretation that for this religious group, religious training does not appear associated with a cognitive style which is close-minded and undifferentiated.

Other individual items discussed in Chapter V which deal with related concepts, such as sympathetic identification, also show no significant differences between religious and non-religious respondents.

Summarizing the findings obtained with these two instruments, I conclude that socialization by transnational movements is associated with normative-functional national identity as well as pro-world-minded orientation. In fact, cross-correlation shows a statistically significant relationship.

Table 7.7 shows the distribution of these findings.

TABLE 7.7

DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD-MINDEDNESS AND FUNCTIONAL
NATIONAL IDENTITY, BY TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT

Kibbutz	48.6%
Non-Kibbutz	39.4
Religious	40.8
Non-Religious	41.3

As a study of political socialization, this research was designed to be a theoretically grounded exploratory analysis of the development of political orientations toward overlapping systems. Empirical research in the field has been minimal, yet it is highly relevant to a broad range of concerns. The interrelated concepts of identity and community are drawn into sharper focus by this comparative approach, which is concerned with multiple perceptions of the individual.

Research has shown that world-mindedness and ethnocentrism are negatively correlated. But there has been scant research on the relationship between identity and ethnocentrism. Are they necessarily isomorphic phenomena? Findings reported here point to the need for more precise definition of concepts.

Robert LeVine derives relevant propositions from his African research.¹³ Based on his study of the Gusii and Nueri, he proposes specific research strategies relating his efforts in the field of socialization with the central concerns of international political socialization. His proposition that a strong sense of country, with positive values and an open membership can lead to more relaxed international relations is empirically testable. In fact, the findings in my study suggest similar propositions.

One alternative proposition which emerges from a discussion of the findings is that socialization by transnational movements socializes to a (more) highly developed, (more) positive political identity, which serves as a mediating factor in predicting to greater involvement with the national political system. The positive correlation found between world-mindedness and functional national identity provides empirical support for this proposition.

C. POLITICAL IDENTITY

The concept of political identity as a tool of potential significance in political socialization research will be outlined in the following pages.

In a volume published since this study was done, the editors define transnational relations broadly to include "both transnational and transgovernmental interactions—all of world politics that is not taken into account by the state-centric paradigm."¹⁴

In the present study transnational interactions were viewed within the context of transnational movements, which could lead to identification, affiliation or exposures sensitizing to multiple loyalties. Transnational movements or organizations may be based on political ideology, scouting, sports, cultural activities or orientations to world peace. Whether membership in an international scout movement socializes to world-minded orientations more or less than does kibbutz upbringing is an empirical question. Similarly, the relationship of such socialization to the development of national identity is empirically testable.

More significant is the fact that elements of both transnational movements selected for this study constitute important aspects of the national identity. The question of immediate relevance, therefore, is:

to what extent does socialization by kibbutz and religion reinforce national identity and how does this relate to the effect on world-minded orientations.

One definition of political socialization states that it is a process of maturation, with a political self as the outcome. Dawson and Prewitt have described the development of this political self in the course of social interaction as similar to the development of the social self described by Mead.¹⁵ An important function of the political self is the holding and expressing of political orientations, which are the focus of this analysis. I propose a conceptualization of the political self as "political identity" defined in terms of Erikson's work on ego identity. Paraphrasing his definition, I suggest that "political (ego) identity develops out of a gradual integration of all political identifications."¹⁶ For the pre-adult in the kibbutz these identifications may consist at the most basic level of a role in the kibbutz community requiring a position in the decision-making process, strongly held convictions as a voter and activist in the national political arena, and an ideologically based view of his obligations toward the working people of the world, regardless of national affiliation.

The political identity (or subidentity) is, of course, only one of the sub-identities constituting the total identity of the individual and developing around its core. Miller defines this core as "the organizing part of the identity in that its traits interact with all the other traits outside the core."¹⁷ He refers to identity as "the pattern of observable or inferable attributes identifying a person to himself and to others," while Erikson, speaking of Freud's formulation of his own "inner identity" with Judaism, sees a reflection in the individual of "an essential aspect of a group's inner coherence."¹⁸

Drawing on these formulations, political identity may be tentatively described as: (1) the pattern of orientations toward political life held by the individual; and (2) the perception the individual has of himself as related to a variety of (overlapping) political systems.

In Israelis and Jews: The Continuity of an Identity, Simon Herman considers conditions leading to psychological integration of sub-identities. He explores the extent of the overlap between sub-identities in terms of consonance, centrality, salience, valence and relative potency. He concludes that integration of sub-identities is more likely to occur when the values associated with various identifications are congruent and consonant and when group belongingness is based on the dynamics of interdependence rather than similarity.

The major focus of his analysis is between the Jewish identity and the Israeli identity, although the Jewish identity may be further broken down into religious, traditional and non-religious components. Summarizing his findings on the relationship of sub-identities, Herman states:

In the majority Jewish society of Israel a large measure of overlap exists between the Jewish and Israeli sub-identities and, where this is so, they are mutually reinforcing. Where, however, they are separated and compartmentalized, the result is a weaker Jewishness and a less rooted Israeliness.¹⁹

As Charles S. Liebman remarks in his review of the book, "Professor Herman's study shows that among the Israeli youth there is a convergence between religious, Jewish, and possibly even Israeli identities. If one may speak in normative terms, Jewishness tends to be strongest among those whose religious observance is healthiest, weakest among those whose religious observance is weakest."²⁰

If Herman's conclusions concerning the relationship of Jewish identity and Israeli identity are valid, then it should be possible to verify empirically the proposition that: Those who are socialized by religion or kibbutz (both defined as representing central values and concepts of Judaism) will evidence stronger national identity than those not socialized by religion or kibbutz. Indeed, empirical evidence presented in Chapter VI supports the prediction. Kibbutz and religious respondents do express a greater degree of international and national involvement than do control groups. The findings are also in accord with those reported by Herman in his finding that the religious not only have as strong an Israeli identity as the non-religious but their attitudes also reflect greater ego submersion on behalf of the State.

Combined with the findings reported earlier in this chapter, i.e. the strongly positive correlation between pro-world-mindedness scores and functional (national) identity, it appears empirically warranted to conclude that, while both kibbutz and religion socialize to international orientations, they also reinforce national orientations. If values associated with the transnational movement are highly salient to both the nation and the world and there is an overlap of congruent values then such socialization will lead to greater involvement on both the national and international level.

Recalling the conceptualization of political identity as the outcome of the "gradual integration of all political identifications," it may be hypothesized that: Children socialized by kibbutz or religion will have more highly developed (i.e. functional) political identities than will children not socialized by these agencies.

The interpretation that socialization by transnational movements leads not only to the predicted greater involvement with the international system, but also to greater involvement with the national system and the development of political identity emerges from an analysis of findings of this specific study. Its theoretical implications should be subjected to rigorous empirical investigation in a cross-cultural setting. Among specific problems to which such an analysis would have to address itself are: (1) The specification of indicators for the concept of political identity; and (2) a broader sampling of the universe of transnational movements.

In the present study, kibbutz and religion are defined as transnational movements and are seen to be associated with high levels of political involvement, both internationally, as predicted, and nationally. The latter is interpreted as reinforcing the Jewish sub-identity which, according to the theoretical formulation stated by Herman, serves to reinforce the Israeli identity. Thus, socialization which reinforces the Jewish sub-identity reinforces the Israeli or national identity. In this case, transnational movements appear to socialize to both national and international orientations. The functional national identity is seen as a mediating factor resulting in greater involvement with the global system through a self-conscious political identity, much as LeVine's strong sense of community with positive values (and an open membership) can lead to more relaxed international relations.

NOTES

1. D. L. Sampson and H. P. Smith, "A Scale to Measure World-minded Attitudes," Journal of Social Psychology, XLV (1957), 99-106. Subsequent uses of the scale are reported in Karl C. Garrison, "World-minded Attitudes of College Students in a Southern University," Journal of Social Psychology, LIV (1961), 147-53; K. Satinder Paul, "Worldminded Attitudes of Punjab University Students," Journal of Social Psychology, LXIX (1966), 33-37.
2. Sampson and Smith, op. cit., p. 99.
3. A. I. Rabin, Growing Up in the Kibbutz (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1965), p. 94.
4. Ibid.
5. Simon N. Herman, Israelis and Jews: The Continuity of an Identity (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 80.
6. D. Katz and R. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1966). The scale is adapted from one developed by J. DeLamater, D. Katz and H. Kelman. Originally used in a small American community, it was to be expanded for use in studies on nationalism on a cross-cultural basis. See John P. Robinson, Phillip R. Shaver, Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes, Appendix B to Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1969), pp. 373-79.
7. The original theoretical formulation on The Authoritarian Personality by T. W. Adorno et al. (New York: Harper, 1950) produced in the following two decades a deluge of studies dealing with various aspects of the concept. By 1956 a bibliographic guide, containing 260 references had been published, see Richard Christie and Peggy Cook, op. cit. The relationship between dogmatism, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and other related measures is discussed by John P. Robinson and Phillip R. Shaver in Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes, op. cit., Chap. 5, pp. 211-23.
8. Gordon W. Allport and Michael J. Ross, "Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, V, 4 (1967), 432-43.
9. Ibid., p. 439.
10. Thos. F. Pettigrew, cited in Allport and Ross, op. cit., p. 434.
11. Milton Rokeach, cited in Allport and Ross, op. cit., p. 435.

12. V. C. Troldahl and F. A. Powell, "A Short Form Dogmatism Scale for Use in Field Studies," Social Forces, XLIV (1965), 211-14.
13. Robert A. Levine, "Socialization, Social Structure, and Intersocietal Images," in International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. by H. C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), Chap. 2.
14. Robert Owen Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972). Keohane and a broad range of contributors focus on interactions which are the direct result of explicit policies held by agents which have "influence" over individual actors in international relations. My focus is on less structured transnational movements which may instill transnational loyalties and shape world views and orientations, but do not exert political power or influence to implement specific transnational policies.
15. See George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).
16. E. R. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1950), p. 213; see also by same author, "The Problem of Ego Identity," in M. R. Stein et al., Identity and Anxiety (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), p. 38; see also, "The Concept of Identity in Race Relations: Notes and Queries," in The Negro American, ed. by T. Parsons and K. B. Clark (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 243, where Erikson states that "identity also contains a complementarity of past and future both in the individual and in society; it links the actuality of a living past with that of a promising future."
17. D. R. Miller, "The Study of Social Relationships: Situation, Identity, and Social Interaction," Psychology: A Study of a Science, ed. by S. Koch (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 674.
18. E. H. Erikson, "The Problem of Ego Identity," op. cit., p. 38.
19. Simon N. Herman, Israelis and Jews, op. cit., p. 204.
20. Charles S. Liebman, Book Review of Simon N. Herman, Israelis and Jews, op. cit., in The Jerusalem Post, October 10, 1970.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The research was designed to be exploratory. It is an exploration of an area in which research is scant, yet is of great significance to contemporary social science. Modern history and political events have added a new dimension and urgency to efforts at understanding the conditions for international cooperation, world-mindedness and, ultimately, community.

Findings relevant to the two major hypotheses were reported at the end of Chapters IV and VI. They will be briefly summarized here to provide a basis for the conclusions and implications for future research to follow.

The first of two central hypotheses predicted that there would be significant differences between the political orientations of Israeli pre-adults toward the national and international systems. A comparison of orientations along each of six dimensions supports the prediction. Respondents show higher levels of knowledge concerning the national than the international political system, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Comparing six information sources, there are clearly discernable differences in the patterns of utilization for national and international information. While impersonal sources are ranked higher than interpersonal ones for all types of information, there is a significant

difference in the number of children who rank interpersonal sources higher for national than for international information.

Involvement with both systems was measured along four dimensions and, for each, the pattern shows greater and more intense involvement with the national system than with the international system. A four-fold typology constructed on the basis of these findings shows that, while the modal type of orientation toward the national political system is subject-participant, for the international system it was parochial-subject, reflecting this same difference in involvement with the two systems.

Age-related comparisons confirm earlier findings based on Piaget's cognitive-developmental model, showing significant breaks in the patterns of development of political orientations before grade six, between the ages of nine and twelve. These discontinuities in patterns of development were found to be more significant relative to international orientations than national, reflecting the theoretically predicted egocentric-sociocentric development.

The second major hypothesis was directed toward an exploration of the effect of transnational socialization on the development of international political orientations. Comparing kibbutz and religious pre-adults with non-kibbutz and non-religious pre-adults, along the same dimensions used in the first analysis, provides clear evidence that supra-socialization by transnational agents has significant effects. Children socialized by transnational movements are more positively oriented toward the international system than those not exposed to this additional socialization process. The pattern is more clearly evident for those socialized by kibbutz than by religion and the difference is

a result, in part, of the cross-pressures attributable to religion. Thus the thrust toward an internationalist, world-minded orientation exerted through religion--Judaism reflected in religious schools and environment--is inhibited by the tendency of religion to lead to adherence to conservative normative values.

The final chapter confirms these findings with two additional measures, while at the same time highlighting deviant findings noted earlier. It provides further evidence of greater world-mindedness among those socialized by transnational movements, with the differential patterns repeated for the two transnational movements. It emphasizes what had been noted earlier: these latter respondents also show a national identity pattern characterized by functional attitudes rather than symbolic or normative, an identity type reflecting the norms and ideals of democratic-participatory political systems.

Within a framework of political culture and utilizing insights of political systems analysis and social psychology, this study was conceived as one effort to study the comparative development of political orientations toward overlapping political systems. Findings and conclusions from this research are offered as building blocks for a theory of political socialization which will encompass the development of political orientations toward the multiple levels of political life within which each individual functions. It also adds an additional area for potential further research concerning transnationalism and world politics.

Reference was made earlier to the findings reported by LeVine in his studies of pre-literate societies. He concludes that a strong sense of community with open membership and positive values can lead to more relaxed and open relationships between peoples. My findings suggest similar implications.

A second notion deals with definitions and measures of transnationalism. As was indicated earlier, the transnational movements selected for this analysis are based on values central to Judaism. There is, consequently, a built-in bias toward overlapping. The significance of consonance lies in the extent to which two situations give rise to psychological forces moving in the same direction. As Barker points out,¹ types of overlapping situations vary "along a continuum, at the one extreme of which are situations leading to consonant behavior and at the other extreme are situations requiring completely antagonistic behavior. At points between these extremes are situations determining behaviors of varying degrees of compatibility or of interference with one another,"²

A model using an additional transnational movement, for example an international students' association, could further explore the relationship between transnational socialization and political identity. Based on the notion of consonance, it would link the propositions concerning the properties of overlapping situations with those related to the development of political identity. It would predict that transnational socialization will lead to world-minded orientations and functional national identity. Alternatively it would predict that only transnational movements which reflect a high level of confluence of political sub-identities would lead to worldminded orientations and functional national identity. Others could, in accord with findings reported by Heinz, strengthen the sub-identity related to the transnational movement. As a consequence of the individual's interaction within the transnational community, regime efforts to build support for itself could be subverted, ignored or redirected.

If the concept of political identity as a consequence of the integration of political sub-identities can be related to the effect of overlapping socialization processes, its relevance to other areas can also be empirically established. I suggest it is highly relevant to the current interest in ethnic studies and identifications. Transnational socialization was defined as similar to socialization by sub-groups within the system, in both cases the outcome of the socialization process being viewed as a function of the position of the individual in the system.

It may be speculated that, when ethnic studies and related programs for sub-group identification reflect a high level of overlap with the thrust of the American sub-identity—socialized by the national system as a whole—there will be mutual reinforcement, and growth of an integrated political identity. Overlap, defined as pertinence to identical regions of the person's life-space,³ will determine the extent of reciprocal influence. Thus where perceived overlap is greater, both sub-identities will be strengthened. Where overlap is less or at the extreme of requiring antagonistic behavior, it can lead to varying degrees of conflict and interference with one another. The significance of applying this theoretical approach to an analysis of ethnicity or sub-group membership lies in the extent to which sub-group (transnational) socialization and the development of political identity may be related to societal cohesiveness or divisiveness.

Those young people socialized by transnational movements show evidence of functional national identity patterns, reflecting commitment to and participation in the national community. There is no correlation with dogmatism as a measure of rigidity or closed-mindedness, and

individual items indicate that these respondents favor an open and inclusive membership in the community.

It was hypothesized that transnationalism socializes directly to international involvement. The data presented support the hypothesis. It may be further hypothesized that transnationalism also leads to the development of political identity; this serves as a mediating factor leading to national involvement which, in turn, reinforces international involvement.

Such an approach, essentially psycho-political in theoretical orientation, would necessitate precise theoretical and operational definitions of the concept of political identity. Based on the analysis by Barker of the properties of overlapping situations, political sub-identities could be explored in terms of the extent of overlap between them, the degree of consonance between them, the extent of their centrality, their salience in different situations, their valence and relative potency. An understanding of the significance of one sub-identity requires an understanding of its association and relationship with other sub-identities. The world-minded sub-identity must be seen in association with the functional national identity to understand the meaning of the total political identity of the young Israeli.

One setting to explore the relationship between transnational socialization and political identity would be a matched group sample of Israeli and American Jewish children. The latter would be selected from a population exposed to similarly intensive religious backgrounds and/or intensive involvement with the Zionist movement. The model would predict that these children would exhibit more world-minded attitudes than a similar group of American Jewish children not exposed to this

additional socialization, and that they would also exhibit greater functional national identity. Herman hypothesized that there is likely to be a larger measure of perceived overlap between Jewishness and Israeli-ness than there is between Jewishness and Americanness, or between Jewishness and any other ethnic sub-identity with which it may be associated.⁴ Thus an alternative model for the above sample could predict to an outcome showing a higher level of world-mindedness but not accompanied by greater frequency of functional national (American) identity.

The interrelationship between the concept of political identity as it has been developed in this study and the theoretical framework of political culture within which this study was conducted derives from developments in contemporary social science research. Lucian Pye points to the concern with political culture and sees it as a "significant development in contemporary political analysis for it signals an effort to return to the study of the total political system without losing the benefits of individual psychology."⁵ While the concept has been criticized as being not sufficiently dissimilar from the now discredited concept of national character, Pye considers it as a significant contribution to an understanding of political development.⁶

I see it as contributing significantly to an understanding of all political systems. By providing a framework within which micro-analysis and macroanalysis can combine to clarify alternative outcomes of the process of political socialization, it establishes its theoretical significance. The research reported above makes a modest contribution to a theory of political socialization which can be usefully applied to cross-cultural analysis. Its heuristic value lies in empirically demonstrating the relationship between political culture and the outcome.

of the political socialization process. Its focus on transnational movements extends both the concept of political culture and that of political identity.⁷ Its findings are offered as contributions both to theory and public policy.

NOTES

1. Herman adopts the analysis of Barker to his own framework of a Lewinian field theory. He suggests that the relationship of two sub-identities can best be analyzed by viewing the person as being influenced simultaneously by two or more psychological situations. In the context of transnational socialization this would place young people in positions of overlapping situations when the transnational movement and the national identity overlap, and exhibit a significant degree of consonance. For the discussion of overlapping situations, see R. G. Barker, et al., "Adjustment to Physical Handicap and Illness: A Survey of the Social Psychology of Physique and Disability," Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 55 (1953), pp. 37-46.
2. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
3. The concept of "life space" is based on Lewin's conceptualization of the environment determining an individual's behavior. "Life space" means the totality of facts determining the psychological environment of the individual, as it exists for him. It is composed of regions surrounded by boundaries. For a fuller and more systematic discussion of Lewin's concepts, see M. Deutsch, "Field Theory in Social Psychology," in Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by G. Lindzey, pp. 181-222.
4. Simon N. Herman, Israelis and Jews, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
5. Lucian W. Pye, Political Culture and Political Development, ed. by Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 9.
6. In answering the critics, Pye stresses the difference between national character and political culture: "In the past the concept of national character, in becoming a residual category used to 'explain' all the differences that could not otherwise be accounted for by objective analysis, tended to be biased toward emphasizing the importance of the unconscious to the point of discounting almost entirely the place of reason in human affairs," ibid., p. 10.
7. By analyzing the effect of transnational socialization in terms of the position of the individual it can be seen as analytically comparable to the subculture concept within the national system.
8. I choose to align myself with the tradition of political analysis in which I had my earliest training, and which provides Pye's rationale for his significant and original study of Burma:

". . . any political analysis, whether it be an adventure in political theory or a recommendation for public policy, must inevitably rest upon some set of assumptions and theories about human psychology on the one hand and a body of sociological knowledge and a philosophy of history on the other. For the political analyst, whether given to a contemplative, reflective approach or bent upon action and manipulation, must always deal with the interactions of individual choices and historical trends—with the relationships between the individual and the groups, the statesman and the state, the lawmaker and the law. Any particular analysis may be based upon more or less sophisticated theories about the nature of either the individual or the collectivity, but the growth of our knowledge in political (or any social) science depends upon a constant striving to incorporate more profound understanding of both levels of human life."

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APPENDIX A

WRITTEN INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

הוראות

אין זה מבחן. אין חשובות נכונות או בלתי נכונות. רק אנשי המחקר יעברו על החשובות.

לפניך שאלה לדוגמא: סמן X ליד החשובה המחאימה לך ביותר.

דוגמא

האם היית אומר שאחה אוכל גלידה -

לעיתים קרובות _____

לפעמים _____

אף פעם לא _____

1. מקום הלידה _____ שנת העליה לארץ _____

2. _____ בן _____ בח

3. באיזו כיחה אחת? סמן בעיגול - ד' ה' ר' ז' ח' ט' י' יא' יב'

4. מקצוע האב _____

5. מקצוע האם _____

6. מקום הולדת האב _____

7. מקום הולדת האם _____

מסכים בהחלט	מסכים	אינני יודע	אינני מסכים	מסכים בהחלט
8. הודי אינם מביעים כל דעה על מדיניות ממשלת ישראל.				

מסכים בהחלט	מסכים	איני מסכים	איני מסכים	מסכים בהחלט
				9. כאשר אנחנו נהיה מבוגרים - לא חזיה לנו כל השפעה על מדיניות הממשלה.
				10. ההשקפות הפוליטיות והפעילויות של אנשים צעירים הן מאד חשובות.
				11. לפעמים פוליטיקה וענייני ממשלה נראים כה מסובכים, שאדם כמוני אינו יכול להבין מה בעצם קורה.
				12. מכיון שהרבה מאד אנשים מצביעים בבחירות לכנסת, אין זה משנה הרבה אם אני אצביע או לא, כאשר אהיה מבוגר.

13. אנו מקבלים אינפורמציה, ידע ורעיונות מקורות רבים. כמה מהם מפורטים להלן.
- סמן את הסיפורה - 1 - ליד המקור ממנו אתה מקבל את רוב האינפורמציה, ידע ורעיונות על כל הדברים הפוליטיים המתרחשים בישראל.
- סמן אח הסיפורה - 2 - ליד המקור השני בחשיבותו ממנו אתה מקבל אינפורמציה, ידע ורעיונות על כל הדברים הפוליטיים המתרחשים בישראל.
- סמן את הסיפורה - 3 - ליד המקור השלישי בחשיבותו ממנו אתה מקבל אינפורמציה, ידע ורעיונות על כל הדברים הפוליטיים המתרחשים בישראל.

חברים _____

הורים _____

טלביזיה _____

רדיו _____

מורים ובית הספר _____

עיתונים ושבועונים _____

מסכים	מסכים	מסכים	מסכים	מסכים
מסכים	מסכים	מסכים	מסכים	מסכים
				14. מנהיגים בעלי שם בינלאומי בארצות אחרות אינם מקוישים השומח לב להרגשתו של האדם הפשוט.
				15. מדינות יצאו למלחמה למרות מה שחושבים האנשים, והאנשים לא יכולים לעשות דבר בקשר לכך.

16. אנחנו מקבלים אינפורמציה ורעיונות ממקורות רבים. כמה מהם מפורטים להלן.

סמן את הסיפורה - 1 - ליד המקור ממנו אתה מקבל את רוב האינפורמציה ורעיונות על כל הדברים הפוליטיים המתרחשים מחוץ לארץ.

סמן את הסיפורה - 2 - ליד המקור השני בחשיבותו ממנו אתה מקבל אינפורמציה ורעיונות על כל הדברים הפוליטיים המתרחשים מחוץ לארץ.

סמן את הסיפורה - 3 - ליד המקור השלישי בחשיבותו ממנו אתה מקבל אינפורמציה ורעיונות על כל הדברים הפוליטיים המתרחשים מחוץ לארץ.

עיונים ושבועונים _____

מלביזיה _____

רדיו _____

חברים _____

מורים ובית הספר _____

הורים _____

מסכים בהחלט	איני מסכים	איני יודע	מסכים	מסכים בהחלט	
					17. השלטונות יכולים לפתוח את דברי הדואר של האנשים או להאזין לשיחות הטלפון שלהם, אם זה יעזור למניעת פשעים.
					18. יש לציית לכל חוקי המדינה גם אם החוק אינו הוגן.
					19. חשוב שיהיו לממשלה סוכנים חשאים ומרגלים כדי לדעת מה באמת מתרחש בארצות אחרות.
					20. טעמם של אנשים צעירים במוסיקה ובלבוש מוטפע ממה שאוהבים אנשים צעירים בארצות אחרות.
					21. אדם יכול להיות אזרח טוב גם אם לא יצביע.

22. מה הדבר החשוב לך ביותר?
 סמן לפי סדר החשיבות כאשר סיפרה - 1 - תהיה הדבר החשוב ביותר.
 סיפרה - 2 - תהיה הדבר השני בחשיבותו. סיפרה - 3 - תהיה הדבר השלישי בחשיבותו וכן הלאה כאשר סיפרה - 6 - תהיה הדבר הכי פחות חשוב.

_____ העיריה (המועצה המקומית)

_____ הכנסת

_____ הנשיא

_____ ראש הממשלה

_____ הממשלה

_____ חבר כנסת

הודאה

יש דברים שמשפיעים עלינו יותר והינם חשובים לנו יותר מאחרים.
לכנין מספר דברים העשויים לקרות. ליד כל אחד מהם שלושה ריבועים.
סמן בבקשה x (אחד בלבד) בריבוע המתאים ביותר להרגשות לגבי הדבר שקרה.

זה לא ישפיע עלי	זה ישפיע עלי מעט	זה ישפיע עלי הרבה	
			23. השוטרים מאימים בשכיחה! - יש חשש לגל פשע.
			24. עקב הפגנות נסגרו מספר מגרשי כדור-רגל.
			25. האהדה לישראל בעולם ירדה מאד! - ארצות מסרבות לקנות ווצרת ישראלית.
			26. מהומות והפגנות בבני-ברק.
			27. הדורים שוב בתים - אין חלוקת דואר.
			28. תצעה אטומית החפוצצה וקוסב הצפוני! - רוסיה וסין מאשימות זו את זו.
			29. מחבלים הפגיוו בחברון.
			30. מלחמה בדרוט אפריקה ורודזיה.
			31. שש מדינות ערביות הועלות יחד כוד לייצר תצעת אטום - איום ככד על ישראל!

זה ישפיע עלי הרבה	זה ישפיע עלי מעט	זה לא ישפיע עלי	
			32. גל שטפונות בחיפה - הרבה הרוגים
			33. משפחות של עולים חדשים ברחוב - בעלי הבתים סלקו אותם החוצה.
			34. ברה"מ קוראת לכל אנשיה במזרח החיכוך לשוב לארצם!
			35. רוסיה מספקת טילים לרודזיה.
			36. 23% מהמשפחות בירושלים הן עניות מאד!
			37. רעידת אדמה ביוון! - הרבה אנשים נחרגו.
			38. טפינה מלאה החמושת התפוצצה באילת - הרבה הרוגים!
			39. גרמניה ורוסיה הכריזו מלחמה!
			40. יכולי אורז דלים באסיה! - סכנה לרעב גדול.
			41. גל שביחות - כחי חרושת גדולים נסגרו - להרבה אנשים אין עבודה!
			42. הופלו משטרים דמוקרטיים באירופה ודיקטטורים נטלו את השלטון לידיהם!

<p>29° ԿՈՅ ԿԻԿ ԳՈՏՈՒՄ ԿՈՅ ԿԻԿ ԳՈՏՈՒՄ - ԿՈՅ</p>			
<p>19° ԿԼԼԼ-ԿԻԿ ԿԼԼԼ ԿԻԿ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ</p>			
<p>09° ԿՈՅ ԿԻԿ ԿՈՅ ԿԻԿ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ -</p>			
<p>69° ԿԼԼԼ ԿԼԼԼ ԿՈՅ - ԿԻԿ ԿՈՅ</p>			
<p>89° ԿՈՅ ԿԻԿ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ-ԿԼԼԼ</p>			
<p>29° ԿԼԼԼ ԿՈՅ ԿԼԼԼ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿԼԼԼ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ</p>			
<p>99° ԿՈՅ ԿԻԿ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ</p>			
<p>59° ԿՈՅ ԿԻԿ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ</p>			
<p>ԿԼԼԼ ԿՈՅ ԿԼԼԼ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ - ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿԼԼԼ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ</p>			
<p>ԿԼԼԼԼ ԿԼԼԼԼ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ - ԿՈՅ</p>			
	ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ	ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ	ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ ԿՈՅ

12° ՀԱՆՆԻՑՈՒ ԸՄԷՈ՞ ԻՆ՞ ԿՅ ՊՈՑԼԵԼՍ ԲՈՒՆԵՆ - ՆՈ ՍՈՈ			
02° ՇԵՆ ԿՅ ՆՈՒՆԿԻ ՈՒ ՀԱՆՆԵՆ ԳՂՂՍ ՆՈՒՈ - ՆՆՈ ՈՈ ՈՒՆԵՆ ԶԵՆԵՆ ԵԼԿԵՆ ՆՈՒ			
69° ՈՂՂՈՒ ԸՆՆՈ ՆՂԵՆՈՒ ԼԼԼԼԵՆ՞			
89° ՍՈՈ ՀԿԿ ԳՈՈ՞ ՍՈՒՂԵՆ ՈՂՂՈՒ ԸՄԷՆՈՒ՜ - ՆՈ			
29° ՈՒՆԵՆ ԼՈՂԵՆ ԸՄԷՆՈՒ՞			
99° ՆՈՒՆԿՆ՞ ՆՈՒՆ ԶՈՒՆԻ ՀՈՒՆ ԵՆՆԵՆ ՍՈՒՆ ՀՈՒՆԿ ԸՆՆՈՒ ՆՆՈ ՈՂՂԻ -			
99° ԼԼ ՆՈ ԼԼ՞ ՍՂԵՆ՞ - ԼԼՈՒ ԼՈՒ ՈՂՂՈՒ ԳՂՂ ՆՈՒՂՈՒ ՍՂԵՆՆԵՆ ԸՆՆՈ			
64° ՀԱՆՆՈՒ՜ ԼԼՈՒՂԵՆ ԸՆՆԻ ՆՈ ՍՂԵՆԻ ՍԵՂԻ ՈՂՂՈՒ ԼՈՒՂԵՆ ԸՆՆԵՆ			
99° ՈՂՂ ՀԼԵ ԿԼԿ՞ ՆՈՒ ՀԼԵ ԼԿՈՒ ԸՄԷՆ՞ -			
	ՆՈՒ ՆՈՒ ՀՂ	ՈՂՂ ՆՈՒ ՆՈՒ	ՈՂՂ ՆՈՒ ՆՈՒ

ՈՂՂ ՆՈՒՂՈՒ (ՆՈՒ ԸՆՆ) ԸՆՆՈՒ ԸՆՆՈՒ ՀԱՆՆԵՆ ՀԱՆՆՈՒ՞
 ՀԱՆՆՈՒ ՆՈՒՂՈՒ ՆՈՒՂՈՒ ՀԱՆՆՈՒ՞ ՀԱՆՆՈՒ ՆՈՒ ՆՈՒ ՆՈՒՂՈՒ ԸՆՆՈՒ՞

ՍԼԵՆՆԵ

אהיה עצוב מאד	אהיה עצוב מעט	לא אהיה עצוב	
			72. הדורים שובחים - אין חלוקת דואר.
			73. עקב הפגנות נסגרו מספר מגרשי כדור-רגל.
			74. מחגלים הפגיוו בחבורון.
			75. רוסיה מספקת טילים לרודזיה.
			76. משפחות של עולים חדשים ברחוב! - ועלי הבחים סלקו אותם החוצה.
			77. ברה"מ קוראו לכל אנשיה נמזרח התיכון לשוב לארצם!
			78. רעידת אדמה גיון! - הרגה אנשים נהרגו.
			79. 23% מהמשפחות בירושלים הן עניות מאד.
			80. גרמניה ורוסיה הכריזו מלחמה!
			81. כפינה מלאה חמושת התפוצצה באילח - הרגה הרובים!
			82. גל שביחור - בחי ודרושת גדולים נסגרו - להרבה אנשים אין עבודה!

הוראה

לפניך מספר מקרים העשויים להתחש. ליד כל אחד מהם שלושה ריבועים.
 איך אנו מחאיר לעצמך שתתנהג במקרה כזה? סמן בבקשה x (אחד בלבד)
 בריבוע המתאים לך ביותר.

הייתי עושה הרבה בקשר לכך	הייתי עושה משהו בקשר לכך	לא הייתי עושה דבר בקשר לכך	
			83. הדורים טובחים! - אין חלוקה דואר.
			84. 25% מהמשפחות בירושלים הן עניות מאד!
			85. גרמניה ורוסיה הכריזו מלחמה!
			86. הנפט מזיק לחופי הרחצה ולצפרים!
			87. הטויות מאימים בשביחה - יש חשש לגל פשע.
			88. רוסיה מספקת טילים לרודזיה!
			89. כנופיות צעירים מאימות לעורר מהומות בנתי הספר.
			90. פצצה אטומית התפוצצה בקוטב האפוני! - רוסיה וסין מאשימות זו את זו.
			91. הוגשה הצעת חוק להעלות את גיל המינימום לנישואים ולהחזקת רשיון נהיגה לגיל 25!
			92. יכולי אורז דליף באסיה - סכנה לדעב גדול!

הוראות

לפניך שלווה מקרים העשויים להתרחש. מחתה כל מקרה רשימת ובריס שאחה יכול לעשות בקשר אליו. סמן בבקשה X ליד כל דבר שאחה מתאר לעצמך שהיית עושה. אהה יכול לסמן יותר מדבר אחד.

93. השוטרִים מאימים בשיבחה - יש חשש לגל פגעו

_____ אעל את הדלת ואמנע מלצאת לרחוב.

_____ אכתוב מכתב לעירייה (מועצת העיר).

_____ אעזוב את העיר.

_____ אפגין ליד בניין המשטרה.

_____ אכתוב מכתב לחבר כנטה.

_____ אחזוט על עצומת מחאה.

_____ אכונב מכתבים לעחוננות.

_____ אארגן את חברי לשמור על הסדר ברחובות.

94. הדורים שוכחים - אין חלוקת דואר

_____ אכתוב לעירייה (מועצת העיר).

_____ אעל את הדלת ואמנע מלצאת לרחוב.

_____ אחלק את הדואר בעצמי.

_____ אפגין ליד בניין הדואר.

_____ אכתוב מכתב לעחוננים.

_____ אעזוב את העיר.

_____ אכתוב מכתב לחבר כנסת.

95. מהומות והפגנות בירושלים!

- אכתוב מכתב לחבר כנסת. _____
- אחווים על עצומת מחאה. _____
- אכתוב מכתבים לעתוננים. _____
- אעלה לירושלים לעזור בהפסקת המהומות. _____
- אנעל את הדלת ואמנע מלצאת לרחוב. _____
- אכוונ מכתב ליואש הממשלה. _____

96. אדם המוחה ביקורת על הממשלה בשעת משבר, האם, לדעתך, הוא יכול להיות ישראלי טוב?

כן. _____

לא. _____

97. אדם שאינו קם כשמנגנים את "החקה", האם, לדעתך, הוא יכול להיות ישראלי טוב?

כן. _____

לא. _____

98. האם יש לך דגל ישראל?

כן. _____

לא. _____

99. האם אתה מניף את הדגל ביום חג לאומי (יום העצמאות)?

כן. _____

לא. _____

100. מה דעתך על ישראלי שאינו מחגאה במיוחד בצה"ל?

101. חמד לך שנושא ה-גדנ"ע עולה בשיחה בינך ובין אורח זר והוא לועג ל-גדנ"ע. כיצד היית מגיב?

הייתי נעלב. _____

הייתי רואה בכך חוסר טעם (חוסר טאקט) מגידו. _____

הייתי חושב שהוא רשאי להכניע את דעחו האישית. _____

102. מה הייתה חושב אילו אזרח זר היה מותח ביקורת על היחס כלפי יוצאי
 עדות המזרח בישראל?

_____ הייתי נעלב.

_____ הייתי רואה בכך חוסר טעם (חוסר טאקט) מצידו.

_____ הייתי חושב שהוא רשאי להביע את דעתו האישית.

103. מה היית חושב אילו אזרח זר היה מתקיף בדבריו את הקבוץ?

_____ הייתי נעלב.

_____ הייתי רואה בכך חוסר טעם (חוסר טאקט) מצידו.

_____ הייתי חושב שהוא רשאי להביע את דעתו האישית.

104. מה לדעתך צריך אדם לעשות כדי להיות ישראלי טוב?

105. ישנם אנשים החושבים שאזרח המדינה חייב המיד להסכים להחלטות ממשלתו
 גם אם הוא חושב שאינן צודקות. מה דעתך על כך?

106. נניח שיצא חוק המגדיל את מס ההכנסה ב-50%. האם היית:

_____ משלם ללא טירוב.

_____ מסרב, אם גם רבים אחרים היו מסרבים.

_____ מסרב, מבלי להתחשב במה שעושים האחרים.

107. נניח שיצא חוק המחייב כל אזרח למסור את סביעת אצבעותיו כמסורה.
 האם היית:

_____ מציית ללא טירוב.

_____ מטוב, אם גם רבים אחרים היו מסובים.

_____ מטוב, מבלי להתחשב במה שעושים האחרים.

108. לפניך רשימת דברים שממשלה עשויה לבקש מהאזרחים. קרא כל אחד מהם וסמן x (אחד בלבד) באחד משלושת הרבועים הנראה לך כמתאים ביותר למה שצריכה הממשלה לעשות.

על הממשלה להשאיר את ההחלטה בידי כל אדם.	על הממשלה לעודד את אזרחיה.	על הממשלה לדרוש מאזרחיה.	
			א. לשרת בצבא.
			ב. לשלם מיסים.
			ג. לשלוח את הילדים לבחי-ספר.

109. מהם הדברים המזכירים לך במיוחד שאחה ישראלי?

110. האם ישנם אנשים שאחה מכיר או ששמעת עליהם שאינן חושב שהם ישראלים טובים? פרט.

111. מה לדעתך הדברים החשובים ביותר המבדילים בין ישראל וארצות אחרות?

הוראות

לפניך מספר דעות ודעיונות. ליד כל מהם שישה ריבועים. סמן בבקשה X
(אחד בלבד) בריבוע המחאים ביותר להרגשתך לגבי הנאמר.

הרנה חלמידים באוצות שונות יענו על שאלון זה וחמיד יהיו כאלה שירגישו
בדיוק כמון.

לא מסכים בהחלט	לא מסכים	לא כל-כך מסכים	די מסכים	מסכים	מסכים בהחלט
					112. בעולמנו המסובך, הדרך היחידה לדעת אח הנעשה היא לסמוך על מנהיגים או מומחים שיש להח בהם אימון.
					113. דמי רוחת כי כל פעם שאדם מסרב בעקשנות להודות שהוא אינו צודק.
					114. בעולם ישנם שני סוגי בני- אדם: אלה שהם בעד האמת ואחרים שהם נגדה.
					115. רוב האנשים אינם יודעים מה סוב בשבילם.
					116. מכל הפילוסופיות השונות הקיימות בעולם, קרוב לודאי שרק אחת היא נכונה.
					117. צורת המשטר הנעלה ביותר היא הדמוקרטיה והדמוקרטיה הנכונה ביותר היא ממשלה שבראשה האנשים החכמים ביותר.
					118. הדבר החשוב ביותר בחיים בשביל האדם הוא לעשות משהו חשוב.
					119. הייתי רוצה למצוא אדם שיוכל להגיד לי כיצד לפחוד את בעיותי האישיות.

לא מסכים בהחלט	לא מסכים	לא כל-כך מסכים	די מסכים	מסכים	מסכים בהחלט	
						120. רוב הרעיונות היוצאים לאור כיום אינט שווים את הנייר עליו הם מודפסים.
						121. האדם לכדו הוא ייצור אומלל וחסר אונים.
						122. רק כאשר אדם מקדיש את עצמו לאידיאל או מסרה, חייו נעשים בעלי משמעות.
						123. לרוב האנשים כלל לא אכפת מה קורה לזולת.
						124. הסכם פשרה עם יריב פוליטי, כרוך בסכנה של נגידה ב"צד- שלנו".
						125. לעיווים, רצוי להמחין בהבעת דעה על המתרחש, עד אשר תמצא הזדמנות לשמוע את דעתם של אלו אוהם אנו מעריכים.
						126. לרוב, ההווה מלא אכזבות ורק העתיד הוא החשוב.
						127. לארצות הברית ורוסיה אין זוג במשותף.
						128. לישראל ומצויים אין דבר במשותף.
						129. בויכות, אני מוצא לנכון לחזור על דברי ימה פעמים, כדי להיות בטוח בדברי מובנים היטב.

לא מסכים בהחלט	לא מסכים	לא כל-כך מחכים	די מסכים	מסכים	מסכים בהחלט
					130. למרות שאיני מוכן להודות בכך אפילו לעצמי, יאיפת חיי הסודית היא להיות אישיות דגולה כמו אינשטיין, בטהובן או שקספיר.
					131. אמנם חופש הדיבור לכל האנשים הינו מטרה נעלה, אך לעיתים אין ברירה ויש להגביל את חופש הדיבור של אירגונים פוליטיים מסוימים.
					132. מוטב להיות "גיבור מח" מאשר "פחדן חי".
					133. יש אנשים המדגישים עצמם כאזרחי העולם, שייכים לאנוגות ולא לאומה אחת גלגד. אני לכשעצמי, חוטב שהנני אך ורק ישראלי.

מסכים בהחלט	לא מסכים	לא כל-כך מסכים	די מסכים	מסכים	מסכים בהחלט
					130. למדינתנו יש זכות לאסור כניסתן של קבוצות גזעיות ודתיות מסוימות לארץ.
					131. יש למנוע הגירה (עליה) לארץ באם המהגרים (העולים) יתחרו בעובדים המקומיים על מקומות העבודה.
					132. עלול להיווצר מצב מסוכן באם לכל אדם בעולם תנחנה זכויות שוות אשר תובטחנה על ידי הסכמים בינלאומיים.
					133. כל המחירים למוצרי יצוא צריכים להקבע על ידי ועד מטחרי בינלאומי.
					134. קרוב לוודאי שהמדינה שלנו אינה יותר טובה מאחרות.
					135. הפליה גזעית עשויה להיות דבר טוב בשבילנו כי היא מונעת זרים לא רצויים מלבוא למדינה.
					140. תהיה זאת טעות מצידנו לעודד קבוצות גזעיות מסוימות לרכוש השכלה גבוהה, מכיון שהם עלולים להשתמש בידע הנרכש נגדנו.
					141. עלינו להיות מוכנים להלחם למען המדינה ללא כל קשר אם היא צודקת או לא.
					142. זרים הם דוחים (לא נעימים) במיוחד בגלל האמונות הדתיות שלהם.

לא מסכים בהחלט	לא מסכים	לא כל-כך מסכים	די מסכים	מסכים	מסכים בהחלט	
						145. עדיף שאירגון בינלאומי יפקח על הגירה ולא כל מדינה בפני עצמה.
						146. חשוב שתהיה ממשלה בינלאומית אשר תבטיח רווחה לכל העמים, כלי להחשב בזכריות של כל אחד מהם.
						147. אין זה רצוי שהמדינה שלנו תשתתף בהסכמי סחר בינלאומיים המנסים לשפר את החנאים הכלכליים בעולם על חשבוננו.
						148. טוב יותר להיות אזרח העולם ולא אזרח של מדינה מסוימת.
						149. הרגשת האחריות שלנו כלפי אנשים מגזעים אחרים חייבת להיות זהה להרגשתנו כלפי האנשים מהגזע שלנו.
						150. יש לתת פקוח מלא, על החומר הנלמד בהססוריה ומדעי המדינה בארצות השונות, לועדה בינלאומית לענייני חינוך.
						151. על המדינה שלנו לסרב להשתתף בחכנית פרוק-נשק כללית, גם אם כמה מדינות אחרות מוכנות לכך.
						152. יש סכנה בעריכת הסכמים בינלאומיים בין המדינה שלנו ובין מדינות שהאמונה הדתית שלהן מנוגדת לשלנו.

מסכים בהחלט	מסכים	לא מסכים	די מסכים	לא כל-כך מסכים	לא מסכים	לא מסכים בהחלט
						15. כל אדם בריא, ללא קשר לגזע או דת, רשאי לחיות בכל מקום שירצה בעולם.
						15. על המדינה שלנו לסרב להשתתף בכל אירגון בינלאומי הזר מאחזנו לותר על איזושהי זכות לאומית או חופש פעולה.
						15. אם יש צורך בדבר, עלינו להיות נכונים להוריד את רמת החיים שלנו, במסגרת פעולה משותפת עם ארצות אחרות, במטרה להשיג רמת חיים שיהיה לכל אדם בעולם.
						15. ראשית יש לשאוף לנאמנות למדינה שלנו ורק אחר-כך אנחנו יכולים להרשות לעצמנו לדון באחזה עולמית.
						15. יש להסכים לעובדה שגזעים מסוימים הינם בדרך הטבע פחות אינטליגנטים מהגזע שלנו.
						15. על בתי הספר שלנו ללמד את ההיסטוריה הכלל-עולמית ולא את ההיסטוריה של ארצנו בלבד.
						15. כוח משטרה בינלאומי צריך להיות האירגון היחיד בעולם הרשאי לשאת נשק.
						15. יהיה זה מסוכן עבורנו להגיע להטבת בינלאומי שלכל אדם בעולם יהיה חופש דת מלא.

לא מסכים בהחלט	לא מסכים	לא כל-כך מסכים	די מסכים	מסכים	מסכים בהחלט	
						159. על המדינה שלנו להרשות הגירה ארצה לכל אדם, גם אם יוריד הדבר אח רמה החיים שלנו.
						160. יש לבטל את כל הממשלות הלאומיות ולחליפן בממשלה עולמית מרכזית אחת.
						161. אין זה נכון מצידנו להסכים שתנאי העבודה בכל הארצות יהיו נחונים לפיקוח בינלאומי.
						162. אהבת המולדת צריכה להיות המטרה הראשונית בחינוך, כך שילדינו יאמינו שהמדינה שלנו היא הטובה ביותר בעולם.
						163. יהיה זה רעיון טוב אם יערכו ניסויי הערובת בין כל הגזעים בעולם, עד אשר יוצר גזע אחד בלבד.
						164. עלינו לחנך את ילדינו לחמוך ברווחה עבור כל האנשים באשר הם שם, גם אם יהיה הדבר בניגוד לאינטרסים החשובים ביותר של המדינה שלנו.
						165. אין כל הצדקה למלחמה, גם אם זו הדרך היחידה להגן על הכבוד והזכויות הלאומיות שלנו.

APPENDIX B

ORAL INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. תאריך בית ספר
2. שם
3. תאריך חלידה
4. הכתה
5. האם אתה או משפחתך תכננתם אי פעם להגר מישראל?
6. מקצוע האב..... מקצוע האם.....
7. מספר האחים..... מקצועם.....
8. כמה זמן אתה גר במקום מגוריך?
9. האם עכבת בסלביזיה אחרי טיסת אפולו לירח? אלו היית האסטרונוט הראשון שנחת על כוכב אחר, ואנשי הכוכב היו שואלים אותך על העולם ממנו באת..... מה היית מספר להם?
10. מה היית מספר להם על ארצך?
11. אלו דברים רעים המתרחשים מחוץ לישראל מטרידים אותך?
12. מה אפשר לעשות לתקון דברים אלו?
13. מה הם הדברים הרעים המתרחשים בישראל והמטרידים אותך?
14. מה אפשר לעשות לתקון דברים אלו?
15. ספר לי על ויטנמס.....
 - א. מי נלחם בוֹיטנמס?
 - ב. מתי התחילה המלחמה?
 - ג. מדוע הם נלחמים?
 - ד. חבץ דעתך בנושא זה.
16. האם ידוע לך אזור אחר בעולם הנתון במלחמה-עכשיו או בשנים האחרונות?
17. איך היית מסביר "מה היא מלחמה" לילד צעיר ממך?
18. מה הגורם למלחמה? מדוע פורצות מלחמות?
19. מי באמת מנחל ומכוון את עניני המדינה בישראל? הבע דעתך.
20. האם יש לישראל אויבים? (אם כן) מי הם?
21. מדוע לדעתך _____, _____, _____, הם אויבים לישראל? (אם הזכיר רק מדינות שכנות-האם יוכל להזכיר גם אחרות).
22. אלו קמת בבקר ומצאת שהנך ראש ממשלת ישראל, מה היית עושה?
23. האם תוכל להעלות סבות טובות לפתיחת מלחמה?
24. מה הם הגורמים להפגנות פרועות?
25. האם תוכל למנות המגנות פרועות שארעו בשנים האחרונות בישראל?
26. איך תסביר את המושג "הפגנה פרועה" לילד צעיר ממך?
27. האם מצצות אטום מצויות ברשות כל ארצות תבל?
 - א. מנה את שמות הארצות שבידן מצצות אטום.

- ב.מה מניע מדינה להחזיק בפצצה אטום?
28. האם תוכל להעלות טבות טובות להפגנות והתפרעויות?
29. האם אחת אושט שחלוקי דעות בין קבוצות שונות בישראל(כאלה היכולות להביא להתפרעויות ותגרות), תמשכנה להתקיים במשך תקופת תייך? אם כן-מדוע?
30. האם תוכל להעלות בדעתך תקופה זה לא יהיו עוד הפגנות והתפרעויות?
31. באיזה מקום בעולם היית בוחר לחיות? מדוע?
32. יש אנשים שבמקרים מסוימים מלמדים זכות על מדינות היוצאות למלחמה. יש השומטים לכך חובה כל מלחמה ולעולם אינם מוצאים סיבה מספקת לפתיחת מלחמה...
הבע דעתך בנידון.
33. האם אתה מניח שבשנות תייך יהיה שלום בעולם או שמדינות תלחמנה זו בזו?
(אם הן תלחמנה), איך תטביר זאת?
- (אם תהיה מלחמה רק במזרח התיכון, מה בקשר לאזורים אחרים בעולם)
34. האם תוכל להעלות בדעתך תקופה ללא מלחמות?
35. מדוע יש לישראל צבא, אוירונים, ופצצות?
36. מה היה קורה אלו לישראל היו פצצות אטום וישראל הייתה משתמשת בפצצות אלו?
37. מה זה "אזרח טוב"? מה אומר לך המושג "אזרח טוב"? כיצד הוא ממלא את חובותיו?
38. באיזו מדה חשוב לישראל להיות חברה באו"ם? אם כן מדוע? אם לא מדוע?
39. כיצד לדעתך יראה העולם בעתיד? (כמאה שנה מהיום).
40. יש אנשים החושבים שאם ארצם מעורבת במלחמה עליהם לתמוך בה גם אם אין הצדקה למלחמה. אחרים חושבים שאם אין הצדקה למלחמה הם אינם צריכים לתמוך בה.
מה הרגשתך בנושא זה? מדוע?
41. מה הבעיה הרצינית ביותר של ישראל?(מתן למלחמה).
א. כיצד נוגעת בעיה זו בתייך?
- ב. ספר לי על כל מה שאפשר היה לעשות בנידון. (אם אין מה לעשות)-מדוע אי אפשר לעשות מאומה בנידון?
- ג. (אם מניח דרכים לפתרון) האם תוכל לראות את עצמך מבצע אלו מהפתרונות? איזה מהם?
- ד. מדוע לא תוכל לבצע את הדברים האחרים שהזכרת?
- ה. מה יקרה כשתבצע דברים אלו? האם הם ישפרו את המצב?(אם לא) מדוע לא? אלו מהם ישפרו במעט את המצב?
42. נניח שהיית ראש ממשלת ישראל והיית רוצה להביא מדינה אחרת לעשות את רצונך... מה היית עושה? כיצד היית עושה זאת?
דוגמא: היית רוצה להשיג שמדינה אחרת תעזור לישראל להביא לשלום עם מדינות ערב.
43. כיצד לדעתך תראה ישראל בעתיד? (כמאה שנה מהיום).
44. דרך אגב... מה זה "שלום"? מה משמעותו של ה"שלום" בשבילך?
45. מה הבעיה הרצינית ביותר בעולם?

45. א. כיצד נוגעת בעיה זו בחייך?

ב. ספר לי על כל מה שאפשר היה לעשות בנידון. (אם אין מה לעשות) מדוע אי אפשר לעשות מאומה בנידון? (אם מניח דרכים לפתרון), האם תוכל לראות את עצמך מבצע אלו מהפתרונות? אלו מהם?

ג. מדוע לא תוכל לבצע את הדברים האחרים שהזכרת?

ד. מה יקרה כשתבצע דברים אלו? האם הם ישפרו את המצב? (אם לא) מדוע? אלו מהם ישפרו במעט את המצב?

46. ספר לי על המלחמה במזרח התיכון

א. מי נלחם?

ב. מתי התחילה המלחמה?

ג. מדוע הם נלחמים?

ד. הבע דעתך בנושא זה.

47. האם ישראל נמצאת בסכנה של ממש? (אם כן)

א. כיצד ישפיע הדבר עליך?

ב. ספר על כל מה שאפשר לעשות בנידון. אם אי אפשר לעשות כלום-מדוע?

אם אפשר לעשות משהו בנידון, האם תוכל לתאר את עצמך עושה חלק מדברים אלו? איזה מהם?

ג. מדוע לא תוכל לעשות את הדברים האחרים שהזכרת?

ד. מה היה קורה אלו עשית דברים אלו? האם הם ישפרו את המצב? אם לא-מדוע? אלו מהם ישפרו במעט את המצב?

48. האם יש מדינות הרואות בישראל אויב? איזה? מדוע?

(האם יש מדינות אחרות מחוץ למדינות ערב?)

49. האם יש לישראל ידידים, מי הם?

50. שש כותרות מהעתונים: א. תחנת הכח ברמת אביב-סכנת זהום אויר.

ב. מלחמת אטום פרצה בין רוסיה וסין-הערים הראשיות נהרסו.

ג. אנפליציה מסחררת-מחירי המזון עלו ב-100%.

ד. יפן וסין הכריזו מלחמה.

ה. 22% מהמשפחות בתל אביב רבתי חסרי גג ורעבים ללחם.

ו. הא"ם מודיע-שני שלישי מתושבי העולם סובלים מרעב.

שאלות-(לכל אחת מהשאלות)

א. כיצד ישפיע הדבר עליך?

ב. ספר לי על כל הדברים שיכולים היו להעשות בנידון. אם אי אפשר לעשות כלום-

מדוע? אם אפשר האם תוכל לראות את עצמך מבצע אלו מהדברים שהזכרת? אלו מהם?

ג. מדוע לא תוכל לבצע את הדברים האחרים?

ד. מה היה קורה אלו עשית דברים אלו? האם הם ישפרו את המצב? אם לא - מדוע?
אלו מהדברים ישפרו במעט את המצב?

51. יום אחד נהגה ראש הממשלה את מכוניתה בדרכה לישיבת. כשראתה שהיא מאחרת
הנבירה את מהירות הנסיעה ונסעה מעל המהירות המותרת. המשטרה עצרה את מכוניתה.
(סיים את הספור)

52. מה חן לדעתך התכונות הנדרשות מראש ממשלה טוב?

53. האם הורריך הצביעו בבחירות האחרונות לכנסת?

54. באיזו מפלגה בחרו? שניהם?

55. אלו הייתה לך זכות בחירה מתר, האם היית בוחר?

56. באיזו מפלגה היית בוחר?

57. האם אתה חושב שהורריך היו בוחרים באותה מפלגה?

האם אתה מכיר אחדים מפנהיגי פפא"י או גח"ל?

58. האם הורריך הולכים לבית בכנסת?

59. האם הורריך מסתיכים לאיזה שחוא ארגון או מועדון?

APPENDIX C

NATIONAL IDENTITY SCALE

National Identity Scale

Translated from Hebrew

Symbolic Scale

Questions and Codes	Scores
1. Suppose a person criticizes the government in time of national crisis. In your opinion, could he be a good Israeli?	
Yes	0
No	1
2. Suppose a person doesn't stand when Hatikvah is being played. Do you think he could be a good Israeli?	
Yes	0
No	2
3. Do you own a flag?	
Yes	1
No	0
4. Do you display it on national holidays? (Yom Haatzmaut, for example)	
Yes	1
No	0
5. What would you think of an Israeli who says that he takes no particular pride in the Israel Defense Force? Simple, direct, angry response, i.e., sees army as a symbol of the nation	1
Any other (Responses taken from coding categories developed from statements of respondents)	0
6. Imagine Gadna comes up in a conversation between you and a foreigner and he laughs at it (makes light of it)	
I would feel insulted	1
I would think it showed a lack of taste on his part (tactlessness)	0
I would think he had a right to his opinion	0
7. How would you feel if a foreigner criticized the treatment of Oriental Jews in Israel?	
I would feel insulted	1
I would think it showed a lack of taste on his part (tactlessness)	0
I would think he had a right to his opinion	0

Questions and Codes	Scores
---------------------	--------

- | | |
|---|---|
| 8. How would you feel if a foreigner criticized or attacked the Kibbutz (concept of)? | |
| I would feel insulted | 1 |
| I would think it showed a lack of taste on his part (tactlessness) | 0 |
| I would think he had a right to his opinion | 0 |

Normative Scale

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. What do you think a person ought to do in order to be a good Israeli citizen? | |
| Mentions duty, obedience, law or discipline | 1 |
| Mentions political participation, activity | 1 |
| Mentions army, defense of country | 1 |
| Other | 0 |
| 2. What do you think a person ought to do in order to be a good Israeli citizen? | |
| Mentions support and love of country, loyalty, flag, anthem, progress and achievement | 1 |
| Other | 0 |
| 3. Some people say that a person should go along with whatever his country does, even if he disagrees with it. How do you feel about that? | |
| Agrees with statement in principle | 1 |
| Must agree in time of crisis | 1 |
| May disagree and attempt to change policy, but must go along with decisions made | 1 |
| Other | 0 |
| 4. Suppose a law was passed increasing income taxes by 50 percent, would you | |
| Pay without question | 1 |
| Refuse if others did | 0 |
| Refuse regardless | 0 |
| 5. Suppose a law was passed requiring all citizens to be fingerprinted and to carry identity cards, would you | |
| Obey without question | 1 |
| Refuse if others did | 0 |
| Refuse regardless | 0 |

Questions and Codes	Scores
---------------------	--------

6 - 8 Here is a list of things that a government might ask its citizens to do.	
a. First, go through this list and tell me which things the government should require people to do.	
b. Now go through the list and tell me which of these things you think the government should encourage people to do, but which they have a right to refuse if they prefer.	
c. Finally, go through the list and pick out those things which you think the government should leave completely to the individual.	
6. Serve in the Armed Forces	
Government should require people to	1
Government should encourage people to	0
Government should leave it to the individual	-1
7. Pay taxes	
Government should require people to	1
Government should encourage people to	0
Government should leave it to the individual	-1
8. Send their children to school	
Government should require people to	1
Government should encourage people to	0
Government should leave it to the individual	-1

Functional Scale

1. What are some of the things that particularly remind you that you are an Israeli?	
Mentions Hebrew language, culture, observance of holidays	1
Mentions sense of identity with Jewish people, shared values, historical ties	1
Functional definition, what one does	1
Other	0
2. What do you think a person ought to do in order to be a good Israeli citizen?	
Mentions duty, obedience, law or discipline	1
Mentions political participation, activity	1
Mentions army, defense of country	1
Other	0

Questions and Codes

Scores

Questions and Codes	Scores
3. Are there any people you know or have heard about who you think are not good Israeli citizens?	
Political dissidents, individuals	1
Political parties, i.e., communists, matzpen	1
Citizens who do not serve willingly, or do not fulfil obligations (leave country, particularly in time of trouble)	1
Other	0
4. What do you think of an Israeli who says that he takes no particular pride in the Israel Defense Force?	
Rational-functional: where would we be without the army, explains duties, functions	1
Mentions peace or anti-militarism as justification	1
Other	0
5. What do you think are the most important things that make Israel different from other countries?	
Basic values, shared responsibilities for war and peace	1
Security position, military situation, isolation and military service (obligation)	1
Language	1
Other	0

Coding categories selected from nine categories established on each question.

For complete coding and scoring categories, please contact author.

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Ph.D. Social Studies Education and Political Science,
1973, Northwestern University
M.A. International Relations, 1948, University of Chicago
Ph.B. Liberal Arts, 1945, University of Chicago

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Northwestern University, Politics and Education,
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Instructor, Northwestern University, American Government
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Director, Political Studies Program, Continuing Adult
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Teacher, Experimental Unit on Methods of Social Research,
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Public Lecturer and Leader of Adult Discussion Groups on
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Associate Director, United Nations Association of Chicago.
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COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

Winnetka Caucus Committee, Chairman - Platform Committee,
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COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES (Continued)

Member of School Board, N.S.S. Beth El (1200 students),
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League of Women Voters, President of Local League and
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Public Member of Committees appointed by Supt. S. Marland
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MEMBERSHIPS

American Political Science Association
International Studies Association
International Association for Educators for World Peace
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PUBLICATIONS AND PAPERS

"The Self, the Nation, the World: A Comparative Analysis
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Political System," Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern
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Sequential Curriculum on American Society for Grades
Five to Twelve, Volumes I, II, July, 1970.
Editor, Handbook of Social Research, Lee Anderson, 1969.
"The Suez Crisis: A Case Study," World Law Fund, 1968.

AREAS OF INTEREST AND COMPETENCY

Political Socialization
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American Government
Law and Politics
Politics and Society
Political Education
Politics and Education
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Grant from Spencer Foundation, Northwestern University Program, for interdisciplinary research on "Bilingual Education and the Development of Political Identity." Focus of the research will be Navajo Indians.

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